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INTRODUCTION
The function of the Justices... is to immerse themselves in the tradition of our
society and of kindred societies that have gone before, in history and in the
sediment of history which is law .... The Justices will then be fit to extract
"fundamental presuppositions" from their deepest selves, ... in fact from the
evolving morality of our tradition.
-Alexander Bickel'
Sir Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology2 forever altered the western
world's understanding of the interrelation between past and present. As
revolutionary in its time as Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species,3 Ly-
I ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 236 (1962).
2 1 CHARLES LYELL, PRINCIPLES OF GEOLOGY (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990) (1830).
3 CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION OR
THE PRESERVATION OF FAvORED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE. (D. Appleton & Co.
1923) (1859).
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ell's treatise stretched the Earth's history from biblical millennia into geo-
logic eons.4 Answering those who claimed that geologic formations were
shaped primarily by unusually violent, catastrophic events of the past, Lyell
demonstrated that the present shape of the earth was largely the result of
many powerful forces operating very slowly over time.5 The planet's to-
pography, Lyell explained, was the result of the daily operation of wind,
rain, erosion, and sedimentation, as well as the usually imperceptible
movement of land masses over millions of years.6 To understand the pres-
ent, therefore, one must trace the evolution of the past, including not only its
wrenching, transformative events, but also the slow process of gradual
change.
As it is with geology, so it is with nations. Each is "the result of a long
succession of events," "of many antecedent changes, some extremely re-
mote and others recent, some gradual, others sudden and violent."7 These
events, gradual and sudden, remote and recent, comprise the history that
shapes a nation. Those who want a deeper understanding of what consti-
tutes a nation in the present must therefore study that nation's entire past.
There has been a great deal of talk lately in the circles of constitutional
law and theory about "fidelity" to the Constitution. The question seems to
be whether it is sensible, or even possible, to remain faithful to a constitu-
4 See ALEC R. VIDLER, THE CHURCH IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION 114 (1990) ("mhe
1830s books by Sir Charles Lyell... established the geological succession of rocks and fos-
sils, and showed the world to be much older than the accepted date for the Garden of Eden.');
see also JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 53 (1994) ("When
the process of creating modem history was completed, Biblical time lay in ruins and the
dreams of millenarians came to be seen as grand self-delusions.").
5 See I LYELL, supra note 2, at 79-80.
6 See RICHARD D. ALTICK, VICTORIAN PEOPLE AND IDEAS 223 (1973) (describing Ly-
eli's theory on the causes of geological change).
I LYELL, supra note 2, at 1.
S See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW vii-xiii (1997) [hereinafter MATTER OF INTERPRETATION] (describing Scalia's
method of looking for the original meaning of the Constitution); Michael J. Klarman, Antifi-
delity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 383 (1997) (providing a critical analysis of "scholarly strate-
gies that seek intermediary solutions-that is, ameliorating the dead-hand problem while
maintaining fidelity to the Constitution"); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation] (suggesting that "we
rethink our ideas of fidelity and change with what is by now quite an old trope: translation");
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV.
395, 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and Theory] (proposing "a theory to explain how
new readings of the Constitution may maintain fidelity with past understandings of the docu-
ment's meaning and purpose"); Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1247 (1997) (presenting various articles and commentary on fidelity to the Constitu-
tion). See generally Symposium, Originalism, Democracy, and the Constitution, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 237-531 (1996).
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tion written more than 200 years ago and amended only sporadically there-
after.9 This question is not unique to our age. Until the latter half of the
nineteenth century, constitutional theory and practice sought a relative con-
tinuity with the Founders' design. Since that time, however, as the nation
has experienced constant change, a different strain of thought-the idea of a
"living Constitution," one that is interpreted as evolving to keep pace with
current events-has competed with originalism. The question, raised per-
sistently as we move further and further from the time of the Founding, is
whether we realistically can, or should, continue to remain faithful to the
Founders' written Constitution.
The very discussion of fidelity reveals an odd mindset about American
constitutionalism, one that is discontinuous when it comes to constitutional
history. To listen to discussions of fidelity, one cannot help but conjure up
an image of the United States poised at the turn of another century, yet teth-
ered directly to the world of the 1780s. It is a weary fact of constitutional
interpretation and constitutional theory that when lawyers, judges, and legal
academics discuss our historical Constitution, they usually are referring to a
Constitution written in 1787 and amended formally on occasions thereaf-
ter.10 As Larry Kramer recently wrote: "What... scholars all share in
9 See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1703, 1703 (1997) (suggesting that the most important question about fidelity,
"whether the Constitution deserves our fidelity," is often overlooked); Michael C. Dorf, Inte-
grating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85
GEo. L.J. 1765, 1796 (1997) ("The question of why the Constitution, largely written by gen-
erations long dead, should bind us today, is a hotly contested question of political theory.");
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Political Function of OriginalistAmbiguity, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 487, 490-91 (1996) (arguing that it would be "political or intellectual hubris" to ignore
how the Constitution has changed "with the passage of time, the entrenchment of nonorigi-
nalist practice, and the accretion of precedent"); Michael J. Klarman, Fidelity, Indeterminacy,
and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1739, 1752-56 (1997) (con-
tending we neither can, nor should be, faithful to the Constitution); Michael S. Moore, The
Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 263, 263-73 (1996)
(attempting, and failing, to find a satisfactory answer to why "those who preceded us [should]
dictate the ideals by which our generation lives").
10 Originalism is much mooted, and mostly discounted. See discussion infra Part I. Yet,
despite widespread criticism of originalism, much of constitutional scholarship continues to
be of this genre. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 57 (1991)
(referring to original documents to conclude that the Founders intended a dualist democracy);
PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTrrUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CoNsTIToN 9-24 (1982) (re-
ferring exclusively to originalist history when discussing "historical argument"); JACK N.
RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION at xv (1996) (seeking to present a contextually grounded account of the adop-
tion of the Constitution to provide a basis for those seeking to find its original meaning); Ak-
hil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. LJ. 641 (1996) (offering an origi-
nalist framework for understanding the Sixth Amendment); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Fourth
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common,.. . is a belief that when we ask about the role of history in con-
stitutional interpretation we are asking about the Founding....
[C]onstitutional theory can fairly be described as 'Founding obsessed' in its
use of history.""
'
The obsession with original meaning, as Kramer pointed out,12 almost
entirely ignores the intervening 200 years of constitutional history. By the
same token, it is precisely because our historical understanding of the Con-
stitution is so predominantly originalist that when the tension between
founding intentions and present needs becomes too sharp, the very same
lawyers, judges, and academics flee history in favor of the "living Constitu-
tion." Time and again, judges have jettisoned history when founding inten-
tions seemed inconsistent with present needs and understandings. Scholars
have done the same, urging-particularly in times of rapid change or press-
ing need-that we abandon original views and interpret the Constitution to
address the problems of the present day world.1
3
This Article challenges common thinking about the use of history in
constitutional interpretation. 14 It seeks to replace the apparent choice be-
tween anachronistic originalism or non-historical living constitutionalism
with an approach that takes all of our constitutional history into account.
This Article makes a simple claim: history is essential to interpretation of
Amendment] (offering an originalist framework for understanding the Fourth Amendment);
Akhil Reed Amar & Rende B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995) (offering an originalist framework for
understanding the Fifth Amendment); Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Elec-
tion: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1347,
1352-55 (1996) (describing the original motivations for having senators elected by state leg-
islators at the time of the Founding and describing the change to direct election under the 17th
Amendment); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1555-1632 (1995) (dis-
cussing the Founders' understanding of the First Amendment and the implications of that un-
derstanding for the Fourteenth Amendment that was framed by the Reconstructionist Con-
gress as well as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast:
Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 500, 505 (1997) (discussing the debates surrounding the passage of the 17th Amendment
and the consequences thereof).
"1 Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-And Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1627, 1628
(1997). Professor Kramer's excellent essay shares much in common with the concerns that
this Article expresses about the anachronistic nature of originalism.
12 See id. at 1628, 1638-39 (stating the importance of studying more than just the Found-
ing, which is contrary to the practice of many constitutional scholars).
1 See infra Part I for a historiography of these developments.
14 Writing in this area, scholars often refer without sharp delineation to "history," "tradi-
tion," "custom," "convention," and the like, even though all of these terms could be under-
stood more specifically. See Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction to THE INVENTION OF TRADMON,
1, 1-5 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1995) (drawing distinctions between these
terms). In this Article, the term "history" is intended to be all encompassing.
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the Constitution, but the relevant history is not just that of the Founding, it
is that of all American constitutional history.' 5 Only by taking all of that
history into account is it possible to arrive at an understanding of today's
constitutional commitments.
This claim about historical interpretation of the Constitution rests on a
very different notion of fidelity, one of fidelity to the Constitution itself,
rather than to its Framers. The United States Constitution is not the Con-
stitution of 1787. It is always new, and yet always old, endlessly worked
and reworked since the time of the Founding.16 The Founders' Constitution
has been layered over constantly with popular understandings-some con-
sistent with Founding-era notions and some that deviate in substantial ways.
Some of these practices are inscribed in text; many are not. They are found,
rather, in the decisions of the Supreme Court, in statutory law, in the actions
of our governmental bodies, in the works of our forebearers, and the com-
mon practices of our people-in all of the sources that reveal the deeper
commitments that we share. As time has passed, these decisions, these
laws, these practices, these commitments have all turned to rock beneath us,
hardened by the passage of time. This sedimentary rock on which we stand
is our Constitution.
Although few might quibble with this description of constitutional
evolution, common reliance on history to interpret the Constitution is seri-
ously inconsistent with it. Time and again, we mine the events of 1787 as
though they are determinative. At the same time, we pay (or profess to pay)
little, if any, attention to the intervening 200 years of constitutional history.
We look regularly for answers at the base of our mountain, when they are
there in the soil and silt at our feet. Our understanding of the Constitution is
anachronistic, cheating the trials and successes of our many constitutional
ancestors. It is only because of this (mis)understanding that we can even
ask the question of fidelity.
True fidelity to the Constitution requires that we be faithful to what
history reveals as this generation's deepest, most enduring commitments,
is See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1050
(1981) ("In making [constitutional] decisions ... the past to which we turn is the sum of our
history, not merely the choices made by those who drafted and ratified the Constitution."); see
also id. at 1071 ("The relevant past for purposes of constitutional law.., is to be found not
only in the intentions of those who drafted and ratified the document but in the entirety of our
histo07."1).
See STEPHEN HOLMEs, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT 161 (1995) ("The process of
framing a constitution,. . . continues long after a constituent assembly has been dissolved.
Indeed, it never stops.... Freed from the enormous task of launching and legitimating a new
regime in a time of troubles, latecomers can devote themselves to achieving particular politi-
cal goals.").
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not just those of the founding generation. To be sure, there often may be no
sharp separation between the two. It is the very nature of history that the
Founders' commitments have been passed along to us through the genera-
tions. It is also true, however, that those commitments have been slowly,
but perceptibly, altered in some critical ways. If fidelity is our goal, then it
is to all of our constitutional history-and not just the Founding-that we
must be faithful. The role of the constitutional interpreter is to reconcile our
deepest constitutional commitments, revealed by all of our constitutional
history, with today's preferences.
Similarly, for the very reason that constitutional values are both passed
from generation to generation and gradually altered as they are passed, the
true nature of our constitutional commitments will be found far closer to the
surface of our constitutional history than might be imagined. Each genera-
tion's constitutionalism is an act of both fidelity and creation. The Consti-
tution that is passed on by each generation is the product of both that gen-
eration's fidelity to past commitments and its application of those
commitments to new problems. Because deeply held constitutional com-
mitments are passed from generation to generation (albeit slowly altered
while they are passed), today's constitutional interpreter is, in most cases,
not going to have to mine far below the surface to identify enduring com-
mitments. It is only in unsettled times, times of rapid change, or when our
commitments have become uncertain, that we may have to return to earlier
eras to find our way.
This Article offers an interpretive methodology to resolve the tension
between originalism and living constitutionalism. It argues for grounding
constitutional interpretation in all of our constitutional history, rather than in
the history of the Founding alone. Part I is a historiography of the use of
history in constitutional interpretation, exploring the shifting of views be-
tween originalism and living constitutionalism. When constitutional inter-
.preters turn to history, they often turn to originalist history, seeking answers
to constitutional questions in the Founders' intentions. As time has passed
since the Founding, however, it has become more difficult to bring Found-
ing-era solutions to bear on modem problems. Thus, at other times, inter-
preters eschew history altogether, focusing instead on the "living Constitu-
tion." Part I also explains that when lawyers, judges, and legal academics
turn to originalist history, scholars of history regularly rise up to criticize the
law's use of history as "law office history" or history by "judicial fiat."
This Part concludes by observing how, in recent times, the twin problems of
fidelity and history have become acute. While the Supreme Court continues
to resolve very modem constitutional problems with justifications purport-
edly drawn from increasingly remote and distant founding moments, con-
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stitutional scholars advance theories of interpretation that-although ex-
tremely clever-can hardly be called faithful to the Constitution or good
historical practice.
Part II then presents a methodology of constitutional interpretation that
is both better history and more faithful constitutionalism. Two ideas about
the relationship between history and constitutionalism are fundamental to
this Part. The first is that when interpreting the Constitution we must, and
necessarily do, take all of our history into account, not just the history of the
Founding era. The second is an understanding that because all of our accu-
mulated history is immanent in us, our constitutional commitments may be
found in more recent, rather than more ancient, history.
Although the methodology of constitutional interpretation suggested
here is quite simple, the process of interpretation it demands is fraught with
difficult questions. No method of constitutional interpretation will yield
easy or certain answers; it is proper for us to be wary of any theory that pur-
ports to suggest otherwise. What is important in choosing any constitutional
interpretive methodology is not whether it provides easy answers, but
whether it focuses our attention on the correct, hard questions. Part III takes
up some of the difficult questions posed by the idea of sedimentary inter-
pretation.
Part III.A addresses the problem of "reconciliation." The task of sepa-
rating out present preferences from deeper commitments will not be an easy
one, especially considering that our enduring commitments rest far closer to
the surface of our history than is commonly thought. It is human nature to
seek to reconcile the two in favor of present preferences, and it takes an act
of unusual discernment and will to separate the two.
Part III.B takes up the problem of "contestability." The American peo-
ple are not a monolith, so the history that reveals our deepest commitments
will be told differently by different interpreters. Thus, the commitments re-
vealed by history necessarily will be contested; the societal process of inter-
pretation will not yield certain or unequivocal answers. This difficulty is a
virtue, not a vice, however. Constitutional interpretation is the process by
which we, as a people, identify our generation's understanding of its deepest
commitments. It is from the struggle over a consensual historical narrative
that those commitments emerge.
Finally, Part III.C discusses the problem of "competence." In our legal
culture, judges play an important role in identifying constitutional commit-
ments. This raises the question of judicial competency to ask historically
biased questions about America's constitutional commitments, and how ap-
propriate it is to vest in judges the authority to answer such questions. This
last Part makes the crucial point that, although judicial decisions provide a
[Vol. 147: 1
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focal point for telling the history of our constitutional commitments, this
task does not fall solely, or even finally, on the shoulders ofjudges. Rather,
all of society engages the judges in a dialogue concerning this historical nar-
rative.
I. ORIGINALISM, LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF
FIDELITY
Temporary delusions, prejudices, excitements, and objects have irresistible in-
fluence in mere questions of policy.... The constitution is not to be subject to
such fluctuations. It is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction.
-Joseph Story'7
History is more or less bunk.... We want to live in the present and the only
history that is worth a tinker's damn is the history we make today.
-Henry Ford18
History has played a vital, albeit contentious, role in constitutional in-
terpretation throughout the 200-plus years since the Founding. This Part is
a historiography. It examines, from the Founding-era to the present, how
judges, lawyers, and legal academics have alternated between originalist
understandings and living constitutionalism, depending upon whether the
pressing need was to maintain "fidelity" to the Constitution as written or to
keep the Constitution current with the times.19 Contemporary scholars try to
resolve these twin concerns of history and fidelity, but their theories, while
creative and helpful, fall short of "demonstrating why and how historical
materials are relevant to the present resolution of present constitutional
problems."
20
As "originalism" is used here, it refers to the practice of explicitly re-
turning to Founding-era understandings and intentions to reach conclusions
17 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
426, at 410 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
CAROL GELDERMAN, HENRY FORD: THE WAYWARD CAPITALIST 177 (1981) (quot-
ing an interview by Charles Wheeler with Henry Ford, CHI. TRIB. (May 25, 1916)).
19 See Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1033 (juxtaposing those who believe the "boundaries
of permissible constitutional interpretation" are "set by the intentions of those who drafted and
ratified the [Constitution]" with those who believe they are "subject to continuous adjust-
ment").
20 John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502, 502 (1964); see also Rebecca Brown, Tradition and Insight,
103 YALE L.J. -177, 203 (1993) (noting the absence of "a theory explaining why tradition is
relevant in the first place"); Kramer, supra note 11, at 1630 (arguing that one cannot answer
the problems of originalism "without first articulating a theory about why historical evidence
should matter").
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about what the Constitution means today. 2 1 "Living constitutionalism," by
contrast, is the practice of interpreting the Constitution, usually in a non-
historical way, to meet the needs of the present.22 This is not to say that
21 There are many varieties of originalism. Richard Kay describes four types of origi-
nalists: those who emphasize (1) original text, (2) original intentions, (3) original under-
standings, or (4) original values. See Richard S. Kay, "Originalist" Values and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 335, 336-40 (1996); see also MICHAEL
PERRY, THE CONsTrrUTIoN IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 54 (1994) (using interpre-
tive discretion to distinguish his version of originalism (weak) from judicial minimalism
(strong)); Paul Brest, The Misconcerned Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 204-05 (1980) (distinguishing strict from moderate originalism); Martin S. Fla-
herty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1746 (1996) (distinguishing among
right originalists, left originalists, historicists, and those who privilege original intent); David
Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutic Critique of the Originalism/Nonoriginalism Distinction, 15 N.
KY. L. REV. 479, 484-85 (1988) (distinguishing between strong, moderate, and weak origi-
nalism, using interpretive discretion as the salient characteristic); Cass R. Sunstein, Five The-
ses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311, 312-13 (1996) (describing hard and
soft originalism). From the historical perspective of this Article, these intra-originalist varie-
ties are irrelevant. Every originalist agrees that the history surrounding the Constitution's en-
actment is of exclusive importance; an originalist is an originalist, no matter what his or her
stripe.
Whose understandings govern is another intra-originalist debate. The issue is whether the
intentions of the Framers, ratifiers, or the average Founding-era citizen controls. See, e.g.,
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
144 (1990) (using an amalgamation of ratifier and average citizen understanding); RAKOVE,
supra note 10, at 11-22 (explaining the salient differences between Framers and ratifiers as
interpretive sources); ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts, in MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 3, 23-
25 (arguing for a textualist originalism that focuses on the original meaning as perceived by
the average citizen); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the
Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512 (1988) ("When we talk popularly about the
Framers' intent, we really should be more precise and refer to the Ratifiers' intent ...").
Once again, these distinctions are immaterial for present purposes. Regardless of whose un-
derstandings are relevant, the controlling historical period remains the same.
22 The provenance of the idea of a "living" Constitution is unclear. Oliver Wendell
Holmes's statement from Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914), that "provisions of
the Constitution... are organic, living institutions," is one of the earliest references to this
idea. Id. at 610. But, Edward Corwin provided the most vivid early description in 1925:
The proper point of view from which to approach the task of interpreting the
[C]onstitution is that of regarding it as a living statute, palpitating with the purpose
of the hour, reenacted with every waking breath of the American people, whose
primitive right to determine their institutions is its sole claim to validity as a law and
as a matrix of laws under our system.
EDWARD S. CORWIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 108 (Alpheus Mason & Gerald
Garvey eds., 1964). Howard Lee McBain's was the first book-length study of what he called
the "living" body of the law, "borrowed from the life of man." HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE
LIVING CONSTITuTION 3 (1927). Corwin's and McBain's image of a living, breathing Con-
stitution must also be viewed against Christopher Tiedeman's nineteenth-century description
of an "unwritten" Constitution. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 16 (Putnam 1978) (1890). Following Corwin and
McBain, Karl Llewellyn gave depth to the idea by describing our "working" Constitution "as
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originalism cannot account for present-day values or that living constitu-
tionalism is free from historical influences. But, as gross generalizations,
these practices account for much of the 200-year-old debate regarding the
use of history in constitutional interpretation.
A. 1787-1870: Originalism, Civil War, and the Origins of the Living
Constitution
In the beginning was the Constitution; and the Constitution was with the
founding Fathers; and the Constitution was the founding Fathers.
-Charles A. Miller23
From its first term in the late eighteenth century through much of the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court often interpreted the Constitution in
a manner consistent with the original intent of the Founders, a practice that
apparently caused little notice or concern.24 The Court's very early consti-
tutional opinions reflected an intimate knowledge of the Framers' design
because the Justices' own memories bridged the temporal distance between
the Founding and the case at hand.
being in essence not a document, but a living institution built (historically, genetically) in the
first instance around a particular Document." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an In-
stitution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934).
23 CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 181 (1969).
24 See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGrrIMAcY AND HISTORY: SELF GOvERNMENT IN AMERIcAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 32-65 (1992) (describing this practice as "maintenance"); Howard
Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living
Constitution" in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 191, 192
(1997) (claiming that the most notable, early assumption about American constitutionalism
was "that the Constitution was like a fixed statute or an agreed-upon contract in the sense that
it represented a discrete act of lawmaking by discernible lawmakers and thus should be inter-
preted with their intentions in mind").
25 Chief Justice John Marshall provides the best example of such an instinctive originalist
jurist. For Marshall, the Constitution "was the distillation of a history that [he] knew well;
and his opinions on the Court, which contain abundant evidence of his historical interests,
firmly established the validity of history as a principle of adjudication in constitutional law."
MILLER, supra note 23, at 26 n.54; see also Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 123-24 (describing Marshall as a "walking historical
'primary source"'). But see Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective
Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 WIS. L. REv. 301, 302 (suggesting that Marshall
synthesized and manipulated historical precedent to expand the scope of judicial review);
Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 438, 447-48
(describing Marshall's use of argument, not precedent, to demonstrate the workability of the
national government).
Ironically, Marshall also provided the seeds for nonoriginalist interpretation. In McCul-
loch v. Maryland, he wrote,
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Even after the founding generation passed, the Justices continued to
rely upon original intent to maintain the Constitution that the Founders had
26 2created. In Scott v. Sanford,27 the Supreme Court's most incendiary deci-
sion of the century, both the majority opinion and the primary dissenting
opinion claimed an originalist justification for the conclusions which would
divide the Nation. Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Dred Scott major-
ity interpreted the Constitution's meaning as synonymous with the original
intent of its Founders. In his words, "as long as it continues to exist in its
present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same
meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its
Framers." 28 If the Constitution was a white man's document in 1789,29 then
it was still one in 1857.30 Even Justice McClean's dissenting opinion,
[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding ....
... [one] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, [one that must]
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.... It would have been an unwise
attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must
have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.
17 U.S. 159, 200, 203-04, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 415 (1819). Marshall, of course, was speaking
not of all constitutional interpretation, but of the expansive interpretation of Congress's enu-
merated power. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 479, 482-83 (1996). Nonetheless, these words from McCulloch gave living constitu-
tionalism its mantra. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price ofAsking the Wrong Question:
An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1256-57
(1984) (claiming that Justice Marshall's view of a living constitution is widely accepted);
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 710 (1975)
(noting that proponents of living constitutionalism endorse Justice Marshall's view of an en-
during and adaptable Constitution).
See KAHN, supra note 24, at 9-64 (discussing the shift from "Constitution making" to
"constitutional maintenance," once the founding generation passed); Gillman, supra note 24,
at 192 ("From the time of the founding throughout the nineteenth century, there was a consen-
sus in court opinions and legal treatises that judges were obligated to interpret the Constitution
on the basis of... original meaning.").
27 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
28 Id. at 426.
29 See id. at 406-12 (arguing at length that the Constitution did not apply to black Ameri-
See id. at 426 ("No one ... supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling in
relation to this unfortunate race.., should induce the court to give the Constitution a more
liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was
framed and adopted."). Despite the blatantly originalist tone of Taney's opinion, several con-
temporary originalists characterize Dred Scott as the first incarnation of judicial activism.
They must do so in order to distinguish their preference for originalist methodology from its
unsavory results. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998-1002 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that Dred Scott initiated a
pattern of judicial activism which led to the current Court's belief in an evolving Constitu-
tion); BORK, supra note 21, at 28-34 (arguing that Taney distorted the original meaning of the
Constitution to further his view of the politics and morality of slavery); William H. Rehnquist,
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which constructed an exhaustive argument to the contrary, drew primarily
from the intentions of the same Founders.31
Following the turmoil of the Civil War, however, originalism became
more difficult to justify: the temporal distance from the Founding widened,
and the havoc of nationwide conflict emphasized that distance. In the words
of Karl Llewellyn, while the Constitution was young "'intent' contribute[d]
to its stability," but, as the Constitution grew older, "the less the need for
such treatment, and the greater the need for departing from it."'32  In the
wake of the Civil War, some prominent constitutional theorists like Sidney
George Fisher and Christopher Tiedeman began to rebel against originalism
and the destruction it wrought, insisting instead that the Constitution was an
evolving document, whose meaning developed apace with society. In
Fisher's words, "The Constitution has failed to protect us from the calamity
of a bloody and destructive Civil War.... [I]ts defects must be cor-
rected. 33 "No people are ruled by dead men, or by the utterances of dead
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 700-01 (1976) ("The apogee of the
living Constitution doctrine during the nineteenth century was the Supreme Court's decision
in Dred Scott v. Sanford [sic].'); cf Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred
Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 273 (1997) (ar-
guing that Dred Scott can be manipulated to discredit any contemporary constitutional the-
ory).
31 For Justice McClean, slavery was "emphatically a state institution," which the Found-
ers themselves expected would expire in twenty years. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at
536 (McClean, J., dissenting). McClean preferred "the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay,
as a means of construing the Constitution," rather than following the majority's fealty to "a
traffic which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death*" Id. at 537.
32 Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 13; see also MILLER, supra note 23, at 26-27 ("[W]hen
memory could no longer serve to explicate the original understanding of the Constitution and
when ongoing history---the political, economic, and social changes since 1789-pressed in-
creasingly for recognition in constitutional law, the two types of history diverged perma-
nently'"); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 43 (2d
ed. 1996) ("'[The expansion of judicial power was] bound to be magnified by time. With
every passing year, the Constitution receded further into history. This recession made the re-
construction of the intended meaning of the constitutional text more difficult and thus pro-
gressively freed the judges to imbue the Constitution with their own values."); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLuM. L. REV.
1, 45 (1997) (observing that "as the temporal gap between law-making and law-application
widens, the normative consensus that once endorsed the originally understood meaning of a
constitutional provision may weaken or even dissipate completely, and the factual or norma-
tive predicates may be altered").
33 SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 55 (1862). For a more
complete discussion of Fisher's constitutional theory, including his notion of constitutional
change outside of Article V, see KAHN, supra note 24, at 70-73. See also Gillman, supra note
24, at 214 ("The Constitution belongs to the people, and to the people of 1862, not to those of
1787." (quoting FISHER, supra, at 96)).
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men, ' 34 Tiedeman likewise argued. Living constitutionalism thus emerged
from the destruction of the Civil War, as these scholars urged the Court to
"recognize the present will of the people as the living source of law" and,
"in construing the law, to follow, and give effect to, the present intentions
and meaning of the people."
35
Yet, the Supreme Court was not quick to adopt this idea of a living
Constitution. In Hepburn v. Griswold,36 for example, the Court explicitly
rejected the evolutionary constitutional theories of Fisher and Tiedeman,
whose "different views, never before entertained by American statesmen or
jurists," were developed "amid the tumult of the late civil war, and under
the influence of apprehensions for the safety of the Republic. 37 Instead, the
Court adhered to "what was intended.., in the minds of the people who or-
dained" 38 the Constitution.
34 TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at 150; see also KAHN, supra note 24, at 77-84 (showing
the influence of nineteenth-century social evolution upon Tiedeman's scholarship); Gillman,
supra note 24, at 217-18 ("[Tiedeman's] point... [was] to distinguish the written Constitu-
tion from the Constitution that 'embodies the living rules of conduct,' which for him was the
'real constitution."' (quoting TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at 36)).
35 TIEDEMAN, supra note 22, at 154. These sentiments were expressed as an explicit
counterargument to the prevailing constitutional theory of Thomas M. Cooley, who believed
that "[t]he object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the
intent of the people in adopting it. In the case of all written laws, it is the intent of the law-
giver that is to be enforced." THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMrrATIONs WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 55 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1868). Although Paul Kahn has attempted to
portray Cooley's constitutional theory as more evolutionary than originalist, see KAHN, supra
note 24, at 73-77, Howard Gillman argues that Fisher's and Tiedeman's theories were more
accurately a reaction against, rather than consistent with, that of Cooley. See Gillman, supra
note 24, at 214-18.
36 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
37 Id. at 625. Justice Miller responded to the majority's vision of the Constitution by cit-
ing Chief Justice Marshall's notion of a living Constitution from McCulloch v. Maryland. See
id. at 629-31 (Miller, J., dissenting). This was the only time a Justice cited these words in
support of living constitutionalism in the nineteenth century. See Morton J. Horwitz, The
Constitutionality of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 30, 41 & n.48 (1993) (noting with astonishment that the Court only cited Marshall's
statement once during the nineteenth century).
38 Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 622. This practice of reading the document in terms of
its origins initially and paradoxically obscured even the most revolutionary changes to the
Founders' Constitution made by the Reconstruction Amendments. For example, rather than
read those Amendments as fundamentally altering the original plan, the Court in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), failed to find in them "any purpose to destroy
the main features of the [federalist] system," id. at 82, as it was established at the Founding.
Traditional, pre-Civil War deference to the states remained unchanged, notwithstanding the
reconstructed Constitution. "[W]hatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to bring about
this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause was African slavery," id. at 68,
not state sovereignty. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (declaring that
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B. 1870-1938: Originalism and Living Constitutionalism in
Competition
Nonetheless, almost as soon as the Supreme Court rejected living con-
stitutionalism, it began to embrace the practice. A mere year after Hepburn
had dismissed Fisher and Tiedeman as radicals (and following some change
in membership), the Supreme Court reversed Hepburn in the Legal Tender
Cases.39 Just one year after the Civil Rights Cases40 had narrowly construed
Congress's power under the Reconstruction Amendments as consistent with
the "provisions of the original constitution,"'41 the Court itself began the
revolutionary practice of reviewing state legislation under the Constitution's
new Due Process Clause. Thus, in Hurtado v. California,42 the Justices
tumed their backs on originalism to ensure the "progress [and] improve-
ment" of the Constitution "in this quick and active age.'A3 To hold other-
wise "would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness at-
tributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians.
'" 4
Then, in 1905, the Court delivered the decision that epitomized the
era's replacement of originalism with a more timeless approach to constitu-
tional interpretation: Lochner v. New York.45 Today, there is considerable
scholarly debate over whether the Lochner-era Court's methodology in
cases involving economic legislation was consistent or not with Founding-
era intentions.46 But, what is beyond contest is that the opinions actually
the Fourteenth Amendment could "not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color").
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1870). Justice Strong's opinion for the majority drew
strength from Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Cohens v. Bank of Virginia, "'A constitu-
tion is framed for ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality as near as mortality
can approach it .... [I]ts framers must be unwise statesmen indeed, if they have not provided
it... with the means of self-preservation from the perils it is sure to encounter."' Id. at 533
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 120, 174,6 Wheat. 264,387 (1821)).
40 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
41 Id. at 22. As in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases used its
restrictive reading of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to defer to state authority.
Because the Civil Rights Act of 1875 had "nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servi-
tude," id. at 31, Congress had no authority to outlaw public discrimination in the absence of
state law or state action.
42 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
43 Id. at 529.
44Id.
45 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
46 See generally Barry Friedman, The Lesson of Lochner (The History of the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, Part II.B) (Jan. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(detailing and addressing traditional and revisionist perspectives on the Lochner era). Several
contemporary scholars believe that originalist views dominated the Court until the constitu-
tional crisis of 1937, while others argue that the Justices used an evolutionary, living constitu-
tional method during this period. Compare 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 81-104 (origi-
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written by the Justices during this period were, for the most part, devoid of
any serious attention to history or mention of the Founders. In Lochner, for
example, Justice Peckham's majority opinion simply balanced New York's
police power against the private liberty of contract.47 In the Court's judg-
ment, New York exceeded the health-related bounds of its police power
when it limited the working hours of bakers to ten hours a day or sixty hours
a week; ipso facto, New York had deprived the bakers and their employers
of liberty without due process of law. It could be, as some argue, that
originalist principles were so ingrained at this time that the Justices simply
did not feel compelled to talk explicitly about the Constitution's original
meaning.49 Or, it could be that the Justices paid little attention to history in
their economic rights opinions until they got into trouble with a resistant
50public. Whichever the case, the Supreme Court's economic due process
opinions after Lochner are striking for their lack of explicit reliance on con-
stitutional history or Founding-era intentions.51 The same was also true of
Commerce Clause cases in which the issue was "the natural development of
interstate commerce under modem conditions. 52 Though there are rare ex-
nalist views), Gillman, supra note 24, at 224-40 (originalist views), Morton J. Horwitz, Re-
publicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & M. L. REv. 57,
57 (1987-88) (originalist views), and Horwitz, supra note 37, at 51-57 (originalist views),
with KAHN, supra note 24, at 97-113 (living constitutional method), MILLER, supra note 23,
at 30 (living constitutional method), Kelly, supra note 25, at 128 & n.25 (living constitutional
method), and William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Ju-
dicial Reasoning in the Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 560-66 (1974)
(living constitutional method).
4 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
48 See id. at 64.
49 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 199-205 (1993).
50 See MICHAEL KAmMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 255-81 (1986) (discussing the public uproar and the
attendant interest in constitutional history surrounding the Supreme Court's resistance to pro-
gressive economic legislation).
51 Instead, the "reasonableness" of challenged legislation under the circumstances was
the Court's almost exclusive concern. For instance, in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908), Justice Harlan, who dissented in Lochner, relied upon the Fifth Amendment to invali-
date a federal statute protecting railroad unions as "an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract," without any reference to originalist principles. Id. at 175. In Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915), the Court, using almost identical reasoning, struck down a similar state
statute as an unconstitutional exercise of police power under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id. at I 1 (finding Adair to be "controlling upon the present controversy"); see also Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (holding a New York statute that prevented price-cutting
of milk by storekeepers to be constitutional, finding that "the guaranty of due proc-
ess.., demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious"). See
generally Friedman, supra note 46 (discussing the controversy over the use of "reasonable-
ness" to assess the constitutionality of laws).
[Vol. 147: 1
THE SEDIMENTARY CONSTITUTION
ceptions, 53 original intentions and historical discussions are noticeably ab-
sent from the Supreme Court's early twentieth-century decisions.
The paucity of historical discussion in the era's constitutional opinions
changed conspicuously, however, with the onset of the New Deal. In the
midst of the Great Depression, a contest between living constitutionalism
and originalism suddenly erupted in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell.54 The Minnesota statute at issue in Blaisdell was politically significant
because it enabled home owners to postpone the mortgage foreclosures that
were then rampant. In upholding the statute against a Contracts Clause
challenge, Chief Justice Hughes's image of a living Constitution was strik-
ing in its candor:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago,
or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of
that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what
the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended
to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the inter-
pretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time,
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was
to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered
the memorable warning----"We must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding"--"a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
52 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 518 (1922); see also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 275 (1918) (determining the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting the ship-
ment of goods produced by child labor by examining the "natural and reasonable effect" of
the statute). Although the Justices split five to four, neither the majority nor the dissent in
Hammer discussed the original meaning of the Commerce Clause. See also Texas & New
Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1930) (placing em-
phasis on Congress's ability "to take cognizance of actual conditions and to address itself to
practicable measures," rather than to heed original constitutional intentions).
53 One notable exception is Justice Sutherland's opinion in Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which he read the Nineteenth Amendment as originalist evidence that
women's inferiority had reached the "vanishing point." Id. at 553. Justice Holmes, in dissent,
stated it would take "more than the Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there are no
differences between men and women, or that legislation cannot take those differences into
account." Id. at 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54 290 U.S. 398 (1934). With the exception of Justice Brandeis, the Justices in the Blais-
dell majority were recent appointees. Justice Stone was appointed in 1925 by President Coo-
lidge, and Justices Hughes, Roberts, and Cardozo were appointed by President Hoover be-
tween 1930 and 1932. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JusTicEs AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITIcAL
HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 194-208 (1992).
55 290 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819)). Horwitz points out that this was only the fifth time, and the
first since Lochner, that the Supreme Court invoked Marshall's famous phrase to promote the
idea of a living Constitution. See Horwitz, supra note 37, at 56. Chief Justice Hughes in-
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Such blatant anti-originalism provoked strong rebuke from Justice Suther-
land, the most originalist Justice on the Court during this period. According
to Justice Sutherland, "[a] provision of the Constitution, it is hardly neces-
sary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does
not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another
time."56
Despite Blaisdell, the Court's resistance to progressive economic re-
form in the face of national economic calamity eventually drove its majority
back to the old habits of originalism. No longer could the Justices strike
down legislation as unconstitutional without more substantial reasons than
that it was "unreasonable." 57 They had to explain to an ever-angrier public
the reason that the Constitution mandated such a result, and the reason given
was fidelity to original understandings. Thus, in 1936, Justice Butler deliv-
ered the era's first originalist argument for finding economic legislation un-
constitutional in United States v. Butler.5 8 Butler was followed four months
later by Justice Sutherland's even stronger historical defense of the Court's
stand against the New Deal in Carter v. Carter Coal.59 Finding the Bitumi-
cluded the language quoted above after Justice Cardozo agreed to withdraw the following
concurrence:
To hold [the law constitutional] may be inconsistent with things that men said in
1787 when expounding to compatriots the newly written constitution. They did not
see the changes in the relation between states and nation or in the play of social
forces that lay hidden in the womb of time.... It is not in my judgment inconsistent
with what they would say today, nor with what today they would believe, if they
were called upon to interpret "in the light of our whole experience" the constitution
that they framed for the needs of an expanding future.
Id. at 55 (quoting Justice Cardozo's withdrawn concurrence).
56 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448-49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). If, when framed and
adopted, the Contracts Clause prohibited a state from postponing payment of a debt because
of an economic emergency, to Sutherland, "it [was] but to state the obvious to say that it
means the same now." Id. at 449.
57 The reasoning used in the first cases in which the Court struck down pieces of Presi-
dent Roosevelt's New Deal agenda as unconstitutional bear little resemblance to the Blaisdell
dissent. For example, in 1935, the Court, speaking through Justice Roberts, struck down the
Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 as unconstitutional under both the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause without making any reference to original intent
See Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935); see also Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (striking down New York's minimum
wage law as unconstitutional without reference to the original intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (finding
the penal provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 unconstitutional); Panama
Refinery Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935) (striking down the presidential invalidation
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933).
58 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (holding that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 violated
the Tenth Amendment and noting that the Tenth Amendment was intended to make clear that
powers not explicitly granted to Congress were reserved for the states).
59 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936).
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nous Coal Conservation Act unconstitutional, Sutherland employed the un-
derstanding of the Constitutional Convention to limit Congress's plenary
authority over the nation's welfare.6
Originalist resistance to the New Deal was short-lived, however, and
living constitutionalism soon regained the upper hand.61 After Butler and
Carter Coal, President Roosevelt went on the offensive "to save the Con-
stitution from the Court and the Court from itself."62 The entire tenor of the
New Deal's criticism of the judiciary was that the judges' interpretations of
the Constitution were behind the times.63 During the "Court-packing" crisis
of 1937, living constitutionalism regained prominence. In West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish,64 Chief Justice Hughes, echoing the nonhistorical, contextual
themes he had articulated in Blaisdell, acknowledged that "the economic
conditions which ha[d] supervened" since the Great Depression as well as
"recent economic experience" had brought into "strong light" the need to
uphold progressive legislation.65 Responding to Hughes, the Court's con-
servative resistance offered their last, but most vehemently originalist, de-
fense of a timeless, static Constitution that "does not change with the ebb
60 See id. at 292-98 ("[The convention] made no grant of authority to Congress to legis-
late substantively for the general welfare... !).
61 In some clear cases involving the structure of governing institutions, the Court contin-
ued, however, to return to founding principles to solve present controversies. See United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (presidential prerogative); Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (presidential removal power); Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923) (grants-in-aid). For example, in the same term as that in which Lochner
was decided, the Court in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), upheld Con-
gress's powei to tax a state agency on the basis of the Founders' intent. According to Justice
Brewer's opinion for the majority:
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That
which it meant when adopted it means now .... "Any other rule of construction
would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the
popular opinion or passion of the day.
Id. at 448-49 (quoting Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857)).
62 President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Radio Address (March 9, 1937), in GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLrVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 184 (13th ed. 1997).
63 Hence, President Roosevelt, responding to the decision in Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), objected to the Nation being "relegated to the horse-and-
buggy definition of interstate commerce.' President Franklin D. Roosevelt, The 209th Press
Conference, 4 PuB. PAPERS 221 (May 31, 1935), quoted in WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG,
THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOsEvELT 90 (1995). Also, note the constant reference to the Justices as the "Nine Old
Men." DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN (1974) (offering an anec-
dotal history of the Justices of the Supreme Court). See generally Barry Friedman, The New
Deal, and the Separation of Law and Politics (Oct. 2, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors) (explaining that the most frequent criticism of the New Deal Supreme Court was
its failure to keep the Constitution current with the times).
64 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
65 Id. at 390, 399.
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and flow of economic events. 66 The economic needs of the day proved
otherwise, however. After the dissent in West Coast Hotel, originalism and
historical analysis found little expression in the Court's opinions under-
mining the constitutional status of economic rights.
67
The Supreme Court's ambivalent use of originalism between Lochner
and West Coast Hotel prompted the first extended complaint against origi-
nalism as bad, instrumentalist history. Coinciding with the Constitution's
sesquicentennial, and in response to what he saw as the manipulation of
history in cases such as Butler and Carter Coal and the dissents in Blaisdell
and West Coast Hotel, Jacobus tenBroek published a series of five articles
intended to discredit originalism once and for all.68 His was the first com-
prehensive critique of the Court's affinity for originalism in its constitu-
tional decisions. 69 Formulating arguments still in vogue today, tenBroek's
goal was to attack the quality and very possibility of the originalist history
used by the Supreme Court in 150 years of precedent. He did so by arguing
that an original intent was "manifestly indeterminable., 70 Even assuming a
66 Id. at 402 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (holding that leg-
islation prohibiting the shipment of filled milk is presumptively within congressional Com-
merce Clause power and consistent with due process); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that employees in industry have a fundamental right to or-
ganize and select representatives for collective bargaining).
68 See Jacobus tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CAL. L. REV. 287 (1938) [hereinafter ten-
Broek, pt.1]; Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction: Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional and Ratifying
Conventions, 26 CAL. L. REV. 437 (1938) [hereinafter tenBroek pt.2]; Jacobus tenBroek, Use
by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction: The
History of the Times of the Convention, 26 CAL. L. REV. 664 (1938) [hereinafter tenBroek,
pt.3]; Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Consti-
tutional Construction: Contemporary Exposition, 27 CAL. L. REV. 157 (1939) [hereinafter
tenBroek, pt.4]; Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids
in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CAL. L.
REV. 399 (1939) [hereinafter tenBroek, pt.5].
69 For an earlier critique of originalism as an orthodox theory of constitutionalism, see
Llewellyn, supra note 22. Perhaps the award for originalist and living constitutionalist spe-
lunking goes to Eric Segall, who recently unearthed an almost one hundred year old law re-
view article, which included many of the themes of today's originalism debate and argued for
a much more flexible interpretive methodology. See Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End
of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411 (1998). The article Segall discovered
is Parts I and II of Arthur W. Macher, The Elasticity of the Constitution, 14 HARV. L. REV.
200, 200 (1900), and it inquires "to what extent the decision of a question of federal constitu-
tional law may properly be affected by the many changes... which have taken place since the
adoption of our fundamental law." Evidently, the article has been cited only once in a law
review. See Segall, supra, at n.3 ("A Westlaw search performed on March 21, 1998, revealed
only one citation to this article ....").
70 tenBroek, pt.2, supra note 68, at 453.
[Vol. 147: 1
THE SEDIMENTARY CONSTITUTION
single, unambiguous intent could be discovered, he insisted it would be im-
possible to think such an intent could be "communicated from one group of
men to another across the boundaries of different ages and different factual
worlds"71 and unreliable to believe that twentieth-century Justices could, or
would, reach the same constitutional conclusions that eighteenth-century
72intentions would require. All of this led tenBroek ultimately to conclude
that originalism, "with its dogma of organic immutability and its retrogres-
sive aspects, with its misapprehension of the facts of judicial operation and
with its weakness of theory, [is] one of the fundamental doctrinal fallacies
of the Supreme Court of the United States."
73
C. 1954-1973: Embracing Both Living Constitutionalism and Originalism
By the 1950s, the Supreme Court began to embrace both living consti-
tutionalism and originalism as each suited the needs of the times. A fair
amount of the Supreme Court's path-breaking jurisprudence during the
Warren era reflected the idea of a living Constitution free from the con-
straints of the past. For example, Brown v. Board of Education,74 the War-
ren Court's most historic decision, was also its least historical. Although
the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment as it applied to segregation
was at the center of the Brown controversy, Chief Justice Warren declared
that the Founders' original intent on the question was "inconclusive." 75 He
71 tenBroek, pt.3, supra note 68, at 665.
72 See id. at 678.
73 tenBroek, pt.5, supra note 68, at 421. A more popular study of the same criticism was
journalist Irving Brant's 1936 book, Storm over the Constitution, which reportedly spurred
President Roosevelt to seek to "reform" the Supreme Court, rather than amend the Constitu-
tion at the height of the New Deal crisis. See KAMMEN, supra note 50, at 484 n.76 (discuss-
ing journalists' responses to Court decisions and their impact upon President Roosevelt).
74 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75 Id. at 489. After the initial oral argument in Brown, the Court issued an order in June
1953 instructing counsel for both sides to submit briefs and reargue the historical issue:
"What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the state legislatures and con-
ventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, un-
derstood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?" Brown
v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953). Despite the historical arguments provided by the
parties on this issue, Warren relied on other grounds. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE FRAMERs' CoNsTrruroN 311-12 (1988) ("Having lost its historical foun-
dation and having bumbled on the principle of racial equality, the Court played with socio-
logical notions that properly exposed it to an avalanche of criticism."); see also Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-6
(1955) (recounting the Supreme Court's request for supplemental briefing in Brown and its
ultimate failure to address the difficult, yet in many ways central, historical question). None-
theless, the historical question remains contested, perhaps due, in part, to renewed interest in
originalism. For a sampling of this debate, see BORK, supra note 21, at 75-76. See also Mi-
chael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor
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then built Brown's landmark holding exclusively upon the changed circum-
stances surrounding 1950s public education and sociological evidence
showing segregation's detrimental effects on black children.76  In many
cases expanding the rights of criminal defendants, the Court likewise made
little or no reference to history.
77
However, the Warren Court returned to originalism when it suited the
Court's needs, especially in cases likely to arouse public opinion.7 For ex-
ample, the Court relied almost exclusively on eighteenth-century evidence
to erect a constitutional "'wall of separation between church and State.'
79
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the De-
segregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist
Case [or Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457 (1996).
76See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94 & n.ll.
77 For instance, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), used "factual consid-
erations" and "common sense" as grounds for overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), and applying the exclusionary rule to the states. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653, 657.
"[R]eason" and "reflection" similarly provided the Court enough cause to overrule Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and require the states to appoint counsel for indigent defendants
in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). Likewise, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), Justice Brennan used Mapp and Gideon to show how the Court "has not hesitated to
re-examine past decisions" in light of new developments. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 5.
78 Paul Murphy speculated that after Brown, the Court returned to history in part because
of the public castigation it received for resolving such a historically divisive issue as segrega-
tion with the "modem authority" of sociological and psychological texts. Paul L. Murphy,
Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST.
REV. 64, 76 n.53 (1963).
Starting in the 1940s, a new coalition of liberal, reform-minded Justices, led by Justice
Black, interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights. Yet, wholesale incorporation was met by resistance from conservative Justices like
Felix Frankfirter, who fought fire with fire, using history to beat back attempts to expand
constitutional doctrine. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), is the best example of the
historical sparring of this period, with Justice Black supporting his theory of total incorpora-
tion with a 31-page historical appendix and Justice Frankfurter calling Black's version of his-
tory "eccentric," "extraordinarily strange," "improvised," and "idiosyncratic." See also
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 327 (1946) (Frankfirter, J., concurring) (presenting an
extensive historical essay to show that Justice Black's description of bills of attainder for the
majority was, at best, a "gloss of history"). Compare id. at 92-123 (Black, J., dissenting), with
id. at 62, 63, 67, 68 (Frankfirter, J., concurring). For a discussion regarding the historical
support for incorporation, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998) and Akhil Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights Against the States?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 443 (1996), favoring
the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the Bill of Rights to the states on originalist
grounds.
79 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (holding that
state officials may not require the recitation of an official state prayer in public schools). For
a discussion of the historical pedigree of the "wall of separation," see Kelly, supra note 25, at
137-42. The Rehnquist Court only recently has begun to dismantle this wall, and interest-
ingly, it has done so with little or no reference to original intentions or Founding-era history.
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Originalism also played an important part in several other landmark cases of
the Warren era in the areas of criminal rights,80 racial discrimination, 81 and
voting rights8.
The Warren Court's inconsistent, but frequent, resort to originalist his-
tory to expand constitutional rights prompted an outcry from professional
historians who revisited the themes tenBroek had developed years earlier.
Historians leveled three major complaints against the historical methodol-
ogy of the Warren era. First, historians described the Supreme Court's his-
torical methodology as "law-office history," 83 meaning the Justices searched
through the past for any shred of evidence that they could use to support
their arguments. In Alfred Kelly's words: "The object of this process is not
objective truth, historical or otherwise, but advocacy.
' '&4
Even more troubling to academic historians was the Supreme Court's
power to declare history by judicial fiat. Given the extraordinary power of
the Supreme Court's pronouncements, historians recognized that the Jus-
See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding a program to send public school
teachers into parochial schools as not violative of the Establishment Clause); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause permits the
state to prohibit sacramental peyote use by members of a Native American Church).
80 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) (reviewing the historical
development of the guarantee against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
151-54 (1968) (charting the history of trial by jury in criminal cases); id. at 163-71 (Black, J.,
concurring) (discussing the historical development of criminal jury trials); id. at 172-93
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (refuting the majority's assertion that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to make the first eight Amendments apply to the states); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-66 (1966) (explaining the historical justification for the right
against self-incrimination); id. at 506-14 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (surveying the historical lim-
its on the admissibility of confessions); id. at 526-27 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
privilege against self-incrimination historically has been against compelled confessions only).
81 See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286-318 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(amassing historical evidence to show that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 prohibited racial discrimination between private persons).
82 For example, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), prompted Justice Frankfurter to is-
sue what Alfred Kelly called his "historical tour de force," Kelly, supra note 25, at 135, as a
counterpoint to the majority's nonhistorical holding. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 268 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Compare Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (relying upon evidence
from the Founding in an attempt to show that Article I, Section 2 contained the one person,
one vote principle), with id. at 20-49 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (presenting the historical counter-
argumT3ent).
Murphy, supra note 78, at 77 (attributing the phrase, originally, to law professor How-
ard J. Graham). Alfred Kelly defined law-office history as "the selection of data favorable to
the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper
evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered.' Kelly, supra note 25, at 122 n.13.
84 Kelly, supra note 25, at 156.
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tices literally could create American history from the bench.8 5 Thus, the
Supreme Court often acted as the oracle of the Constitution's original
meaning by issuing "a simple declarative statement of a revelatory kind of
what the original intent actually had been ... without any supporting his-
torical inquiry into the question at hand.
' 86
Finally, and perhaps most interesting in light of present-day complaints
regarding the conservative force of history, historians decried the Warren
Court's use of history as an activist tool to break prior precedent while
maintaining the appearance of constitutional continuity. Many of the Jus-
tices' "extended essay[s] in constitutional history," Alfred Kelly observed,
were employed "as an instrument of extreme political activism."87 Origi-
nalist history provided the perfect rationale for such activism. "After all, if
the Fathers proclaimed the truth and the Court merely 'rediscovers' it, who
can gainsay the new revelation?"
88
In response to these criticisms, a unique voice entered the debate to de-
fend the Supreme Court's use of history. In 1969, Charles Miller was the
first to argue that the Court's institutional role actually justified the rhetori-
cal employment of history. In his extensive study of history and constitu-
tionalism, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, Miller saw signifi-
cant differences between the roles of lawyers, historians, and judges.
89
According to Miller, lawyers use history pragmatically to win their cases,
while historians search the past to discover the scholarly truth.90 What
Miller felt his scholarly contemporaries failed to recognize was that history
performs a distinct function in the judicial system. Miller claimed that the
"most satisfying justification of the use of history" 91 is that the Founders
intended it to assist constitutional development, and he defended the Court's
85 See MILLER, supra note 23, at 25 ("When the Supreme Court has the chance to tell us
what American history is, history becomes more than a tool of decision. It affirms or denies
the significance of past events for the activities of the present.").
Kelly, supra note 25, at 123. Charles Miller put matters less delicately when he ob-
served that history, as far as constitutionalism is concerned, is what the Justices of the Su-
preme Court say it is. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 20.
87 Kelly, supra note 25, at 125.
88 Id. at 132. Indeed, this was the position Justice Black took in a 1968 television inter-
view. When asked about certain unpopular constitutional decisions, Justice Black responded,
"the Court didn't do it .... The Constitution did it." Justice Black and The Bill of Rights
(CBS television broadcast, Dec. 3, 1968), quoted in Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Origi-
nal Intentions in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 226,226 (1988); see also American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("To hold a governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce
that we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it....
89 See MILLER, supra note 23, at 192-93.
90 See id. at 192.
91 Id. at 190.
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use of the past to tell a coherent national story.92 Thus, historians' criticism
that the Supreme Court should either "write only accurate history or give up
the practice entirely" was misguided.93 According to Miller, "the world of
the judge in a constitutional case is that of neither advocacy nor scholarship.
It is, in the highest sense of the word, politics."
94
D. 1973-1997: The Court and the Academy at the Extremes-Fidelity,
Antifidelity, and Strained Reconciliation
Charles Miller's words proved prophetic as the Supreme Court entered
the late twentieth century, when the combination of history and politics
transformed both the Supreme Court and constitutional theory. The
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade95 opened the political (and
interpretive) fissure. Strong public sentiments on both sides of the
abortion question highlighted the difficulty with finding a right in the
Constitution that was unsupported by clear text or Founding-era intentions.
Challengers to the Roe decision were quick to make this point.96 Prior to
Roe, the Warren Court had used originalism as a liberal weapon to expand
constitutional rights; after Roe, many conservative theorists turned to
originalism to limit judicial discretion.97  Thus, in Roe's aftermath
92 See id. at 190-91.
93 See id. at 192.
94 Id; see also PERRY, supra note 21, at 204 (concluding that constitutional adjudication
is both law and politics); Bickel, supra note 75, at 5 ("Happily, finding the original under-
standing, like applying the Constitution itself, is, at best, 'not a mechanical exercise but a
function of statecraft' and of historical insight." (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 76 (1938)).
95 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
96 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 927-28 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REv. 159, 180.
97 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 132-36 (1996)
(describing the conservative turn to originalism in the wake of Roe); Neil M. Richards, Clio
and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809,
884 (1997) (explaining that, since the Warren era, conservatives have used originalism to
prove that history is no longer "the activist tool of legal liberalism").
Constitutional textualism also has experienced a revival. See, generally, Frank H. Easter-
brook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Ci. L. REV. 349 (1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Our
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551
(1985); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CmI. L. REv. 1175 (1989);
Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
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originalism became as much a political movement as an interpretive meth-
odology.98
Robert Bork was one of the first legal scholars to yoke originalism to
political conservatism. 99 In time, originalism became the official interpre-
tive methodology of American conservatives, and the Reagan administra-
tion promoted originalism in a public relations campaign to transform the
federal judiciary.100 Cleverly, conservative originalist judges and scholars
thus turned the written Constitution against the idea of constitutional
change.
°10
Conservative reliance on originalism in response to cases like Roe
forced liberal scholars into a position that would prove unfortunate. Aca-
demics like Thomas Grey and Paul Brest questioned why constitutional
rights necessarily must find their bases in Founding-era intentions, or even
in clear text. "Do we have an unwritten Constitution?" Grey asked, and for
him the answer was a vehement "yes."102 But, in the political climate of the
98 See Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF:
CONTEMPORARY CONSTrrUTIONAL ISSUES 9-10 (1996) (discussing Judge Bork's originalism
and observing "that it is no more than a lucky coincidence that the theory produces politically
desirable outcomes"); Brown, supra note 20, at 202 (recognizing that originalism's use of tra-
dition "is but a thinly-veiled effort to cut off all possibility of progressive interpretation of the
past," which uses tradition as a ratchet to turn "constitutional interpretation... backward but
not forward"); Fallon, supra note 9, at 492-93 (arguing that originalism is "a political or rhe-
torical stalking horse for a set of substantive positions with respect to a relatively narrow set
of constitutional issues," ajustification used to "obfuscate substantive discussion of what is at
stake"); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To It), 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1587,
1593 (1997) ("[Olriginalism is more a theory of law than an agenda for research, and as such
its obectives may well diverge from those of historians.").
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 8 (1971) ("Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be pre-
ferred. ... [t]he judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications,
and not construct new rights."). Bork was soon joined by others. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
363-72 (1977); Epstein, supra note 96, at 179-80; Monaghan, supra note 97, at 375;
Rehnuist, supra note 30, at 697-98.
l0o For a retelling of these developments and legal liberals' somewhat ineffective re-
sponse, see KALMAN, supra note 97, at 132-39.
101 See BERGER, supra note 99, at 363-64 ("The sole and exclusive vehicle of change the
Framers provided was the amendment process."); BORK, supra note 21, at 143 ("The Consti-
tution may be changed by amendment pursuant to the procedures set out in article V. It is a
necessary implication... that neither statute nor Constitution should be changed by judges.");
Monaghan, supra note 97, at 375-76 ("mhe supreme court, like other branches of govern-
ment, is constrained by the written constitution."); Rehnquist, supra note 30, at 696-97 ("A
mere change in public opinion since the adoption of the Constitution, unaccompanied by a
constitutional amendment, should not change the meaning of the Constitution.').
102 Grey, supra note 25, at 709, 718; see also Brest, supra note 21, at 225-26, 234-38
(endorsing the application of normative values, even when they cannot be found in the "four
comers of our founding document").
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times, it did not matter whether the arguments of scholars such as Grey and
Brest made logical sense. From a rhetorical perspective, their arguments
that constitutional values need be found neither in explicit text nor origi-
nalist history appeared to give unelected judges free rein with the country's
fundamental charter.
10 3
The debate over originalism revealed a growing tension between inter-
pretive methodology and acceptable results. As Laura Kalman has pointed
out, constitutional judges, lawyers, and scholars all "wanted to have it both
ways": they wanted modem constitutional results justified in originalist
terms.10 4 This became clear in Bork's confirmation hearings for a seat on
the Supreme Court at the end of President Reagan's second term. Bork was
defeated because his views were outside the "mainstream."10 5 His method-
ology, which was wholeheartedly originalist, obviously included a number
of constitutional results that the people did not, or would not, support.
The debate over history's role in constitutional interpretation has inten-
sified in recent years, even as it echoes debates from the past. Historians
such as Laura Kalman and Jack Rakove criticize law's originalism on
103 See Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's Judicial Activism, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 293, 294-95 (1996) (characterizing the Supreme Court as nine, life-tenured
lawyers whose elite outlook trumps the majority's favor for "capital punishment, restrictions
on abortion, prayer in the schools, and the removal of vagrants from public places"); see also
BOR, supra note 21, at 171-76 (critiquing the argument that "the Constitution is not law");
Robert H. Bork, Speech Before the University of San Diego Law School (Nov. 18, 1985), in
THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 43, 45 (The Federalist
Society ed., 1986) (stating that if judges were not subject to some limitations "then there
would be no law other than the will of the judge," and "that any defensible theory of constitu-
tional interpretation must demonstrate that it has the capacity to control judges"); Edwin
Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTTUoN: THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13, 18 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (vilifying those academics who
"suggest [] that constitutional interpretation appropriately be guided by such standards as
whether a public policy 'personifies justice,' or 'comports with the notion of moral evolution,'
or confers 'an identity' upon our society"); Monaghan, supra note 97, at 359-60 (introducing
his critique of Brest and others who seek to "marr[y] ... the Constitution with external con-
cepts of political morality").
104 See KALMAN, supra note 97, at 138 (claiming that legal scholars wanted "to declare it
impossible to determine original intent and they wanted to preserve originalism"); see also
POSNER, supra note 32, at 309 (describing this desire as a "judicial defense mechanism-a
way of shifting responsibility for unpopular decisions to other people, preferably dead people
such as the framers of the Constitution, whose grave provides a convenient place for the buck
to stog',).
Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 97 to 0, Confirms Kennedy to High Court, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 4, 1988, at A18; see also Sarah Fritz & Karen Tumulty, Bork's Battle Tone Viewed As
Pattern for Rest of 1987, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1987, at 1, 7 (calling Bork an "unorthodox
candidate for the Supreme Court").
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grounds similar to those advanced by tenBroek and Kelly.10 6 Meanwhile,
legal academics like Martin Flaherty maintain originalism is still possible, if
only we would write better history. 10 7  Living constitutionalism likewise
retains its champions among those who fear that "the Court's understanding
of the role of law may be growing dangerously out of touch with American
society."108 And, Charles Kelly's defense of "law office history" now finds
advocates in Cass Sunstein'09 and John Phillip Reid, i" 0 who champion the
search for a "useable past,""' "to find, argue, or invent some history
... and use it as authority similar to a judicial precedent, rather than as evi-
dence to explain the past."
' "12
106 See KALMAN, supra note 97, at 132-39 (describing how the Reagan administration
relied on originalism to advance its agenda); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on
the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 87, 89 (1997) (suggesting
how historians 'should' react to the legal community's use of their work for originalist pur-
poses"); Rakove, supra note 98, at 1593 ("Ideally, [historians] should strive to get the story
right for its own sake, let the chips fall where they may."); see also David A.J. Richards, In-
terpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 490, 512 (1985) (arguing that the origi-
nalists ask "the wrong questions in ways that disable the historian from assisting the legal in-
terpreter in understanding the meaning of his legal tradition"). Eric Segall argues that few
new arguments have been made about originalism since 1900 and that we should acknowl-
edge originalism's failures and abandon the debate. See generally Segall, supra note 69.
For arguments on grounds similar to tenBroek's and Kelly's, see Brest, supra note 21, at
218-22 (explaining the difficulty that originalism entails); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Construc-
tivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1211-14
(1987) (summarizing the reasons why originalism is impossible); Sandalow, supra note 15, at
1067 (arguing that the sources of originalism are unreliable guides to founding intentions).
See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 523, 526 (1995) (encouraging interpreters to get the facts straight and to un-
derstand historical questions in context); Flaherty, supra note 21, at 1750 (urging the use of
primary and secondary sources to achieve "evidentiary depth" and "temporal breadth").
108 Horwitz, supra note 37, at 98; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 17 (1972) (arguing that the principles expounded by
the Framers, not their particular understanding of them, were meant to endure); Brest, supra
note 21, at 222-28 (arguing that the aims of constitutionalism are best served by nonoriginalist
adjudication); Brown, supra note 20, at 178 (formulating her view of tradition as an insight to
contextualize specific constitutional issues, not as an authoritative device); Grey, supra note
25, at 704-06 (embracing the Court's role as "expounder of basic national ideals of individual
liberty and fair treatment"); cf RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 229-55 (1995) (re-
fusing to become the judicial "potted plant" required by originalism).
1o9 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 603-04
(1995) (urging constitutional lawyers and judges to "try to identify those features of the con-
stitutional past that are, in their view, especially suited for present constitutional use").
110 John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 203-05 (1993) (de-
scribing what he calls "forensic history," a method of searching for proof or evidence in his-
tory).H
III Sunstein, supra note 109, at 603.
112 Reid, supra note 110, at 217. Reid's point is not that constitutional historians are free
to cast away the canons of sound history. He is far too accomplished a historian to argue
against historical accuracy. His point is that constitutional interpreters are not historians
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What distinguishes today's debate from that of the past, however, are
those contemporary scholars who struggle creatively to reconcile the desire
for originalist fidelity with the pragmatic need for a living Constitution."
3
Even as some critics such as Michael Klarman are ready to abandon histori-
cal fidelity altogether, 114 these scholars search for a way to unite their desire
for fidelity with an equally essential understanding that the Constitution, to
survive, must stay current with the times. The problem is that their solu-
tions, while creative, attempt the unachievable. Their fine work only serves
to demonstrate that it is impossible to maintain true fidelity to the Founding,
and yet ensure the Constitution's applicability to present-day questions.
Playing upon the inherent attraction of originalism, scholars such as Jef-
ferson Powell and Suzanna Sherry have turned to the cause of living con-
stitutionalism. Powell, Sherry, and others, argue that originalism itself was
not the interpretive methodology intended by the Founders, or, that origi-
nalism refutes originalism.1"5 Although their point is well taken, the diffi-
strictly speaking, that centuries of use have legitimated another "species of history" to be used
in constructing constitutional meaning that "does not meet the canons of historians' history."
Id. at 205. For a similar discussion of the circumstances wrought by three decades of histori-
cal debate in the legal academy, see Richards, supra note 106, at 513-16.
113 See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1367
(1997) ("Readings of the Constitution have changed. A theory of fidelity must explain at least
this. It must explain, that is, why readings change, whether such changes are changes of fi-
delity, and more generally, how we could know whether such changes are changes of fidel-
ity."). James Fleming has identified two strategies that the neo-originalists have adopted to
counter what he calls "narrow" originalism's monopolization of fidelity:
Dworkin takes the first: Tum the tables on the narrow originalists. He argues that
commitment to fidelity entails the very approach that they are at pains to insist it for-
bids, and prohibits the very approach that they imperiously maintain it mandates.
The second is taken by Bruce Ackerman and Lawrence Lessig... : Beat the narrow
originalists at their own game. Ackerman [and] Lessig... advance fidelity as syn-
thesis and fidelity as translation as "broad" or "soft" forms of originalism that are
superior, as conceptions of originalism, to narrow originalism.
James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1335, 1336-
37 (1997) (citations omitted). For a discussion of how fidelity enters the neo-originalism of
both Ackerman and Lessig, see Doff, supra note 9, at 1773-87.
114 See generally Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997); Mi-
chael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 145 (1998).
llS See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 885, 885 (1985) (discussing what the Framers thought others should do with the Con-
stitution and distinguishing it from what the Framers actually did in construing the Constitu-
tion); Suzanna Sherry, NaturalLaw in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 171, 171 (1992) (arguing
that to the Framers, the Constitution was "only one source among many"); Suzanna Sherry,
The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1987) (suggesting that
"the founding generation did not intend their new Constitution to be the sole source of para-
mount or higher law, but instead envisioned multiple sources of fundamental law"). Leonard
Levy and Jack Rakove are two more scholars who have joined Sherry and Powell in attacking
the historical validity of originalism. See LEVY, supra note 108, passim (presenting an exten-
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culty with this scholarship is that it tells us what fidelity is not; it does not
describe what fidelity is, or should be.
Bruce Ackerman has developed an elaborate theory which is designed
to achieve both fidelity and acceptable constitutional outcomes for present-
day problems; yet his theory-although insightful and creative-is ulti-
mately too elaborate and nuanced to be helpful. He describes an intricate
process of popular mobilization by which the people have amended, and
may continue to amend, the Constitution in ways judges should respect,
even if that mobilization did not result in textual amendment. 116 Ackerman
believes that the role of judges is to synthesize these "constitutional mo-
ments" to produce constitutional meaning that will check present-day pref-
erences. 11 7 The problem is that even if Ackerman's theory was truly con-
sistent with original intentions-a dubious proposition in and of itself"18 _
history does not move exclusively in the earth-shaking jolts and volcanic
eruptions of Ackerman's constitutional moments. Ackerman restricts
judges to "synthesizing" only those "constitutional moments" of higher
lawmaking," 9 rather than paying attention to the gradual accumulation of
history. 12 As Sir Charles Lyell taught us, however, often the most dramatic
sive, book-length attack on the historical, ideological, and judicial foundations of origi-
nalism); RAKOVE, supra note 10, at xv & n.*, 339-65 (reconstructing the Constitution's
founding to show how the Framers would have wanted constitutional meaning to develop with
the nation's experience); Rakove, supra note 98 (deconstructing the originalist endeavor point
by point). But see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5
CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988) (offering a contrary reading of the historical support for this
argument).
16 See I ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 34-57.
117 Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1519, 1519
(1997).
118 See Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of
Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759, 787-92 (1992)
(reviewing I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)) (stating tht"Ack-
erman's narrative distorts American constitutional history more than does the traditional nar-
rative he deplores"); Eben Moglen, The Incompleat Burkean: Bruce Ackerman's Foundation
for Constitutional History, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 531, 542-43, 547 (1993) (criticizing the
history on which Ackerman bases his conclusions as "too polar-too committed to the con-
ceptual purity of the first great constitutional moment'); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liber-
alism Past, 105 HARv. L. REv. 918, 924 (1992) (reviewing 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10)
(criticizing Ackerman for failing to acknowledge the momentous constitutional changes of
other eras).
119 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 116-19.
120 This element of Ackerman's theory arises out of the need to constrain judges, to tie
them to their preservationist task, while still allowing for constitutional change that does not
take the form of written amendments. His constitutional moments are dramatic enough that
judges (and those who look over judges' shoulders) can readily identify that something im-
portant has changed.
[Vol. 147: 1
THE SEDIMENTARY CONSTITUTION
changes occur very gradually over time.121  The U.S. Constitution has
changed slowly and incrementally in many ways that are not captured at all
by Ackerman's constitutional moments.
122
Of all the recent creative attempts to reconcile fidelity and constitu-
tional change, it is Lawrence Lessig's scholarship that best demonstrates the
difficulty of the venture. Lessig has developed an extremely stylized
method of "translating" founding intentions to modem-day circumstances,
which allows judges to account for changed circumstances while remaining
faithful to a timeless Constitution.123 In his more recent work, Lessig goes
beyond "easy" cases of translation--those that merely require interpretation
in light of changed facts or changed constitutional text' 24-- to focus on
harder cases that he labels "structural translation." 125 Structural translation
involves judges taking into account not only the "foreground" changes of
factual circumstance, but also changes in the "background" assumptions
against which the Constitution is interpreted.
126
The problem with Lessig's theory is that, in order to label a responsive-
ness to background structural changes as "faithful" to the Founding, one
must adopt an impossibly strained understanding of the concept of "fidel-
ity." How is it possible to take seriously the idea of fidelity to original un-
derstandings, when essentially every part of those understandings is con-
stantly up for grabs? Lessig would have judges account not only for
changes in the facts as applied to original understandings, but to changes in
the understandings themselves. By taking account not only of changed
facts, but changed understandings as well, it becomes difficult for Lessig to
maintain seriously that we are remaining faithful at all to the Founding.
127
121 See supra Introduction (discussing Lyell's view that geological formations are the
product of slowly operating forces, rather than catastrophic events).
122 See Klarman, supra note 118, at 764-66 (arguing that Ackerman's theory fails to
acount for more subtle constitutional change); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. C. L. REv. 877, 884 (1996) (tracing "the great revolutions in Ameri-
can constitutionalism [that] have taken place without any authorizing or triggering constitu-
tional amendment').
123 See Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 8, at 401-07, 410-14; Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, supra note 8, at 1189-1214, 1263;.
124 See Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 8, at 404-05 (discussing, for example, the
effect of constitutional amendment).
125 Id. at 406.
126 See id. at 438-43.
127 See Dorf, supra note 9, at 1787 ("The most that Lessig can do is show that some
modem constitutional decisions do not contradict a suitably translated version of the Framers'
intentions. He cannot show, however, that the decisions derive from those intentions.");
Richard A. Epstein, Fidelity Without Translation, I GREEN BAG 2d 21, 24 (1997) (using the
example of the Commerce Clause to argue that Lessig's translation transforms the Clause into
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As the academy struggles to resolve the tension between fidelity and
present needs, Supreme Court decisions emphasize that this tension remains
within us. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 12 the Rehnquist Court unani-
mously recognized the need to employ living constitutionalism to address
modem constitutional problems like euthanasia. Yet, equally often the Su-
preme Court has chosen to dress present-day constitutional results in origi-
nalist garb. In cases like United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton129 and
Printz v. United States,"' the Court employed strictly originalist methods to
solve constitutional problems that are the unmistakable result of late-
twentieth-century concerns.
What is most troubling about decisions like Term Limits and Printz is
that our world has changed significantly since the Founding in ways that not
only ought to have affected the decisions, but likely gave rise to the very
problems before the Court. 31 The term limits movement, for example, was
an "Orwellian grant of power" which "repudiate[s] the attitude of cautious necessity that the
Founders brought to the creation of the national government under the Constitution").
128 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
129 514 U.S. 779 (1995). Term Limits invalidated as unconstitutional Arkansas' state-
imposed term limits on federal legislators. Both the majority and the dissent addressed this
question in exclusively originalist terms. See id. at 800-01 ("[W]e conclude that the Framers
intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for the Members of
Congress, and that the Framers thereby 'divested' States of any power to add qualifications.");
id. at 823-27 & nn.33-41 (collecting numerous originalist sources to prove states cannot alter
the requirements of the Qualifications Clause); id. at 845-926 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using
originalist evidence to show that the Founders meant to reserve to the states the ability to
control their representatives' qualifications).
130 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). In Printz, the majority and the principal dissent focused al-
most entirely upon the Founders' Constitution to decide whether Congress could require state
executive officials to check the backgrounds of gun purchasers, as required under federal law.
See id. at 2370-79; see also id. at 2387-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Absent even a modicum
of textual foundation for its judicially crafted constitutional rule, there should be a presump-
tion that if the Framers had actually intended such a rule, at least one of them would have
mentioned it.").
Nothing better highlights the remote abstraction of today's originalism than Justice
Souter's dissenting opinion, with its reliance on language in one political pamphlet written by
Alexander Hamilton, which Justice Souter concluded had decided this constitutional question
for us long ago:
In deciding these cases, which I have found closer than I had anticipated, it is The
Federalist that finally determines my position. I believe that the most straightfor-
ward reading of No. 27 is authority for the Government's position here, and that this
reading is both supported by No. 44 and consistent with Nos. 36 and 45.
Id. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
131 History, in this way, both determines the timing and shapes the constitutional prob-
lems of the day. The issues involved in Term Limits and Printz would not have arisen in the
1950s and 1960s, when the centralization of government in Washington, D.C., went unques-
tioned. Had the cases arisen then, the results certainly would have been opposite and the
analysis less contentious (if not downright easy). See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Origins
of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1032 (1997) ("Mhe
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bom out of frustration with the perceived lack of accountability and respon-
siveness of a Congress beholden to special interests. The Founders' think-
ing may provide rough guidance, but it can hardly be determinative in a
world dramatically different from 1787-not only in terms of communica-
tions technology, campaign fundraising, and electoral strategy, but even in
constitutional formalities such as the direct election of senators following
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment.132 Yet, these changes since the
Founding find almost no mention in the originalist methodology of the
opinions, although they no doubt influenced the Justices' thinking on the
problem and the outcome of the case.
Like the theories of Ackerman and Lessig, the Rehnquist Court's most
recent decisions expose the impossibility of originalism-the more the
Court struggles to pretend that past intentions actually solve present-day
constitutional problems, the less successful originalism becomes. Today's
strained attempts at reconciliation, while creative, ultimately fail to bridge
the gap between the world of the original, written Constitution and the cu-
mulative changes that have shaped the Constitution as it exists today. If fi-
delity is the goal, and history the guide, a new understanding of constitu-
tional interpretation is necessary to reconcile historical fidelity with
constitutionalism.
II. SEDIMENTARY CONSTITUTIONALISM
[I]n every complex written tradition, any particular "present" is a slice through
a continuously changing diachronic quarry of deposits made by generations of
people with different, often inconsistent and competing values, beliefs and
views of the world.
-Martin Krygier
133
Originalism seeks to keep faith with our Founders, while living consti-
tutionalism seeks to keep pace with the times. There often appears to be an
irreconcilable tension between these two methods of interpretation, a ten-
supposed lessons of the past are not only constantly invoked to justify decisions and policies,
but they also shape the ideologies and perspectives from which these decisions emerge.").
Constitutional values are not bom of the moment; they have a history that must be
understood .... Our circumstances are perceived in part through the lens of earlier
valuations and our aspirations are in part shaped by them. Ultimately... the values
to which constitutional law gives expression are more nearly those of the present
than those of the past.
Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1039.
132 For a similar critique of Term Limits, see Dorf, supra note 9, at 1813. "Moreover, in
ignoring most post-enactment history, the majority squandered an opportunity to strengthen
its argument considerably." Id.
133 Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237, 242 (1986).
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sion that only increases as we move forward in time. 134 Yet, because faith-
ful constitutionalism is innate in us, we manage to resolve the tension daily.
The fidelity we display is not necessarily fidelity to the Founders. Rather, it
is fidelity to the Constitution itself, a document embodying our deepest and
most enduring values, the ones that have been passed from generation to
generation, changing form even as they remain with us.135 Because fidelity
is owed to the Constitution rather than to the Framers, faithful constitutional
interpretation requires that we take all of our constitutional history into ac-
count, rather than defining the Constitution only with reference to the
Founding. In Justice Holmes's words, constitutional decisions "must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said a hundred," or even two hundred, "years ago."'
36
This Part presents a theory of sedimentary interpretation:137 the task is
to show that constitutional interpreters regularly examine our deeper con-
134 Stephen Holmes reminds us that just as we struggle today with the question of fidelity
to the Framers' plan, the Framers themselves worried about the moral propriety of binding
future generations to their Constitution. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Para-
dox o Democracy, in PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 134, 137 (1995).
I5 In the words of Robert Cover, our reading of the Constitution
must stand or fall not... upon the intentions of 1787 or 1866 framers. It constitutes
a judgment about our own political present and future.... The ultimate and only
justification for the constitutional government we have is that it will secure to us and
our posterity the blessings of liberty--not that it was intended by the framers to bind
US.
Robert M. Cover, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26,27.
136 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920).
137 Tom Merrill describes a very similar method of interpretation, which he calls "con-
ventionalism," and which he contrasts with originalism. Conventionalism involves judges
interpreting the Constitution in light of "conventional meaning-the consensus view about the
meaning in the legal community of today." Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 509, 511 (1996). Despite using the phrase "legal community," it is not clear
Merrill means to restrict interpretation only to the views of that narrow community. Merrill
also claims conventionalism is "conservative," but that would only seem to be the case be-
cause it necessarily takes time for new commitments to become embedded in the culture. Ob-
viously, Merrill's theory recognizes that the Constitution will change over time. Thus, he may
be wrong to assert that judges "would always exhibit a bias in favor of the status quo." Id at
513. For example, to the extent that existing legislation is contrary to the commitments of the
people, even fairly recently developed, that legislation will fall. That is what the practice of
judicial review is all about.
Bill Nelson also has advanced a theory of interpretation that bears close affinity to sedi-
mentary interpretation, a theory he calls "neutral judging." William E. Nelson, History and
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1268 (1986).
The best way to appreciate how a neutral judge uses history is to examine how his
use differs from that of an interpretivist. A neutral judge examines not the history of
a constitutional text's adoption, but the history of the concepts in that text, as they
have been understood since its adoption.
[Vol. 147: 1
THE SEDIMENTARY CONSTITUTION
stitutional commitments with regard to all of our constitutional history, par-
ticularly the more recent history, and to explain why they do so. Norma-
tively, the hope is to convince constitutional interpreters to do self-
consciously what is innate but frequently misplaced because of the felt ten-
sion between fidelity to the Founding and the necessities of the time.
138
The roots of sedimentary constitutional interpretation are found at least
as far back as the Dred Scott decision.13 9 Recall that it was around that time
that scholars first suggested abandoning originalism for living constitution-
alism. The place to look, however, is neither to Chief Justice Taney's
strictly originalist understanding in Dred Scott that the Constitution was the
Founders' "white man's document," nor to the post-Civil War scholars who
refused to be ruled by "dead men." Rather, the place to look is to Justice
Curtis's dissenting opinion in Dred Scott. Justice Curtis understood that
true historical constitutionalism meant not only looking to the founding, but
taking into account the "long series of acts of the gravest importance" since
that time, which he felt properly should have been brought to bear upon the
issues before the Court.140  In other words, Justice Curtis would have re-
solved Dred Scott relying not only on Founding-era intentions, but also in
light of subsequent historical developments. As Charles Miller has ob-
served,
Id. at 1268. Although Nelson emphasizes the telling of a historical narrative that relies on all
of constitutional history, he has somewhat more faith in the social consensus that will emerge
from that history regarding the consensus that can be reached as to what history reveals.
A number of others have also employed the concept of sedimentation to describe the
gradual process of legal development. Foremost among them is Steven Winter. See Steven L.
Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441,
1487-91 (1990) (quoting M. MERLEAU-PONTY, IN PRAISE OF PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 108-09 (J. Wild et al. trans., 1963)); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881, 1883-88 (1991) [hereinafter Winter,
Upside/Down View]; see also Krygier, supra note 133, at 256 ("Law... rests upon mountains
of inherited tradition."); Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 8, at 409 n.53 ("'There are
originalists who treat each alteration in our Constitution as hermetically sealed. But are there
not many others prepared to interpret the document in light of its layered history, its sedi-
mentary quality?' (quoting Justice Ginsburg's comments on originalism)).
138 Cf JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 53-54 (1984) (arguing that
once understood, traditions can be recovered or rejected, but "to base recovery on ignorance
and implicit faith, as some previous generations have done, or to base rejection on ignorance
and bigotry, as many in our own generation have done, is not worthy of a free and rational
person").
139 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), discussed supra notes 27-31 and
accomanying text.
Id. at 619 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Taney may have had the better history, but Justice Curtis was the
better historian, for he agreed to follow intent not only as contemporaneous
meaning but also as potential for growth. He saw history as process, not only
as event. He studied the stream and the flow, not merely the source.
A. The Metaphor of the Sedimentary Constitution
The contours of today's Constitution necessarily reflect all of constitu-
tional history. To "see" why this is so, engage in a mental exercise. Picture
the Constitution scattered on a tabletop, the clauses strewn all about. The
Third Amendment is here, the Twenty-First Amendment over there, at the
far edge might sit the congressional bicameralism provisions and the execu-
tive power, and nearby rests the Equal Protection Clause, and so on. Now,
lay atop each clause its history, its interpretive development. Instantly the
picture moves from two dimensions to three; the tabletop becomes a topog-
raphy.142 Some clauses of the Constitution-like the Due Process Clause or
the Fourth Amendment-are mountains of historical development, layered
high with interpretive meaning.143  Other clauses-such as the Third
Amendment or the requirement that the President be thirty-five years old-
are deep valleys, barely touched in the intervening two hundred plus years
since the founding. 144 Between these are plains and hills, such as the Ap-
pointments Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and struggles over the exercise
of the War Power.
145
141 MILLER, supra note 23, at 27-28.
142 Cf Tribe, supra note 97, at 1239 (emphasizing the three-dimensional nature of the
constitutional map).
143 The accumulation of history atop each part of the Constitution is illustrated by exam-
ining the case annotations in the United States Code for each clause. For example, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has two entire volumes of annotations, with
equally lengthy supplements, stretching over 3500 pages. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
in U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV § 1, 8-1098, 1-1083 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998) ("Due Proc-
ess in General"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, in U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV § 1, 8-912,
1-455 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998) ("Due Process as to Specific Subjects"). The annotations
for the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment span over 600 pages. See U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V, in U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. V, 516-902, 732-973 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998). The
Fourth Amendment also has its own volume, with over 2000 pages of annotations. See U.S.
CONST. amend IV, in U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV, 6-1045, 1-1144 (West 1987 & Supp.
1998).
144 Annotations for these clauses are sparse. The Third Amendment has five annotations,
see U.S. CONST. amend. III, in U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. I-I1, 956-57 (West 1987), while the
presidential qualifications clause has only four, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, in U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. Il-Art. VII, 20 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998).
145 These clauses fall somewhere in the middle. The annotations for the Appointments
Clauses cover 18 pages, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, in U.S.C.A. Const. Art. II-Art. VII, 50-
63, 6-11 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998), those for the Eighth Amendment cover over 400 pages,
see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, in U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. VII-XIV, 88-266, 35-260 (West
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Constitutional interpretation necessarily must take into account the
complete sedimentary development of each clause that is our constitutional
history.146  Suppose, for example, that a question should arise as to the
meaning of the Third Amendment. Although peaks may tower around it,
because we have not had cause to consider this question much in our his-
tory, inevitably we find ourselves returning to, and curious about, original
understandings of this particular amendment. 147 Contrast this with an inter-
pretive question regarding the Due Process Clause. This clause has been the
subject of a mountain of previous interpretation; the understandings of the
Founders as to its meaning have been layered over countless times. Would
it not strike most of us as odd, if not impossible, to maintain that fidelity to
the Due Process Clause requires returning to original understandings, ig-
noring all that has intervened?
1 48
1987 & Supp. 1998), and those for the War Power cover barely 14 pages, see U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 8, in U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I, 689-702, 120-21 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998).
146 See Kramer, supra note 11, at 1639 ("[W]hatever answers the original design holds
may be inappropriate today. We need to study subsequent developments, to get a sense of the
inevitable growth, if we want a confident picture of how things are likely to work in our
world.").
147 Of course, it is not insignificant that 200 years have passed without presenting many
questions about the quartering of troops. See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir.
1982) (recognizing the lack of precedent surrounding the Third Amendment in a case chal-
lenging the presence of troops in prison guard residences). The absence of interpretation and
conflict is also history. In Professor Merrill's words:
Suppose there is a vague or ambiguous provision that has no evolved and settled
meaning for today's legal community. In these circumstances, the conventional in-
terpreter would no doubt look to the same type of evidence ... about the meaning to
the legal community that existed at the time of enactment. When there is no settled
contemporary understanding of meaning, in other words, the conventional meaning
is the original meaning.
Merrill, supra note 137, at 512; see also Balkin, supra note 9, at 1718 (characterizing the
Third Amendment as "innocuous" and "of limited relevance").
148 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the
evolutionary nature of due process: "jt]hat tradition is a living thing"). Reflecting on Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Souter recently commented: "Common-law
method tends to pay respect... to detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new
examples and new counterexamples. The 'tradition is a living thing' . . . albeit one that moves
by moderate steps carefully taken." Washington v. Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2284 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also id. at 2262 (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("We begin,
as we do in all due-process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices."); id. at 2267 (detailing the number of rights found to exist in the Due Process
Clause since its Founding); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952) ("IThe concept of
due process of law is not final and fixed.....).
A particularly provocative question arises regarding the application of the sedimentary
methodology to the meaning of the Second Amendment. In recent years there has been a
raging academic and popular debate regarding the right to bear arms. Professor Levinson
highlighted the need for academic attention to the question when he pointed out that typical
advocates of constitutional liberty, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, would just as
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Although it is easy to visualize why today's Constitution is shaped by
all of our history, it is necessary to think more about history itself to realize
that when we search for an understanding of constitutional commitments,
our search ordinarily ought to begin much closer to the top of the sedimen-
tary topography. In particular, it is important to distinguish the "doing" of
history from history itself.149 When we think of history, we often think of
the historian's task, that of describing as accurately as possible the events of
a distant past.150 This is the task urged on us repeatedly by historians, most
recently by Martin Flaherty-to interpret the Constitution, they argue, we
must do a better job of investigating history, working harder to understand
Founding-era commitments.
15'
soon sweep the Second Amendment under the rug. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989). Recent entries to the burgeoning litera-
ture that set out clearly the terms of debate include Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the
Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1 (1996) and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical
Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1994). An advocate of the right to
bear arms might pose the problem thus: If sedimentary interpretation requires taking all of a
clause's constitutional history into account (albeit focusing on the topmost layers), and if 200
years of constitutional history seems to have recognized an interpretation of the Second
Amendment that recognizes a personal right to bear arms, is that accumulated history not an
absolute bar to recent legislative gun control efforts? Without purporting to resolve the ques-
tion, it may be apt to recognize that, as will often be the case, there may be at least two ways
of describing that history. See infra Part III.B (explaining how historical accounts often will
be contested and contestable). For example, it may well be that the right to bear arms has not
so much been accepted as it has not been challenged. It is also possible that changed condi-
tions will alter the terms of the Amendment's original meaning, a methodology of interpreta-
tion accepted even by originalists. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 8, at 1175
("[M]eaning depends on context.., the same text written in two different contexts can mean
quite different things.").
149 Collingwood draws sharply the distinction discussed in the text, although his termi-
nology differs. First, he separates out the object and methodology of history, that is, the col-
lection of facts about the past, from what history is for, that being to obtain human self-
knowledge. R.G. COLLINGIVOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 10 (1946). Later, he distinguishes
learning about the "outside" of an event--the "what happened"--from its inside, or meaning.
See id. at 213-14.
150 See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 261 (discussing the ability to discriminate be-
tween "false and faithful representations of past reality"); KEITH WINDSCHUTILE, THE
KILLING OF HISTORY 177 (1996) ("The job of the historian is not to search for some theory
that will reveal all, nor some teleology that will explain the purpose of things. Rather, it is to
reconstruct the events of the past in their own terms."). The commitment to accuracy is re-
flected in DAVID HACKETr FIscHER, HsTORIm'S FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF
HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970) (providing an elaborate logic of historical analysis).
151 Martin S. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565, 1572-79
(1997). This is not to say the task is simple, or even possible. As in other disciplines, there
has been enormous debate among historians of late about "objectivity," whether there is one
history that can be described with accuracy. But even as historians argue this point, there
seems to be no serious disagreement that the role of the historian is to do the best job possible
of describing this historical past. For a strident argument in favor of objectivity, and a criti-
cism of postmodern theories that would undermine it, see WINDSCHUTrLE, supra note 150, at
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For constitutional purposes, history is not simply something that we do,
but something that we are. 152 Our history is immanent in us, in our present,
just as our present (and all its cumulative history) will be immanent in our
future.1 13 History is something that is passed down from generation to gen-
eration. Each new generation is the accumulation of the history that came
before.' 54 As each generation passes, its history becomes part of the sedi-
ment that is left behind, the silt that forms our terrain, the topographical
constitution atop which we stand. 5
The very reason that we "do" history is to come to an understanding of
precisely what has been passed on to us through the generations. 56 We
173-83. Equally insistent that the search for truth is essential, APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 4,
at 243-47, nonetheless understand that different groups will have different understandings of
the factual events that constitute history. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE
"OBJEcTIvrIY QuEsTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988) is a magis-
terial historiography of the objectivity question. The central conclusion of Novick's work is
that the ideal of objectivity is itself historically contingent. See id. at 1-17; see also infra Part
111.B (discussing the problem of the contestability of the historical narrative).
152 See WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, MYTHISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 11 (1986) ("Con-
sciousness of a common past, after all, is a powerful supplement to other ways of defining
who 'we' are."); cf APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 9 (stating that historians often dismiss
the "role of history in shaping national identity... as irrelevant to their work, which they de-
fine as researching in archives and writing scholarly books and articles"); iad at 6 (contrasting
the popular sense of history as "successions of names, dates, and events" with history's pres-
ent image as a hothouse "of debate about ethnic and national identity"). For an extended dis-
cussion of the role of history in shaping collective identity, see infra Part m.
153 See HANS GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 282 (2d rev. ed. 1994) ("[W]e are
always situated within traditions, and this is no objectifying process-i.e., we do not conceive
of what tradition says as something other, something alien. It is always part of us .... ");
ALFRED NORTH WHIEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 280 (1933) ("The individual, real facts
of the past lie at the base of our immediate experience in the present. They are the reality
from which the occasion springs .... ).
154 See APPLEBY ETAL., supra note 4, at 92 (describing a French school text drawing of a
timeline of French men and boys each dressed in period dress, essentially depicting "an un-
broken chain of French fathers who had lived long in the land and propagated"). The drawing
itself characterizes the passing of values and history from generation to generation. See also
GADAMER, supra note 153, at 297 ("In fact the important thing is to recognize temporal dis-
tance as a positive and productive condition enabling understanding. It is not a yawning abyss
but is filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which everything
handed down presents itself to us,').
155 See EDVARD SHILS, TRADiTION 167 (1981) ("Memory is more than the act of recol-
lection by recollecting persons. Memory leaves an objective deposit in tradition. The past
does not have to be remembered by all who reenact it; the deposit is carried forward by a con-
tinuing chain of transmissions and receptions."). According to Martin Krygier, "[tjhe tradi-
tionality of law is reflected not merely in the pastness of its present, the extent to which cur-
rent law is the presently visible residue of generations of deposits," but "[i]t is equally
reflected in the presence of the past, the extent to which only the presently authoritative past is
treated as significant." Krygier, supra note 133, at 248.
156 See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 ("What historians do best is to make connec-
tions with the past in order to illuminate the problems of the present and the potential of the
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study the sedimentary development of the topography because it situates us
in the present.1 57 Even though we are, quite naturally and unavoidably, the
embodiment of our history, we nonetheless study our accumulated history to
get a better sense of who we are. 18 Without our history we would float un-
tethered in the universe, without context for our lives. "We study history,"
Collingwood observed famously, "in order to attain self-knowledge."
159
In studying history, we seek to establish continuity between what has
come before and contemporary circumstances.16° Development of the his-
torical narrative is a constant mediation between the "us" of the past and the
"us" of the present. 161 History is not merely the academic historian's task of
data collection and description. It is a hermeneutic process of reconciling
our understanding of the past with our view of the present, what Hans Georg
Gadamer described as the merging of horizons.1 62 Because the historical
future."); GADAMER, supra note 153, at 284 ("Modem historical research itself is not only
research, but the handing down of tradition."); SHELDON S. WOLIN, THE PRESENCE OF THE
PAST: ESSAYS ON THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1989) ("Societies try to express
what they are about.., by appealing to or constructing their pasts and connecting that past
with present arrangements of power.").
1 7 See Brce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 527 (1994) ("Even
though the 'earth belongs to the living,' each generation begins with a historically given base-
line.' 2.
See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 69 (1961) ("[W]e can fully under-
stand the present only in the light of the past. To enable man to understand the society of the
past and to increase his mastery over the society of the present is the dual function of his-
tory."); ARTHuR C. DANTO, NARRATION AND KNOWLEDGE, at xv (1985) ("It is impossible to
overestimate the extent to which our common ways of thinking about the world are histori-
cal."); cf Rakove, supra note 131, at 1032 ("Most of our reasoning about the present is in fact
deeply historical in nature.").
Collingwood, supra note 149, at 315.
160 See GADAMER, supra note 153, at 327 ("Historical knowledge can be gained only by
seeing the past in its continuity with the present-which is exactly what the jurist does in his
practical, normative work of 'ensuring the unbroken continuance of law and preserving the
tradition of the legal idea."' (citation omitted)); Katherine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and
the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 303, 312 ("Tradi-
tion ... connects past and present and gives each meaning in terms of the other. It is old, yet
in its timelessness acts as a source of new recognitions."); Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1064
("[I]istory does not reside merely in the past, but in the interaction of the past with the pres-
ent").
161 See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 231 (describing the relationship between narra-
tive and history). On the narrative structure of histories, see DANTO, supra note 158, at 143-
81.
162 GADAMER, supra note 153, at 306; see also CARR, supra note 158, at 35
("[Hfistory... is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an
unending dialogue between the present and the past."); Brown, supra note 20, at 218 (de-
scribing her cognitive method of constitutional interpretation as "leam[ing] what we can and
bring[ing] our new perspective-a product of our own traditions-.... to produce an answer to
specific problems that is neither the Framers' nor the interpreter's alone. It is a compro-
mise ... of past and present"). For a cogent explanation of Gadamer's theory that the conver-
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narrative is hermeneutic, the story that we tell about ourselves necessarily
changes as our history accumulates beneath us and we gain perspective on
it.163 Although specific events in the past might not change, our under-
standing of them does. 164 Our historical consciousness changes, not only
because of the remove, but because we inevitably reinterpret past events in
light of present occurrences.1 65 The telling of history is often one of causa-
tion, of trying to piece together a coherent story recounting how we got
from where we were to where we are.166 As we tell and retell that story, our
perspective changes and so does the story we tell.
167
sation between past and present, mediated by history, is epistemologically and ontologically
intrinsic to interpretation and thus understanding, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gada-
mer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 609, 619-24 (1990).
163 See D.J. Boorstin, Tradition and Method in Legal History, 54 HARV. L. REV. 424,
433 (1941) ("Legal history, like other history, must always be rewritten."); Sandalow, supra
note 15, at 1069-70 (discussing the changes in technology as well as the worldview that have
occurred since the Founding and the Reconstruction Congress to change our perception of
constitutional issues). In his presidential address to the American Historical Association, the
eminent historian Frederick Jackson Turner said: "A comprehension of the United States to-
day, an understanding of the rise and progress of the forces which made it what it is, demands
that we should rework our history from the new points of view afforded by the present."
TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, at v (Barton J. Bern-
stein ed., 1968) (emphasis added) (quoting this statement by Turner, and pointing out that it
was chosen by "a young American historian," Arthur Schlesinger, as the title page for his New
Viewpoints in American History).
64 See Bartlett, supra note 160, at 330 ("Tlhe past, like the present, is always in flux and
part of the process of negotiation about who we are, what matters, and what constitutes im-
provement."). Carr makes the point that for this very reason a history often will tell more
about the author and the author's times than it will about the period being studied. See CARR,
supra note 158, at 44.
165 This is a central theme in Arthur Danto's brilliant analytical philosophy of history.
Danto argues repeatedly that the past takes on its meaning from what follows; because we
cannot be certain what follows, we cannot understand the significance of the present. What
historians do is create for us the significance of the past by telling the narrative of history in
light of the present. See, e.g., DANTO, supra note 158, at 158 (explaining that one could have
visited Newton's house at the time of his birth, but the building did not take on significance
until much later)
[B]y the time it is clear what we have done, it is too late to do anything about it.
'The owl of Minerva takes flight only with the falling of the dusk.'... We capture
the future only when it is too late to do anything about the relevant present, for it is
then past and beyond our control. We can find out what its significance was, and
this is the work of historians: history is made by them.
Id. at 284; see also id. at 341 ("The present is cleared of indeterminacy only when history has
had its say; but then, as we have seen, history never completely has its say. So life is open to
constant re-interpretation and assessment."); cf CARR, supra note 158, at 28 ("[W]e can view
the past, and achieve our understanding of the past, only through the eyes of the present.").
166 See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 302-05 (describing the explanatory role of his-
tory in terms of cause and effect); MCNEILL, supra note 152, at 5-7 (discussing patterns of
causation in history); Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1070 (explaining that to better understand
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What is most important is that as we mediate between our past and our
present, we simultaneously carry constitutional values with us and transform
them. 168 This account explains why the more recent tellings of our history
should be, and often are, privileged in constitutional law. On this under-
standing of history, it becomes evident that our constitutional values largely
will be found in the upper layers of our sedimentary constitution.169 In the
words of Dean Sandalow, "the values to which constitutional law gives ex-
pression are more nearly those of the present than those of the past.
' 170
To see this somewhat theoretical point more clearly, consider an ex-
tremely current and tangible problem of constitutional interpretation, that of
the federalist "revival. 17' Mirroring developments in the broader political
arena 172 in a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has turned away
from the broad deference to national authority of the post-New Deal years .to
a certain solicitude for state sovereignty. Among the decisions that have
the present "we search out from the past those elements of experience and strains of thought
that apear most relevant to our own time").
Philip Bobbitt describes this phenomenon with an analogy to poetry:
As both the interstitial and the reviewed methods of change operate from the past,
they also operate on the past. It has been remarked that every artist creates his own
precursors. I must have read Keats differently having read Yeats and perhaps read
both differently having read Auden. So I must read Pierce and Meyer differently
having read Griswold and must read them all differently having read Roe.
BOBBrIT, supra note 10, at 224-25 (footnote omitted).
168 Edward Shils may be the most eloquent on this score:
The identity of a society through time to its members and to external observers is a
consensus between living generations and generations of the dead. The living for-
ward into the present of beliefs and patterns of institutions which existed in an earlier
time is a consensus between the dead and the living in which the latter accept what
the former have presented to them. The content of the consensus changes through
interpretation; the consensus is maintained through reinterpretation of what the ear-
lier generations believed.
SHILS, supra note 155, at 168; see also GADAMER, supra note 153, at 293 ("Tradition is not
simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand,
participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it[s content] ourselves.");
PELIKAN, supra note 138, at 58-59 (asserting that the Supreme Court "must subordinate itself
to the ancient authority even as it proceeds to decide what the authority means now').
169 Cf GADAMER, supra note 153, at 290 ("What we call 'classical' does not first require
the overcoming of historical distance, for in its own constant mediation it overcomes this dis-
tance by itself.").
170 Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1039.
171 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on
Professor Lessig's Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1439 (1997).
172 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and
the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 247 (1996) (arguing that although it has not yet
jelled, the regulatory agenda of the 104th Congress may represent a coming 'constitutional
moment' revising the New Deal agenda).
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captured so much notice are United States v. Lopez,1 73 limiting the scope of
Congress's enumerated powers, as well as New York v. United States174 and
Printz v. United States, 75 preserving sovereign state functions from national
commandeering.
176
In a recent article, Professor Steven Calabresi suggests that these Su-
preme Court decisions about federalism indicate that "we can... go back to
the days of limited national power." 177 Although Calabresi does an admira-
ble job of discussing the forces motivating these decisions, neither the de-
scriptive word "revival" nor Calabresi's observation is correct. We cannot
"go back." We cannot erase New Deal understandings any more than we
can pretend that the very advances in transportation, telecommunications,
and market technology that influence the federalist balance of power never
occurred. 178 What we can do is construct a new federalist understanding
atop old ones. That is what we are doing.
Notice, however, that even as we construct this "new" federalism, both
the Supreme Court and numerous commentators inevitably retell our federal
story in a way that seems to make it coherent and consistent with all of our
past.179 That is the very reason there has been so much focus on the New
Deal in recent scholarship. The New Deal itself was a seeming rupture from
past commitments, and today's "revival" is yet another turn-this time
shifting away from New Deal commitments. The story about American
federalism told at the turn of the last century was very different from that
173 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
174 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
175 117 S. Ct. 2365,2384 (1997).
176 See also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 261 (1997) (holding
that suit brought by Indian tribe members against the State of Idaho was barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that
the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against
states to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause).
177 Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In De-
fense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 752 (1995).
178See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 368-69 (1997) (dis-
cussing how advances in technology have affected the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and
arguing that "doctrinal changes mirror what is happening in the nation and the world at
large").
For examples of Justices and commentators retelling the federalism story, see Printz,
117 S. Ct. at 2376-79; id. at 2387-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 568-83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 825-38 (1995); id. at 845-918 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-56 (1985); id at 568-77 (Powell, J., dis-
senting); id at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1496-1503, 1515-20 (1994); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federal-
ism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 125.
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told in 1940,"' and the same is true again at the turn of this next century. It
is different not only because of intervening events, but also because those
intervening events have required us to see and to make sense of the older
history in a way that brings us coherently from then to now, in a way that
maintains continuity with our past. Thus, we forge our values out of our
past--often our most recent past-and leave those values in the topmost soil
as we move on.
B. The Inevitability of Sedimentary Interpretation
By now it ought to be apparent why it is that we should rely on all of
our history in identifying our more deeply held commitments, and also why
those commitments-our commitments-often rest quite close to the sur-
face. We must rely on all of our history, because over time our commit-
ments have been altered by the passage of history. And for this same rea-
son, we have carried our commitments, albeit in their constantly shifting
form, on our generational shoulders into the present.
However, an odd sort of contradiction remains. On the one hand, much
of our interpretive methodology actually is consistent with sedimentary in-
terpretation, in that we quite naturally accept more recent understandings as
embodying our deepest constitutional commitments. 81 On the other hand,
as Part I made clear, much of our rhetoric still shifts between the poles of
originalism and living constitutionalism as we continue to debate whether
we must adhere to Founding-era commitments. There is a disjunction be-
tween what we say, and what we often do. This Subpart explores why this
disjunction exists and explains that despite their inconsistent rhetoric, even
originalists and living constitutionalists necessarily engage in the methodol-
ogy of sedimentary interpretation.
1. The Problem of the Written Constitution
A good part of the reason for the disjunction between the rhetoric of
constitutional theory and the reality of constitutional practice is that we have
a written Constitution, one that also contains an explicit set of directives as
180 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Po-
litical Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1380-92 (1994) (detailing
different understandings of federalism as seen through the lens of the Lochner and New Deal
Courts); Sunstein, supra note 172, at 254 ("As a result of the New Deal, state autonomy was
very different in 1940 from what it had been in 1920.").
181 See Ruti Teitel, Original Intent, History and Levy's Establishment Clause, 15 L. &
Soc. INQUIRY 591, 604-06 (discussing Establishment Clause jurisprudence and stating, "His-
tory for the Court was not confined to original history but rather spanned our entire national
history").
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to how it is to be amended. It is the very "written-ness" of our Constitution
that has made it difficult for theorists to account for the otherwise quite
natural, gradual process of constitutional change, a point made clear by the
enormous attention that has been directed to the Article V amendment proc-
ess. 1 82 Article V provides a means to "rewrite" the written Constitution, but
as an exclusive methodology, the Article V process has proven inadequate
in both theory and practice. 183 It is inadequate in practice because it takes a
remarkable act of supennajoritarian will to change the Constitution. It is
inadequate in theory because, as almost anyone can recognize, the Constitu-
tion has been altered over time in ways not recorded by formal amend-
ment. 184 In the inimitable words of Karl Llewellyn: "Surely there are few
superstitions with less substance than the belief that the sole, or even the
chief process of amending our Constitution consists of the machinery of
Amendment."
185
The struggle over the question of when and whether the Constitution
may be "amended" outside Article V186 betrays the great force that the
"written-ness" of our Constitution has upon our interpretation of it. The
written text of the U.S. Constitution is law in a way that obviously could not
be true in a country such as Great Britain, which has a great constitutional
tradition but no written constitution. In some sense, the interpretive debates
182 See generally RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (collecting papers dealing with
this problem).
8 See Fallon, supra note 32, at 45-46 (arguing that the "cumbersome" process of con-
stitutional amendment is outweighed by the need for constitutional law to reflect "changes in
social, technological, and economic context"); Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1046 ("The
amendment process established by article V simply will not sustain the entire burden of ad-
aptation that must be borne if the Constitution is to remain a vital instrument of govern-
ment.").
184 This point is made stunningly by Sanford Levinson in a paper aptly entitled Account-
ingfor Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) >26; (D) All of the Above), in which Levinson convincingly
demonstrates that "any answer is more sophisticated theoretically than '(b).' 8 CONST.
COMMENT. 409, 428 (1991); see also Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed,
108 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 38) ("A significant amount of constitutional
change has happened outside of Article V."); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the
United States: From Theory to Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 182,
at 37-38 ("[Constitutional] change has occurred primarily through non-Article V means
I Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 21.
186 See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1051-70 (1984) (arguing that constitutional amendment has occurred not merely
through the process established by Article V, but through structural amendment as well); Ak-
hil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988) (considering the possibility of "constitutional amendment by
direct appeal to, and ratification by, We the People of the United States").
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we have here in this country would make no sense in the absence of such a
written text. Rather than focus on the intentions of those who wrote the
text, we would quite naturally ask questions about constitutional tradition.1
8 7
Yet, the written text makes us insecure of constitutional change not reflected
in the text itself. The written text somehow directs us to the intentions of
the law-giving Founders, its supposed authors. 188 It is this fixation on the
Founders that gives rise to the question of fidelity.
The problem of fidelity that confronts us whenever we face sharp con-
stitutional change nonetheless largely escapes our notice with regard to the
vast alterations that occur quite gradually. For example, although the doc-
trine of federalism requires reconciling major changes in direction, a large
part of our constitutional law developed in much smaller, almost impercep-
tible steps. Consider, for example, constitutional understandings regarding
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 189 the nature of presidential
power, 190 the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 191 the operation of the jury
system, 192 and the election of Senators. 193 To be sure, there were moments
of sharper change in all of these. For the most part, however, our under-
187 See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTITUTION
5-7 (8th ed. 1927) (contrasting the British constitutional interpreter's modem method to the
American interpreter's more staid approach).
188 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 7-8 (1998) (criti-
cizing the "professional narrative" that focuses on founding moments as impeding our ability
to understand the process of constitutional change).
189 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (stating that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment "must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (noting that the Eighth Amendment is "progressive, and is not fastened
to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice"). But see Scalia, supra note 21, at 45-46 (using the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause as an example of the impracticability of evolutionary constitutional philosophy).
190 See Flaherty, supra note 21, at 1732-38 (tracing the development of separation of
powers in the Supreme Court).
191 See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., CONsTrnmONAL CRmiNAL PROCEDURE 141-75 (3d
ed. 1995) (chronicling the evolution of a right to counsel from the "right to be heard" to the
right to appointed counsel in certain cases).
192 See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 592-600
(1993) (detailing major decisions in the development of the right to ajury trial and examining
how textual original intention had little to do with this development). Compare, e.g., Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (invalidating a provision of the state constitution ex-
cluding any woman from jury service unless she filed a declaration of her desire to serve),
with Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 65 (1961) (upholding a similar statutory provision). The
Taylor Court conceded that its holding diverged from founding-era intentions. See 419 U.S.
at 536.
193 See Vikram David Amar, supra note 10, at 1352-55 (showing how the states, prior to
the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, devised a number of ways to limit state legisla-
tors' discretion in choosing Senators).
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standings of these aspects of American constitutionalism have evolved
slowly over time, involving incremental generational change that has been
quite comfortable and often uncontested.194 In each of these areas our pres-
ent-day understanding is very different from that of the Founding era. De-
spite this, in all these areas there is no serious movement to return to the
Founding to define what our commitments should be today.
Evidently, when we try to understand or interpret most of our Constitu-
tion, we often do not return to Founding-era understandings. Instead, we
quite naturally treat this sedimentary development for what it is, the gradual
evolution of our constitutional ideals. For the vast majority of our constitu-
tional commitments, we accept the present-day state of affairs for what it is.
The short Sections that follow demonstrate that the rhetoric of origi-
nalism and living constitutionalism regularly give way in practice to sedi-
mentary interpretation. Because of the nature of our written Constitution
and the problem of fidelity it engenders, we have endured a long-running
debate between originalists and living constitutionalists. Yet, because our
Constitution is in fact sedimentary, what we do by necessity is far more in-
structive than what we say.
2. Originalism's Failure: Anachronistic History
Originalism, the most widely accepted and established use of history in
constitutional interpretation, is anachronistic. Originalism is a huge histori-
cal non sequitur. The rhetoric of originalism suggests that we can ignore the
accumulated history atop our Constitution. But people today do not think in
1787 terms and could not if they wanted to.195 Unlike the Founders' Con-
stitution, today's Constitution privileges liberty over property rights, 96 ac-
cepts the utility and prevalence of administrative agencies, 197 and acknowl-
194 See HoLMES, supra note 16, at 161 (using "the strength of the Union, the broad leg-
islative responsibilities of the President, and especially judicial review" to illustrate how
"[m]any of the basic features of the American Constitution ... were innovations introduced
without any formal amendment procedure having been invoked").
195 See SmILs, supra note 155, at 1 ("Very few persons argue for the revival of the beliefs
and institutions of the remoter past which have been obliterated in the more recent past. Even
if they desire their revival, they do not that think there is any reasonable chance that what they
desire will be realized' ).
196 Compare, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-503 (1977) (apply-
ing heightened scrutiny to invalidate a law interfering with family living arrangements), with
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (applying rational-basis scrutiny to
uphold a law prohibiting opticians from fitting eyeglass lenses without a prescription).
197 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984) (establishing a rule of judicial deference to agency determinations); cf
Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 550-57 (1997)
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edges enhanced power in the President of the United States vis A vis the
other political branches. 198 All of these features have become embedded in
modem constitutional life.
Consider, for example, a question much mooted today concerning
whether the Fourth Amendment expresses a preference for warrants.
19 9
Scholars, such as Telford Taylor and Akhil Amar, have made historical
claims that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment did not intend the War-
rant Clause to be tied to the Search and Seizure Clause because the Framers
feared general warrants and would not have preferred them, as does present
doctrine.200 Yet, suppose this is true. What sense does it make to return to
the question of whether James Madison, John Wilkes, or even Lord Camden
believed warrants were essential, in light of all the historical development
since?20 1 We have lived under the warrant model for at least one third of a
(reviewing SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 8) (arguing that Scalia's
originalist formalism is incompatible with the administrative state).
198 See Flaherty, supra note 21, at 1728 (describing the "historic growth of presidential
power").
199 The warrant question is only one of many Fourth Amendment issues around which
there has been significant historical development. The Amendment was once construed in
tandem with the Fifth Amendment to protect private papers, an interpretation since aban-
doned. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("[A]ny forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man's ... private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime ... is
within the condemnation .... [of the] Fourth and Fifth Amendments."). Later, the exclusion-
ary rule came to be an integral part of the Amendment. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914) (holding that the use of unconstitutionally seized letters at a trial involved "a
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused"). Even later, the Amendment was applied to
police practices of state officers. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that
"all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a state court"). Perhaps most importantly, intrusions on pri-
vacy came to matter far more than physical invasions of property. See Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) ("For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."); id.
at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe rule that has emerged from prior cases is that there
is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'). See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (arguing that the
Court has not relied on original understandings of the Fourth Amendment in light of "sweep-
ing change in the legal and technological context").
200 See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STuDiEs IN CONsTrrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-29
(1969); Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 762-81. For a recent skeptical look at
some Fourth Amendment originalist histories, emphasizing yet again the divergence between
law-office history and historian's history, see Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History;
Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1707 (1996).
201 See SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 98, at 5-6 (describing as "good rhetoric" but
"not persuasive argument" a liberal newspaper commentary that challenged congressional
discussion of a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule based on "the behavior of
British troops under King George III two hundred years ago"); Eisgruber, supra note 25, at
473 ("It would be fruitless, and next to impossible, for the Justices to return to first principles
[Vol. 147: 1
THE SEDIMENTARY CONSTITUTION
century. Countless cases have been decided by applying and adhering to
that interpretation; generations of police officers and lawyers have been
trained in that understanding; the public undoubtedly understands that po-
lice need warrants; and changes in technology, such as the ready accessibil-
ity of wiretapping equipment, have had a real impact on our sense of
whether warrants are required. None of this is to say that we could not
again depart from a generalized preference for warrants. The point is that
such a change would have to be understood as one of historical develop-
ment, not as a return to the Founders' intentions.
To be fair to originalists, their preference for returning to Founding-era
commitments has more to do with their theoretical understanding of what
the Constitution is, and of the proper role of judges in interpreting that Con-
stitution, than with their understanding of history. Originalists are positiv-
ists: they view the Constitution as law that must be interpreted as it was un-
derstood by the lawgivers.2 0 2 They also take a majoritarian view of politics
that ill-accommodates judicial discretion.203 Thus, originalism is seen as a
way to constrain judges and remain faithful to the lawgivers' intentions all
204at once.
each time they determined whether police officers failed to honor a suspect's request for
counsel or whether a state had created a public forum.").
202 See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 9 (stating that originalists believe that "original
meaning should prevail ... because the authority of the Constitution as supreme law rests on
its ratification by the special, popularly elected conventions of 1787-88"); Michael C. Dorf, A
Nonoriginalist Perspective on the Lessons of History, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 352
(1996) (noting that originalism "is fundamentally rooted in a positivist conception of democ-
racy, which asserts that law is binding because it expresses the view of the sovereign"); James
A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and Critique, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1991) (explaining how originalists believe that judges "are powerless to deviate
from the terms of the 'popular consent' expressed in the Constitution"). The positivism of
modem-day originalism is criticized in Stephen B. Presser, Book Review, 14 CONsT.
COMMENT. 229, 233 (1997) (reviewing SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTrrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995)) (applauding Gerber for
chastising modem-day originalists such as Meese and Bork, who "have failed to appreciate
that the Constitution was about more than popular sovereignty, and that instead it was to in-
corporate ajurisprudence of natural rights").
203 See BORK, supra note 21, at 145 (arguing that judicial discretion is to "impose the
values of an elite" in ways that "are not correctable democratically").
204 See Nelson, supra note 137, at 1261 (discussing originalism's support in positivism
and judicial neutrality). William Eskridge comments on the paradox that some notable origi-
nalists such as Justices Scalia and Thomas rely on sources such as The Federalist Papers and
pre-ratification debates to interpret the Constitution, but disdain the use of similar legislative
history to interpret statutes. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read the
Federalist Papers but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1301, 1301
(1998). Eskridge argues that the distinction can be justified because of the easy strategic use
of legislative history and the cheap cost of producing it (as opposed to pre-ratification consti-
tutional history). See id. at 3. Eskridge correctly observes Scalia's and Thomas's use of pre-
ratification history to provide "context" in order to understand the meaning of a constitutional
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Yet, we have enough difficulty pretending we can really discern the
Founders' understandings; we are not likely to make sense of them in our
world, except when they are writ very large. No doubt, the Founders' vision
of the Fourth Amendment is instructive at some basic level. Their concern,
however, was about the protection of property, not privacy. And their world
bore little relation to our world, where people live stacked atop one another
in slums and skyscrapers, regular police forces roam the streets, telecom-
munications are pervasive, and high-tech equipment allows police to listen
in at will.20 5  For reasons such as these, constitutional understanding
evolved to require warrants and focus on privacy, not property. °6 Imple-
menting an originalist vision of the Fourth Amendment-or any other con-
stitutional clause, for that matter-in any coherent way would require
sweeping all the accumulated sediment off our topography, returning the
Constitution to its essentially two-dimensional tabletop form. History,
however, cannot be swept away so casually.
Therefore it should come as little surprise that originalist judges them-
selves regularly interpret the Constitution by relying not only on the history
of the Founding but also upon pre-constitutional understandings and post-
ratification practices: in short, on all of our history. In Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., 20 7 for example, Justice Scalia purported to be relying upon origi-
nalist methodology to determine the right of a biological parent to maintain
a relationship with his adulterously fathered child. Despite the claim to
originalism, however, Justice Scalia explored the nature of the right from
the common law preceding constitutional history through to the present.
208
provision, see id. at 2, but the same use can and should be made of legislative history. For an
expression of this latter view from a scholar who otherwise is skeptical of the use of legisla-
tive history, see John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673 (1997).
205 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 401 (1974) (cataloguing the "wonder[s] of our lives that the framers did not
know' .
20 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that searches without
warrants are "per se unreasonable" and shifting attention from concepts of property law to
expectations of privacy).
207 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
208 See id. at 124-27 (concluding that the "marital family" has traditionally been pro-
tected against claims from outsiders trying to secure parental rights over a child). There is
some evidence that Justice Scalia will use post-ratification history only as a one-way ratchet to
deny the existence of a constitutional right. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, the Su-
preme Court struck down a state law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign in-
formation, finding in the First Amendment a right to publish anonymously in the political
arena. 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). Justice Thomas concurred, specifically declining to address
the question of "whether 'an honorable tradition' of anonymous speech has existed throughout
American history" and instead finding such a right as a matter of how the Constitution was
"originally understood." Id. at 359.
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As Rebecca Brown has pointed out, such reliance on pre- and post-
ratification practice is inconsistent with originalism's understanding of con-
stitutionalism, which purports only to adhere to what the Founders in-
tended.209 Nonetheless, originalists rely upon these extra-originalist sources
because they cannot help but rely upon them. The only way even origi-
nalists can understand (or "interpret") the Constitution sensibly is in light of
its long history.1
Understanding what our Constitution means requires reversing origi-
nalism's anachronistic priority of the Founders' intentions over historical
interpretations. The views of the Founders are not without importance, as
explained below. Their thinking inevitably affects our own; in some in-
stances it may even be determinative. But because the Constitution is sedi-
mentary, there is a limited utility in drilling clear through to the base every
time a question of constitutional interpretation arises. Better interpretations
rest far closer to the surface.
3. Living Constitutionalism's Failure: The Inevitability of History
Because originalism theoretically would impose anachronistic values on
us, living constitutionalists flee history to keep the Constitution current with
the times. They cannot, however, escape the fact that today's deeply held
constitutional commitments have been shaped by history. Thus, history in-
evitably holds the key to our constitutional values. To the extent living con-
stitutionalism purports to reject history, it makes no sense.2 Constitution-
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented. Scalia purported to be applying an
originalist methodology, see id. at 371-72, but nonetheless relied extensively on post-
ratification practice, see id. at 371-78. He focused his attention on the "universal and long-
established American legislative practice" of banning such speech, id. at 377 (citation omit-
ted), paying scant attention to any history of engaging in anonymous political speech. There
is room to question whether, in Justice Scalia's view, subsequent practice can establish a right
that was not clearly recognized at the time of ratification or can only defeat such a claim.
209 See Brown, supra note 20, at 191 ("Does evidence ofpre-Constitutional tradition bear
on the intent of the Framers, who clearly set out to make drastic changes in the political tradi-
tions of their nation? Is evidence of post-Constitutional tradition at all relevant to what the
document originally meant?").
210 See Fallon, supra note 32, at 27 & n.133 (describing how Bork, Monaghan, Scalia,
and Thomas all "accept at least some non-originalist principles and decisions as binding
law'N).
211 David Richards, for one, has said that living constitutionalists
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alism without history is not constitutionalism at all, largely because history
has shaped our deeper values.
212
History's inevitability is best seen by acknowledging its central role
even in the most nonhistorical methodological approach to constitutional
interpretation, moral philosophy. History, for example, is essential to
Ronald Dworkin's notion of "law as integrity.'213 Dworkin sees interpreta-
tion as the identification of our past practices, the development of a justifi-
cation for those practices, and then the altering of those practices in order to
make them fit with that justification.1 4 Notice where Dworkin begins: our
are dead wrong on the interpretive grounds of failing to understand and apply the ab-
stract principles of government implicit in original historical understandings, the set-
tied and often brilliantly articulated case law, and other authoritative constructions of
how these principles should be construed.
... [T]he interpretation of constitutional law cannot be identified with positivistic
conventions of the living constitution. It must instead engage in a complex historical
reconstruction of our constitutional traditions ....
Richards, supra note 106, at 518-19; cf id. at 499-500 (discussing the importance of history in
intereting law).
Christopher Eisgruber stands in the curious position of recognizing the inevitability of
history and wanting to deny it at the same time. Eisgruber recognizes that "[o]ur obligation to
respect the past is born of its inevitable presence within our politics," yet despite its inevita-
bility, he would not extend it much of a role if it conflicted with broader notions of "justice."
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65
FoRDHAM L. REv. 1611, 1621 (1997). Although a central point of this Article is that history
cannot and should not define all of our choices, Eisgruber's view conflicts with the deep, for-
mative role history plays in constitutional development. At a certain level, history shapes our
conceptions of justice in the present. Accordingly, history is a fundamental force that formu-
lates the very constitutional questions we ask today; it is not a secondary effect that should be
viewed as an aid to, but not as a constraint upon, constitutional interpretation.
213 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 95-96, 225-28, 254-58 (1986). History in the
sense described here is prominent in many places in Dworkin's work. At the outset, Dworkin
describes interpretation as identifying practices and developing justifications for them, only
then to adjust the practices to make them they best they can be in light of the justification. See
id. at 65-67. These "practices," however, do not come out of nowhere, but develop over time.
Dworkin recognizes this when he discusses "law as integrity." Law as integrity is both back-
ward and forward looking. See id. at 225-38; see also Richards, supra note 97, at 502-03
(disclosing the historical aspects of Dworkin's thought).
214 See DWORKIN, supra note 213, at 65-66. There are those who are skeptical that
Dworkin's purported methodology is what leads him to resolve cases in the fashion that he
does. In particular, these critics believe that to some extent Dworkin's "backward-looking"
concern for the fit between practice and justification may be camouflaging what at bottom is
nothing but reliance on a moral theory. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 11, at 1628 n.1 (charac-
terizing Dworkin's thought as "ahistorically historicist" in that "[p]ast events are merely pres-
ent data to be used in flushing out the moral theory that provides the real motivating force be-
hind interpretation"); Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and from the
Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 433,
435 (1992) (arguing that Dworkin is not so interested the in text, structure, or extended body
of case law, rather "[h]is implicit legal universe consists of a handful of general principles
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practices are and must be historically developed, whether that history is re-
cent or distant.215 Law as integrity "insists that legal claims are interpretive
judgments and therefore combine backward-and forward-looking ele-
ments; they interpret contemporary legal practice as seen as an unfolding
political narrative." 216 Indeed, sedimentary interpretation bears a close af-
finity to a metaphor of Dworkin's own. Dworkin likens the development of
constitutional law to the writing of a chain novel.217  Obviously, in the
writing of that novel, each author has considerable leeway in what to make
of what has come before. Similarly, although our history limits our choices,
it does not constrain us entirely.218 We make choices in telling our history,
embodied in a handful of exemplary, often rather bodiless, cases"). In a recent review, Ed
McCaffery comes to Dworkin's defense, insisting that Dworkin does in fact rely on "past
cases" as well as "past practices beyond legal cases alone" to resolve present controversies.
Edward J. MeCaffery, Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1045-46 (1997)
(reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW (1996)). McCaffery argues that Dworkin's
"method is powerful, yet deeply commonsensical; indeed, it is far from clear that there is
anything else to do." Id. at 1045.
215 To this end, Dworkin argues that:
[A]ny strategy of constitutional argument that aims at overall constitutional integrity
must search for answers that mesh well enough with our practices and traditions-
that find enough foothold in our continuing history as well as in the Constitution's
text-so that those answers can plausibly be taken to describe our commitments as a
nation.
Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1254 (1997).
216 DWORKIN, supra note 213, at 225. Similarly, even when hiding behind a Rawlsian
"veil of ignorance" one necessarily must take into account present understandings of the
world shaped by the past we have lived. Rawls makes this explicit when discussing the con-
cept of "reflective equilibrium," which is achieved when moral judgments from the original
position match those in our prior experience. According to Rawls, the "best account of a per-
son's sense of justice" is that which finds equilibrium between judgments reached after con-
sidering a conception of justice and the "class of facts" that represent prior experience. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48, 51 (1971).
217 See DWORKIN, supra note 213, at 228-32 (comparing law to "an artificial genre of
literature," the chain novel, in which each author adds a chapter to a novel after interpreting
the chapters that have already been written).
218 See McCaffery, supra note 214, at 1051 (explaining that "[flit and fidelity to the past,
while constraining, are under-determinative," in defending Dworkin's "forward-looking" ju-
risprudence); Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1001, 1013 (1988) (claiming that judging "simultaneously acknowledges
our debt to the past and denies that the past should control the present"). A different expres-
sion of this idea is found in the concept of path dependency. Path dependency explains why
our choices are somewhat constrained, and yet why we remain free within the bounds of that
constraint. See Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship (Oct. 6, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors) (describing the path dependency of history and its influence on interpretation); see
also Kramer, supra note 11, at 1640 (describing how economists and game theorists use his-
tory to support the concept of path dependency); William E. Nelson, New Directions in
American Legal History, 4 BENCHMARK 283, 291 (1990) (noting that past decisions dictate
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and we make choices in light of that history-choices that will determine
not only our lives, but those of future generations.219 By the same token,
however, the chain novelist is constrained by the chapters that have come
before.
There are some scholars who see constitutionalism as "aspirational," as
holding the key to what we might be or should become, and who seem to
reject historical interpretation for a sort of "timeless" understanding of con-
stitutional values. But again, those aspirations themselves are shaped in-
evitably against our history, and are path dependent upon it. This point can
be illustrated by considering the views of scholars like Lawrence Sager220 or
Christopher Eisgruber,221 who favor a "justice-seeking" Constitution, one
that embodies timeless values. In The Incorrigible Constitution, for exam-
ple, Sager identifies two of these timeless values, arguing that "slavery and
torture must be prohibited because they are wrong.' 222 Although Sager has
picked what must seem the easiest of examples, history quite obviously be-
lies his claim. It is simply impossible to look history in the eye and none-
theless argue that slavery has always been "wrong." Slavery itself was en-
shrined in the Constitution. It was not abolished in this country until the
end of our first century, and it took a devastating war to accomplish that.
2 23
As for torture, the Supreme Court did not even cast an eye on what may
well be called torturous practices in police interrogation until well into our
what is presently possible by creating question in an intellectual framework). On path de-
pendency, see generally W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb.
1990, at 92 (using physics and evolutionary theory to explain positive feedback economics
and the collection of small events that determine a greater path).
219 David Richards makes this point, responding to the argument that "[h]istory or con-
vention [is] often substantively unjust, and interpretive theories of law resting on history or
convention... improperly trammel the task of law in doing justice." Richards, supra note
106, at 491. Richards observes two fundamental mistakes underlying this argument. "First, it
assumes that a theory of legal interpretation can plausibly disengage meaning in law from
history and convention. Second, it assumes that a theory of law that takes seriously the place
of history and convention in legal interpretation must blind lawyers... in doing the work of
justice." Id,
220 [The liberty-bearing provisions of the
Constitution... may present themselves as positive law because of their adoption by
ratifying social majorities, but their raison d'dtre, their substantive claim to incorpo-
ration among those principles that govern us at the deep and enduring level of con-
stitutional law, is their stature in an appropriate account of political justice.
Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 936 (1990).
221 See Eisgruber, supra note 212, at 1614 ("The purpose of constitutionalism... is to
discipline the present in order to enable future people to govern in the interests of justice
. Sager, supra note 220, at 938.
223 Sager himself recognizes this. See id. at 936 (describing the "appallingly belated
abolition of slavery")..
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second century. 24 One would hope that courts will continue to condemn
these practices, but the essential point is that our views on them necessarily
are historically contingent. As Cass Sunstein has argued, all theories ofjus-
tice necessarily are historically and culturally situated.225
Considering that, try as we might, we simply cannot avoid interpreting
the Constitution historically, there is a peculiarity to some discussions of the
"living" Constitution, which seem at times to deny the need to build upon
our history.2 6 No matter what else is true, it is simply impossible to inter-
pret the Constitution without reference to history. Even a "break" from tra-
dition is just that, an acknowledgment of our past and a decision to reject its
practice or lessons in light of current circumstances. 227 Even a "break" from
the past is continuous with our past in a certain, important sense." Con-
stitutional interpretation is inherently historical.
4. Solving the Puzzle of Article V
There remains the puzzle of Article V. Sedimentary interpretation re-
quires the judge (or the interpreter) to be alert to the process of very gradual
constitutional changer 29 This is something that common-law judges seem
224 A LEXIS search of Supreme Court decisions containing the terms "torture" and "in-
terrogation" yields forty-one cases. The earliest is Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897). The bulk of the cases, beginning with the third oldest, are found in the 1940s through
the 1960s.
225 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 903-10 (1987).
226 Although we cannot abandon our history, there is something dangerous in suggesting
that we can.* This is a point made poignantly by Katharine T. Bartlett in her piece Tradition,
Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, supra note 160. Professor
Bartlett's subject is the feminist rejection of tradition and the past. Although the reasons of
feminist scholars for rejecting past tradition are understandable, Bartlett argues that such a
rejection is ill-advised, even if it were actually possible. As Bartlett explains, "[ain approach
to progress built on distance from, rather than identification with, the past creates dissonance
and conflict." Id. at 305. Bartlett's point is not that interpretation of the past in general, and
tradition in particular, needs to be static, but that whatever we do in the present must be con-
structed upon the framework of the past. See id. at 305-06.
227 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Due Process
has represented the balance... between ... liberty and the demands of organized soci-
ety... having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as
well as the traditions from which it broke."); Bartlett, supra note 160, at 336 ("[A] tradition
consists of those aspects of the past from which a society has broken, as well as those a soci-
ety has endorsed and made its own.").
228 See GADAMER, supra note 153, at 281 ("Even where life changes violently, as in ages
of revolution, far more of the old is preserved in the supposed transformation of everything
than anyone knows, and it combines with the new to create a new value.").
2 See Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1063 ("Changes in constitutional law, and the altered
circumstances, knowledge, and valuations that underlie them, occur incrementally."). Gradual
change is apparently as frustrating as it is imperceptible. For example, Steven Calabresi re-
cently asked: "If the meaning of the Constitution really results from the courts reading a text
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to do quite naturally, although many theories of constitutional interpretation
seem to lack a sufficient place for this incremental common-law methodol-
ogy.230 Yet, how is it possible to reconcile this process of gradual change
with an explicit device in the written Constitution that describes how change
to that document is to be brought about? Is Article V without meaning?
The short answer to this puzzle rests in the realization that Article V,
like the rest of the Constitution, is subject to sedimentary development.
Like all other parts of the Constitution, the Article V amendment process
has become imbued with popular understandings both as to when it must be
employed, and when it legitimately may be ignored. 31 It is, for example,
widely recognized that the Reconstruction amendment process occurred in
ways that, to say the least, are problematic under the written strictures of
Article V.232 No one, however, seriously argues that those amendments are
not "valid" amendments to the Constitution. What happened is either that
Article V itself was "amended" during Reconstruction, or that the amend-
ments received widespread acceptance over time, itself a modification of the
Article V process. Similarly, the question of when we must resort to Article
233V clearly has undergone a gradual interpretation. It may not be entirely
certain what that understanding is, in part because understandings emerge in
response to specific cases, and in part because the question still cries out for
study. But some understanding is possible. For example, one important
in a new context and translating it, then why do old readings persist for so long after the con-
text has changed? Why did we have to wait so long for Erie or Darby or Brown or Lopez?"
Calabresi, supra note 171, at 1451.
230 But see Strauss, supra note 122, at 885 (arguing that common law provides the best
explanation of American constitutionalism despite theoretical reluctance to accept it in the
face of a written charter).
231 Professor Levinson makes a similar point
The most significant alternative, from the perspective of the traditional lawyer, con-
cerns the relative displacement of Article V as the mechanism by which amendments
occur. Not only have Americans been inventive in their use of Article V; more sig-
nificant, their inventiveness has been manifested in the very process of invention it-
self. Just as the "scientific method" itself has been transformed in the process of
conducting the operations of "science" itself, so has the method of constitutional
governance been transformed in the process of actually governing ourselves over the
past two centuries.
Levinson, supra note 184, at 429-30; cf 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 188, at 10 (describing how
"both Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats refus[ed] to follow the path for
constitutional amendment set out by their predecessors").
232 See, e.g., 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 44-47 (summarizing the intentional depar-
tures from the Article V amendment process by the Reconstruction Republicans); 2
ACKERMAN, supra note 188, at 160-206 (analyzing the political battles over the process by
which the Fourteenth Amendment was passed outside the process laid down in Article V).
233 Cf 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 188, at 15 (arguing that the text of Article V "makes its
procedures sufficient, but not necessary, for the enactment of a valid amendment").
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role for Article V is as a means to change judicial decisions, and it has been
employed several times to this end. 3  There is much good work to be done
here, but the central point is that like the rest of the Constitution, Article V
has undergone change. Like the rest of the Constitution, its meaning -is
sedimentary as well.
C. The Methodology of Sedimentary Interpretation
Because we regularly engage in sedimentary interpretation, it should
come as little surprise that its methodology is familiar. Sedimentary inter-
pretation is based upon intuitions and practices we already share; it simply
reconciles accepted interpretive practice with interpretive rhetoric.23 5 This
section discusses the tools of sedimentary interpretation, and how they
should be employed in order to decide constitutional cases.
The Supreme Court's understanding of substantive due process pro-
vides a rough formula for all of constitutional interpretation. The Supreme
Court has gradually come to employ a formulation (developed initially by
234 Article V has been used to overrule the Supreme Court four times. The Eleventh
Amendment was enacted and ratified to overrule Chisoim v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 DalI. 363
(1793); the Fourteenth to overrule Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); the
Sixteenth to overrule Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); and the
Twenty-Sixth to overrule Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). See JOHN R. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 20-24 (1994) (explaining how amend-
ments were used to overrule unpopular Supreme Court decisions).
235 That the sedimentary approach to interpretation "fits" current practice is made clear
by Philip Bobbitt's discussion of "ethical" arguments. Bobbitt's work identifies the modali-
ties of constitutional argumentation, and suggests that commitment to the use of these argu-
ments itself legitimates judicial review. See BOBBrT, supra note 10, at 5; PHILIP BOBBITr,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at xv (1991). Many of the modalities are quite common,
such as textual or originalist (what Bobbitt calls "historical") arguments. See BOBBITr, supra
note 10, at 7.
Bobbitt suggests the following exercise: take a Supreme Court opinion and underline all
the passages with different colors reflecting the various types of constitutional arguments.
There will remain a barren "patch of uncolored text." BOBBrr, supra note 10, at 93-94. That
remaining patch is the discussion in the case that results from sedimentary interpretation, what
Bobbitt calls "ethical" argument. See id. at 94.
Although it is not easy to fix precisely what Bobbitt means by ethical argument, its affin-
ity with the sedimentary approach is made clear by his own summary description: "Ethical
constitutional arguments" ensure that the solutions to constitutional questions "comport] with
the sort ofpeople we are and the means we have chosen to solve political and customary con-
stitutional problems." Id. at 94-95. Bobbitt has a method of developing ethical arguments
that is complex and a little difficult to fathom, one that looks to the limits on federal power to
define the nature of rights. But again, the sedimentary character of his approach is summed
up as he explains, "[T]his rule works better in a society like ours, that is no longer young and
that has both a good many statutes and a well-developed constitutional sense." Id. at 156.
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Justices Holmes and Cardozo,236 and seized upon readily by other Justices,
including Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Goldberg in particular237) which
seeks to identify those values "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' 8  This formula recently was
adopted by the entire Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg.
239
The search for the "history" and "traditions" of the people is precisely
the right one for constitutional interpreters.240 The goal is always to identify
in our history a set of commitments more enduring and less transient than
immediate popular preference.24 1 This is the single most important function
of a constitution-to limit present preferences in light of deeper commit-
ments.242 The Supreme Court's regular use of history is, however, unself-
236 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.); Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434
(1920) (Holmes, J.).
2 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
238 Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105; see also William W. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United
States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. RaV. 227, 247-54 (1988) (trac-
ing the history of this formulation).
239 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997); id. at 2281-83 (Souter, J., concurring). Even before
Glucksberg, Sylvia Law wrote that "[e]very justice of recent decades has affirmed that these
indeterminate provisions [of the Constitution] must be interpreted in light of 'our history and
traditions."' Sylvia A. Law, Conversations Between Historians and the Constitution, 12 THE
PUB. -ISTORIAN 11, 12 (1990). Law thus sees a role for historians in assisting with the de-
velopment of constitutional meaning, see id. at 13, a sentiment Laura Kalman echoes, see
Kalman, supra note 97, at 202-08. Cf Jane E. Larson & Clyde Spillenger, "That's Not His-
tory". The Boundaries of Advocacy and Scholarship, 12 THE PUB. HISTORIAN 33, 35 (1990)
(arguing for the role of historians as providing the Court with historical background material
under the "history and traditions" test).
240 See James C. Mohr, Historically Based Legal Briefs: Observations of a Participant
in the Webster Process, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 19, 24 (1990) ("The 'history and traditions' doc-
trine may be thought of as one of the most important bridges upon which lawyers and histori-
ans meet .... ").
241 Rebecca Brown makes the interesting point that as originally employed, the formula-
tion may have been a search for the Framers' values, and thus inappropriately intentionalist.
Brown criticizes the test as often too conservative and backward looking. See Brown, supra
note 20, at 200-05. Although this may have been so, at least as presently employed the test
looks far beyond the Founders. See also Teitel, supra note 181, at 609 ("To the extent that the
Court's tradition in quiry simply legitimates longstanding practices, it becomes a virtual proxy
for the endorsement of majoritarian understandings and raises serious questions about the role
ofjudicial review in the religion area.").
242 See infra Part III.A (discussing this function of constitutionalism). The accumulated
sediment atop the Constitution makes historical interpretation not only inevitable, but possi-
ble. Contrast today's 200-year-old constitutional culture with Christopher Eisgruber's de-
scription of the problem the Founders faced in establishing the new U.S. Constitution:
If Publius was right that a national government is essential, then Americans had no
choice but to establish a government from reflection and choice. The apparent alter-
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conscious, and often overly selective, a process Morton Horwitz rightfully
condemns as "roaming through history looking for one's friends."243 Con-
stitutional interpreters should be open to considering all of our constitutional
history in order to understand present-day commitments.
It likewise is important to recognize that in identifying our deepest tra-
ditions, not all history is likely to count equally. Because our deepest values
have been passed on through the generations, 244 constitutional meaning of-
ten will be evident by examining the more recent layers of history.
245
What judges should do in interpreting the Constitution is what they of-
ten already do. They should turn to the usual sources of interpretation. But
in utilizing those sources, the theory of sedimentary interpretation estab-
lishes their relevance and explains why we often privilege more contempo-
rary evidence of our deeper constitutional commitments over the intentions
of our forebearers.
An obvious beginning is the text of the Constitution, the priority of
which is often overstated. As explained above, we put much stock in our
written Constitution, yet at the same time, we regularly accept the fact that
many readings conflict with the precise words that the Constitution em-
ploys. "No" in the First Amendment and "all" in the Sixth Amendment do
not mean "no" 246 and "all,, 247 while the Eleventh Amendment means little
native to a chosen constitution-a constitution founded upon custom and tradition-
was inapplicable to the American situation. The country's great size, and the dispa-
rate histories of the groups who settled it, left the new nation without a homogenous
culture. And much of what was shared among its diverse citizens was inherited from
the English political tradition and thus rendered subject to challenge by the recent
revolution. The founding generation put its faith in reason and choice because it had
no other choice.
Eisgruber, supra note 25, at 442.
243 Morton J. Horwitz, Republican Origins of Constitutionalism, in TOWARD A USEABLE
PAST 148 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 160-70 (discussing how the present shapes the
past).
245 See infla Part II1.A (exploring the difficult problem of reconciliation this poses).
246 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) (limiting the scope of the
First Amendment by permitting the FCC to regulate the content of a radio broadcast that is
indecent, but not obscene).
247 See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370-74 (1979) (limiting the scope of the
Sixth Amendment by holding that the indigent are not entitled to counsel provided by state in
cases punishable by fine or prison sentence, if a prison sentence is not actually imposed). Of
course the Sixth Amendment might have been interpreted only to permit defendants to be rep-
resented by counsel, not as imposing an affirmative obligation on the state to provide counsel
to indigents, but this has not been the Supreme Court's direction. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that an indigent defendant facing a prison sentence in a
felony prosecution has the right to counsel provided by the state).
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248of what it says. Deviation from the text is as common as it was inevita-
ble: the Framers could not hope to see the future perfectly. The written
Constitution often serves as a guide, and undoubtedly its written-ness has
proven extremely important to its durability. But in many of its most con-
troversial aspects, we have written over the text with history. In a percep-
tive article, David Strauss tackles certain puzzles in constitutional interpre-
tation, noting for example that although we claim to privilege the text of the
constitution and the intent of the Framers, in reality recent precedents often
249trump both of these sources. Strauss correctly concludes that the distinc-
tion between a written and unwritten constitution is not nearly as significant
as the distinction between "societies with mature, well established constitu-
tional traditions and those with insecure traditions."
250
For this very reason, pre-constitutional history and traditions also are
important interpretive tools, particularly at a high level of generality. Even
originalists rely heavily on pre-constitutional understandings.251  What
originalists intuitively seem to understand is that our Constitution is part of
a broader tradition, and that in making the move to a written constitution,
we did not turn our back on all that had come before.252 We properly care
very little about precisely which punishments were acceptable in England in
1750.253 On the other hand, we frequently-and appropriately-refer to the
writings of Locke and Montesquieu and even to more ancient thoughts
248 The Supreme Court has been quite explicit on this point. See Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) ("'[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms."') (quoting
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
249 See Strauss, supra note 122, at 879. In arguing for the priority of common law con-
stitutionalism, Strauss notes many oddities of our present interpretation of the Constitution.
To cite but one example, Strauss observes that we have adhered to literal textual meaning far
more often for the less important matters. See id. at 916. Strauss makes the useful point that
it is more important for some questions to be settled relatively permanently than necessarily
correctly. See id. at 912-13. For more contested matters, however, it is more important that
constitutional meaning evolve along with present-day concerns and circumstances. See id. at
925-34. In this Strauss is surely correct, just as he is correct that in reality most difficult con-
stitutional questions are matters resolved by subsequent interpretation, not by text. See id. at
877, 916-23.
250 Id. at 890.
251 See Brown, supra note 20, at 190-91 (discussing the Supreme Court's awkward use of
pre- and post-ratification practice in its originalist decisions).
252 See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 18 (stating that learning from experience for citizens
of the founding generation meant learning from history, from antiquity to the present, not just
their generation).
2B See sources cited supra note 189 (explaining the evolving nature of analysis under the
discussion of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause).
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about popular democracy.254 Because the Framers relied on older under-
standings for some of the most basic aspects of our constitutionalism, these
understandings naturally continue to carry weight with us.
Similarly, we frequently rely on the views of the Founders, although
their relevance ought to depend upon the particular type of question pre-
sented. As Larry Kramer suggests, "[t]he Founding is a starting place, not a
fixed reference point. ' 255  Even the concept of a starting place requires
probing, as Kramer recognizes.256 In some instances, a particular clause of
the Constitution may have such a developed sedimentary understanding that
257there will be little occasion to return to ground zero. In other instances,
the question presented may be so novel that it is extremely useful to return
to first principles. In still other instances, we may have lost our way and
need to return to the Founding to resituate ourselves. When periods of rapid
change have unsettled our views, interpreters gain perspective by returning
to first principles and tracing growth forward.
When returning to the Founding era, however, it is important to under-
stand why we look there. The impetus should be to locate the most general
254 See RAKOVE, supra note 98, at 1598 (describing the Founders' familiarity with the
works of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, and Blackstone, in addition to being well
versed in the current science, jurisprudence, philosophy, and literature, and how these all in-
fluenced the original language of the Constitution).
255 Kramer, supra note 11, at 1639; see also Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1069-70 (argu-
ing that neither the language of the Constitution nor the intent of the Framers controls mean-
ing subsequently given to the Constitution, although both may be relevant to some degree).
Saying that we should examine the Framers' intent does not state precisely why this is the
case. As noted previously, originalist arguments are unconvincing. From a sedimentary per-
spective, the Framers' views obviously are part of the history that must be taken into account.
See also Dorf, supra note 9, at 1801-03 (describing this use of originalism as "ancestral origi-
nalism"). Michael Doff and Randy Barnett recently offered additional arguments for taking
account of the Framers' intent that have to do with our undeniable respect for the individuals
that fashioned our system of government. See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Fram-
ers'Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 403, 406 (1996) (referring to Framers as "wardens");
Doff, supra note 9, at 1803-05 (referring to this as "heroic originalism"). The Dorf and Bar-
nett arguments seem to be far more persuasive accounts of why constitutional interpretation
focuses so frequently on the words and opinions of specific Framers.
256 See Kramer, supra note 11, at 1640 (asserting that "[t]o assume that values articulated
at the Founding should apply unchanged is to overlook the ways in which those val-
ues.., may themselves have changed").
25 Many of the doctrines of the Fourth Amendment--such as the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement-are highly particularized and afford little reason to resort to
original understanding. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding
that police may search a closed container in an automobile without a warrant if they have
probable cause to suspect that it contains contraband).
258 This may well have justified the Term Limits opinions that began with examinations
of founding frst principles; it was the failure to take those first principles and apply them to
the present that make the opinions so disappointing. See supra notes 129-32 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Term Limits opinions).
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of constitutive ideas, not to embark on an acontextual hunt for an answer to
a particular contemporary problem.259 The latter is precisely the endeavor
that earns the justifiable scorn of historians. The proper focus of a return to
times long past is to locate some germinal idea---"a decision, idea, value,
belief, whatever '"26 --that we can use as a starting point to cabin the search
for later, more specific understandings and commitments.
Likewise, post-ratification practice is valuable, although it is important
to keep in mind why this is so. Judges, legislators, executive officials,
scholars, and lay citizens argue about what the Constitution means in terms
of what our past practice has been.261 Post-ratification is misused, however,
to the extent it is asked to serve solely as proof of Founding-era intentions
that necessarily bind us. Rebecca Brown makes the powerful point that it is
incoherent to rely on ex post actions to explain ex ante intentions.262 On
this point she is to an extent correct, but only to an extent. We often do
what we intended to do, so post-ratification actions may shed light on pre-
ratification intentions. We do not, however, always do what we intended.
We equally often deviate from past commitments, sometimes for good rea-
son, sometimes for no reason at all.
Widespread reliance on post-ratification practice may be the best rec-
ognition that what we intuitively are trying to do is identify present, not
past, commitments.263  Long-standing actions and practices often reveal
deeper commitments to a certain way of being. In a sense, post-ratification
259 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 188, at 32-33. Ackerman states:
I aim to push the Fathers off the pedestal without dropping them into the dustbin of
history.... If we are to grasp their enduring importance, we cannot look upon them
as demigods with final answers.... If we are to grasp 1787's enduring importance,
we must approach it with different expectations. We must search for the deeper
ways that the Founding language, institutions, and ideals have shaped the very proc-
ess through which later generations have revised the substantive commitments of the
Eighteenth century.
Id.
260 Kramer, supra note 11, at 1651.
261 One might argue that reasoning from precedents reflects nothing more than an appli-
cation of the moral principle that like cases must be treated alike. Be that as it may, the prin-
ciple standing alone is of no value. The meaning that the Constitution takes on is the accumu-
lated understanding of those "like" cases.
262 See Brown, supra note 20, at 190-91 (asking rhetorically whether "post-Constitutional
tradition [is] at all relevant to what the document originally meant").
263 Professor Brown is correct to observe that we should not "discount the force of pres-
ent tradition in rigid deference to past tradition.... mhat is the greatest evil of traditional-
ism" Id. at 216. The proper focus is situated in the present, looking toward the past, rather
than vice versa. Thus, the proper role of the interpreter is, as she suggests, "to gauge and
evaluate the lessons of present tradition." Id. at 221.
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practice is just a shorthand for the notion of tracing our commitments
through the sediment.
The constitutional decisions of the courts themselves reflect the evolu-
tion of constitutional meaning.264 Thus, they are, as David Strauss reminds
us, an extremely important resource for constitutional interpretation. 261 If
one wants to get a quick understanding of what the Constitution means to-
day, the best resource may well be Supreme Court decisions, or even a trea-
tise collecting those decisions into a black-letter statement of present under-
standings.2 66 The Supreme Court has been a consistent chronicler of
constitutional practices, understandings, and commitments.267 As many
have observed, including Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo,
David Strauss, and Edward Levi, common law methodology is the process
whereby we keep the law current with popular understandings.2 68 There is a
certain magic to the common law in this regard.
Yet, common law constitutional precedents are only one of many means
of tracing the evolution of fundamental commitments. 269 When mining our
history, we need to look to the actions and positions of constitutional actors
264 See Hoy, supra note 21, at 497 ("Precedent is ... a crucial part of what the law means
to us, and our understanding will be conditioned by the history of the reception of the legal
text in the decisions of prior judges.").
265 See Strauss, supra note 122, at 877 ("[I]n the day-to-day practice of constitutional
interpretation, in the courts and in general public discourse, the specific words of the text play
at most a small role, compared to evolving understandings of what the Constitution re-
quires.").
266 See, e.g., ERviN CHEMERINsKY, CONSTItUTIoNAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
(1997).
This reveals that constitutional precedent is often as important, if not more so, than
either the constitutional text or the Founders' intent. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1988) ("[O]riginal under-
standing must give way in the face of transformative or longstanding precedent, a conclusion
that in turn may make inevitable the unsettling acknowledgment that originalism and stare
decisis themselves are but two among several means of maintaining political stability and
continuity in society!"); see also BORK, supra note 21, at 155-60 (recognizing the importance
of accumulated Supreme Court precedent to the nation's self-understanding).
268 See BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 152 (Colonial
Press Inc. 1960) (1921) ("If judges have wofully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if
the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie ... the hands of their
successors."); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 5 (1963) ("The substance of
the [common] law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds ... with what is then under-
stood to be convenient ... ."); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
127 (1949) ("[The mechanism of legal reasoning] provides for the participation of the com-
munity in resolving the ambiguity [of legal rules] by providing a forum for the discussion of
policy . .. ."); Strauss, supra note 122, at 888 ("The common law approach makes sense of
our current practices in their broad outlines... ").
269 For this reason, although Strauss's instinct is correct, his application of his own intui-
tion is far too limited. Cf. Strauss, supra note 122, at 932-34 (using only judicial doctrine to
illustrate common law constitutional development).
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ranging well beyond the courts.2 70 There is a relatively new and vibrant lit-
erature stressing that actors other than the Supreme Court regularly "make"
constitutional law.271  Other scholars emphasize that legal outcomes, in-
cluding those that give meaning to the Constitution, are the result of a policy
272contest among the political branches. The intuitions of these authors are
correct. If we want to know how the Constitution is interpreted, it is best to
look at all of those who have an official role in interpreting it, or in dis-
playing our popular understanding of the document, not just the Constitu-
tion's self-appointed "ultimate arbiter.,
273
A moment's thought highlights the extent to which the Constitution
takes on meaning outside the pronouncements of constitutional courts. The
270 Bruce Ackerman highlights this point when, in the course of describing an approach
to understanding constitutional change, he states:
While decisions of the Supreme Court play a role, a larger role will be played by
Presidents and Congresses-and their efforts to gain the support of the American
People at general elections. We will be studying Congressional Committee reports,
Presidential proclamations, and party campaign platforms with the same care that
lawyers usually reserve for Supreme Court opinions.
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 188, at 17.
271 See, e.g., NEAL DEViNs, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 233-70 (1996) (dis-
cussing the roles of the executive and legislative branches in making and interpreting the law);
Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 23-
40 (1988) (discussing the roles that the executive branch, governmental agencies, and the
states play in interpreting the Constitution); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 68-87 (1996) (discussing the history of
the relationship between the Constitution and the development of all three branches of gov-
ernment).
272 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equi-
librium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Econ-
omy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing
Plan, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1992).
273 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("mhe federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution ... !"). The question of whether the Supreme
Court's decisions ought to bind other branches has been much mooted of late. See, e.g., Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 1359, 1359-62 (1997) (arguing that such decisions should be binding, despite admit-
ting that "most scholars, most officials, and.., many ordinary citizens" disagree); Gary Law-
son & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1996) ("mhe President... is not bound by, or legally required to give
deference to the constitutional determinations of... the courts."); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,
221 (1994) (arguing that the President is not bound with respect to those powers entrusted to
him). See generally Symposium, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court De-
cisions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 977, 978 (1987) (providing various views of the role of the Supreme
Court in creating binding constitutional law). For a history of the growth of judicial suprem-
acy, see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998), which examines the origins of
the countermajoritarian difficulty and its historical relationship to judicial supremacy.
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meaning of the Commerce Clause has been developed far more by numer-
ous congressional enactments than by a handful of Supreme Court deci-
sions, yet too often we focus just upon those decisions. The balance of the
War Power has been beaten out in hard-fought confrontations between the
Executive and Congress; what the courts have had to say is of relatively lit-
tle significance. Our understanding of the role of the states in foreign rela-
tions purports to come from judicial decisions, but those decisions-which
accord primacy to the national government-fail to take into account the
extremely active role that some states actually play in relations with neigh-
boring and even non-contiguous countries. 274 Constitutional judges them-
selves not only rely upon recent judicial decisions, they often turn to other
historical interpretations as well, such as significant congressional decisions,
common approaches among the states, and widespread practices among the
populace over time.
275
Indeed, the Supreme Court apparently recognizes the shortcoming of its
own precedents as the divining rod of deeper commitments, regularly con-
sulting other sources as to those commitments. For example, interpreting
the meaning of due process, a concept itself widely accepted as having an
evolutionary character, the Supreme Court often looks to the statutory ap-
proaches of the fifty states. Steven Winter recognized this some time ago,
when he observed the Court essentially "polling" state practices to deter-
mine whether it violated due process for police officers to use deadly force
in apprehending fleeing felons.276
Without drawing what could be an endless list, the point is that a large
variety of sources remain available to the courts to test and measure long-
standing commitments. In an article dealing with statutory interpretation,
Nicholas Zeppos painstakingly collected data on a wide variety of sources
utilized by the Supreme Court to find the meaning of statutes, some of them
quite inapt to traditional interpretive methodologies such as intentional-
ism.2 77 Among the sources he chronicled were canons of interpretation, ex-ecutive agency interpretations, legal briefs, views of private groups and fa-
274 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1617, 1637-39 (1997) (describing the federalism implications of state foreign relations
activities).
275 See Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of Judicial
Review, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 679, 683 (1986) (noting the Supreme Court's
"open effort to divine a natural trend or consensus concerning the common law rule" at issue
in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)); see also Friedman, supra note 192, at 597 ("The
Court turns time and again to a head count of states to discern the majority practice.").
276 Winter, supra note 275, at 683-85 (1986) (analyzing the Court's use of prevailing
rules for determining reasonableness).
277 Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1073 (1992).
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mous jurists, sources of international law, law review articles, and books
both legal and otherwise.278 As might be expected, the list is at least this
long in constitutional cases, as the Supreme Court has relied on a wide vari-
ety of materials encapsulating our history.
Although the Court has not always been self-conscious about what it is
doing, the cases that employ these rich sources are all evidence of the fun-
damental task before the Court-to identify long-standing values that con-
strain us in the face of present-day, popular desires. What the Court does
when it turns to this panoply of sources is consult all that rests deeply within
US. 27 9 Turning to history, the Court pieces together a story that seeks to de-
termine and persuade us why it is that a popularly chosen course would de-
viate too much from what, at a more fundamental level, we believe. That is
what we all instinctively do when we think about the Constitution.
The decisions of the Supreme Court are rife with historical references,
confirming the intuition that history is essential to the enterprise of consti-
tutional law. Nonetheless, the Court often fails to take a systematic ap-
proach to history, doing an incomplete job at some times, neglecting history
altogether at others. 280 This failure to attend to history is not costless. Un-
der the best of circumstances, nonhistorical, insufficiently historical, or in-
correctly historical decisions may nonetheless reach correct results. Often,
however, the Supreme Court actually will reach premature, poor, or wrong
decisions because it neglects the historical examination that should have in-
formed the decision-making process.
The role of sedimentary interpretation perhaps is illustrated best by ex-
amining some of the Supreme Court's most controversial decisions. First,
Brown v. Board of Education2s' serves as an example of a case in which
278 See id. at 1091-98.
279 See BOBBrrr, supra note 10, at 221 (stating that "[i]t is a notable feature of ethical
argument that it may incorporate an address like Lincoln's even though it was delivered from
no bench and ratified by no legislature," referring to the invocation of "The Gettysburg Ad-
dress" in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
280 This is less than surprising when one recognizes that even those who watch the Su-
preme Court most carefully themselves fail to appreciate the centrality of history. To see the
truth in this, open a casebook on constitutional law. Although the cases discussed here are
certain to be included, it is more than a little startling that usually the casebook authors have
edited out the most critical portion of the decisions, that is, the discussions of, and references
to, history. For example, as explained below, historical evolution was essential to the resolu-
tion of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice Blackmun's extensive historical discussion
in that opinion, however, is often eliminated by casebook editors in favor of what is in essence
the brief formalist reasoning of the opinion regarding the right to privacy. See, e.g., GuNTHER
& SULLIVAN, supra note 62, at 531 (omitting Blackmun's historical review); cf BOBBrrT,
supra note 10, at 157-58 (discussing how the Roe opinion "may be parsed," yet omitting en-
tirely any mention of the historical discussion).
281 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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history was inappropriately cast aside. Second, in two due process cases-
Roe v. Wade282 and Bowers v. Hardwick 83 -the Court properly relied on all
of our constitutional history, but did so with the incorrect methodology,
casting doubt on the results. Finally, one recent decision, Washington v.
Glucksberg,24 demonstrates what sedimentary interpretation requires.
1. Brown v. Board of Education: Ignoring History
Brown is an example of a decision that likely was correct the day it was
decided, but failed to make a proper historical case. On its face, Brown was
very much a decision in the model of living constitutionalism, 28 5 and some-
what of a disingenuous one at that. Trying to distinguish Plessy v.
Ferguson286 without overruling it explicitly, the Brown decision claimed to
be about education (which it was not) rather than about race (which it
was).?87 This became evident in the aftermath of Brown, as the Court struck
down one Jim Crow law after another, desegregating golf courses, parks,
and swimming pools through per curiam decisions, citing only Brown.288 If
Brown were an education case, such citation and per curiam decisions just
would not do, a fact commented upon by many who attacked the Court in
the aftermath of Brown.
2 89
282 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
283 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
284 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
285 See 347 U.S. at 492-93 ("In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back
to 1868.... Ve must consider public education in light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation.").
286 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
287 See 347 U.S. at 489-90, 492-93. In focusing on education, the Court went on at some
length about how education had become central to citizenship, citing highly controversial so-
ciological evidence regarding the impact of racial discrimination on the education of African-
American children. See id. at 493-94 & n.11. Ipso facto, racial discrimination in education
was out. See id. at 495 ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we
hold that the plaintiffs... [have been] deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
288 See, e.g., Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (airport restaurants and rest
rooms); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (city
parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of
Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956) (public law school); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches,
bathhouses, and swimming pools); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971
(1954) (golf courses and fishing lakes); Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 347 U.S. 971 (1954)
(public university).
289 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421,430 & n.25 (1960) (arguing that the Brown Court should have emphasized the
broader evils of segregation rather than just those apparent in the context of education); Her-
bert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-35
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Where the Brown Court went wrong was in abandoning its obligation to
examine history to determine if racial segregation was consistent with the
deeper values of 1950s America. As a case about race in which society's
historical commitments were examined, there is a very strong argument that
Brown was decided correctly.290 At the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, the
country may have been content to accept Jim Crow, or at least content to
overlook those who practiced it. At the time of Brown, however, this was
no longer the case. Views on the acceptability of state-enforced racial seg-
regation had shifted.29' World War II had taught the country the horrors of
racism, and the Cold War had, in Mary Dudziak's perceptive words, made it
"imperative" that America keep faith with its democratic rhetoric. 292 In this
context, Jim Crow stood as one huge, gaping embarrassment, a weapon of-
ten turned against the United States in foreign relations as well as a source
of discomfort at home.293 The change in views about segregation was evi-
dent in the vast positive public commentary in the aftermath of Brown that
focused not on the Court's education rationale,294 but upon the inconsis-
tency of de jure segregation with the country's rhetoric of equality. 295 Of
(1959) (arguing that the Brown decision's narrow basis did not adequately explain Brown it-
self or subsequent decisions based on Brown).
290 See Nelson, supra note 137, at 1270-73 (developing an argument supporting Brown
based upon changing historical commitments); cf POSNER, supra note 108, at 62 (discussing
the "evil" motivations of segregation).
291 See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions,
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996) (documenting that, in 1954, opinion polls reflected that "roughly
half of the country supported racial integration in public schools").
292 Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62
(1988). For a detailed examination of the social, political, and economic forces that served as
Brown's background, see also Klarman, supra note 291, at 13-71.
293 See Klarman, supra note 291, at 34 (discussing the "ideological forces" which shaped
the "changing racial norms").
294 Ironically, Brown today receives some of its fiercest resistance from African-
American scholars. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1604-5 (1989); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1750-54 (1993). That scholarship seems to reflect disappointment that
Brown failed to achieve its promise, causing those scholars to turn on the decision itself. As
this Article's analysis makes clear, however, Brown's very failure to rely upon history may
have both undercut its subsequent impact, and from the start misled as to precisely what it
could promise.
29 See, e.g., Annual Southern Baptist Convention, 1954, at 56 (stating that Brown is "in
harmony with the constitutional guarantee of equal freedom to all citizens, and with the
Christian principles of equal justice and love for all men"); Charles Fairman, The Supreme
Court, 1955 Term-Foreword: The Attack on the Segregation Cases, 70 HARV. L. REV. 83,
91 (1956) (noting that the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions reflected "a quickened
national conscience"); Howard W. Odum, An Approach to Diagnosis and Direction of the
Problem of Negro Segregation in the Public Schools of the South, 3 J. PUB. L. 8, 13 (1954)
("mhe pressure upon the South to reform its undemocratic actions must also be identified
with the nation's mid-century high motivation for the reaffirmation of its basic democracy.");
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course, Brown also met with widespread resistance, but the tenor of that re-
sistance-phrased often in terms of the minority status of the southern
states296-only reinforced the fact that the decision found support in the
deeper views of society at large.2 97 The entire country-save the Supreme
Court-seemed to view Brown for what it was, a case resting on a funda-
mental national commitment to ending formal barriers to racial equality.
Many applauded, some spat, but this is what Brown was about.
Although one can only speculate as to why the Brown Court did not
justify its decision in a manner more attentive to the American people's
298changing commitments, this error came with costs. Perhaps least signifi-
cant among these costs was the stunning critical academic commentary that
began with Learned Hand's and Herbert Wechsler's Holmes Lectures.
299
Editorial Excerpts from the Nation's Press on Segregation Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
1954, at 19 [hereinafter Editorial Excerpts] ("The ruling ... is one of the hardest blows dealt
against communistic propaganda in many years. Unpleasant as it is to many Southerners, we
are on the road to making the democratic principles embodied in our Constitution a fact."'
(quoting the University of Kentucky's student newspaper, The Kernel)); id. ("Had the decision
gone the other way the loss to the free world in its struggle against Communist encroachment
would have been incalculable. Nine men in Washington have given us a victory that no num-
ber of divisions, arms and bombs could ever have won." (internal quotations omitted)); The
Supreme Court: Historic Decision, NEWswEEK, May 24, 1954, at 26 (noting that segrega-
tion, the symbol of inequality, once a "weapon of world [c]ommunism" had been "shattered"
by Brown).
296 See Text of 96 Congressmen's Declaration on Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1956, at 19 (reporting the text of "Declaration of Constitutional Principles" issued by South-
ern representatives.
Even though we constitute a minority in the present Congress, we have full faith that
a majority of the American people believe in the dual system of government... and
will in time demand that the reserved rights of the states and of the people be made
secure against judicial usurpation.
Id.
297 Some of the support came from the South. See, e.g., Editorial Excerpts, supra note
295, at 19 ("mhe court is entirely right in its statement that segregation, however 'equal' the
physical facilities, does put the brand of inferiority on Negro pupils in the schools." (quoting
The Baltimore Sun)); Reaction to High Court Decision: Hailed as Triumph for Democracy by
Some, Tragic by Others, in South, NASHVILLE, TENNESSEAN, May 18, 1954, at 2 ("[T]he rul-
ing was the only one it could make.").
298 The best candidate may be the explanation that many on the Court-egged on in par-
ticular by Felix Frankfurter-felt that tackling the issue head on might have generated hostil-
ity in the South. See Mark Tushnet with Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v.
Board of Education, 91 COLum. L. REV. 1867, 1921-29 (1991) (recounting Frankfurter's and
the Court's general fear of Southern resistance and the consequent maneuvering over the ap-
propriate remedy). History suggests the Court might have saved itself the bother of trying to
be politic (or political) about the South, and stuck to its assigned task of probing deeply-held
commitments and justifying its decisions on those grounds.
299 See generally LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMEs LEcTURES, 1958, at 54-55 (1964) (criticizing The Segregation Cases as an illegiti-
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This commentary prompted other academics to complain about the candor
and craft of the Court, and to vaunt the search for neutral principles. 30 0 It is
worth wondering what would have happened if the Supreme Court had put
Hand and Wechsler to the test by squarely confronting race as an issue. In
the public at large, however, the costs were greater still. Rather than being
forced to argue in favor of segregation in the face of a well-reasoned argu-
ment against it, some Southern politicians and newspapers were able to at-
tack the Brown Court's use of sociological evidence, and to raise questions
about public education.301 This allowed the South to avoid directly con-
fronting public approbation of its racial practices.
302
Most importantly, Brown's failure to rely upon and develop the case for
the country's commitment to racial equality permitted the country to avoid
the discussion of precisely what that commitment would entail. Had the
Court met its historical obligations, the decision likely would have come out
the same way, but it would have been better grounded and would have pro-
vided a more focused and substantial basis for the inevitable discussion that
was to follow. As it has turned out over the long haul, public commitments
to racial equality seem stronger in support of eliminating formal government
barriers to equality than they do in support of affirmative government ac-
tions to ensure equality.303 It is too much to blame Brown for either the
contentious nature of this debate, or to suggest the nature of the decision
mate "coup de main"); Wechsler, supra note 289, at 31-35 (criticizing the principled, rather
than the doctrinal, reasoning underlying Brown).
300 The debate over neutral principles is rehearsed in Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles:
A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 (1997).
301 See, e.g., Cook Rips Segregation Ruling as 'Hot Potato,' ATLANTA CONST., June 2,
1955, at 1 (quoting Georgia Attorney General Eugene Cook's criticism that "the court is try-
ing to apply psychology and sociology to the U.S. Constitution"); Dixie Rejoins the United
States, THE ECONOMIsT, Sept. 24, 1955, at 15 (quoting Southern reaction: "These nine men
repudiated the Constitution, spat upon the tenth amendment, and rewrote the fundamental law
of this land to suit their own gauzy concepts of sociology"); James Reston, A Sociological
Decision: Court Founded Its Segregation Ruling on Hearts and Minds Rather Than Laws,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 1954, at 14 ("Relying more on the social scientists than on legal prece-
dents... [t]he [C]ourt's opinion read more like an expert paper on sociology than a Supreme
Court opinion."); Segregation Was Doomed Before the Court Acted, SAT. EVENING POST,
June 19, 1954, at 10 (reminding the Supreme Court "that even social progress will be better
safeguarded if Congress reads the sociology textbooks" and suggesting that the Justices stick
to the "[d]ull reading" of legal precedent).
302 See Nelson, supra note 137, at 1272 (noting that Southerners "were not prepared to
translate their emotional [preference for segregation] into a rational argument in support of
that qractice").
See Friedman, supra note 300, at 532-34 ("[The public seems to see some justice in
the principle that those who have been wronged ought to be made whole... [but] there is the
question of whether reliance on race-conscious remedies impedes the ultimate goal of race
equality.").
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necessarily affected the subsequent outcome. Yet, if the Court justified its
decision in historical terms, we may well have seen the debate about racial
equality evolve differently.
2. Privacy Cases: Right History, Wrong Theory
Unlike Brown, in privacy cases such as Roe v. Wade304 and Bowers v.
Hardwick,05 the Supreme Court has attended to historical developments
since the Founding era, but it has done so without properly considering the
reason why. In Roe and Bowers, fundamental commitments were in flux
and highly contested. It is difficult to say that proper historical considera-
tion would have changed the result in either case, but it might have. In any
event, a concern for present commitments was the correct one, and with this
perspective the Court's historical narratives might have been seen in a very
different light.
Despite'widespread criticism of the direction taken by the Court in Roe,
as a matter of sedimentary interpretation its decision is one of the Supreme
Court's better-reasoned historical decisions. Even those who favor the out-
come in Roe have been reluctant to support the Court's reasoning;306 but
careful attention to Justice Blackmun's opinion-to all of it, not just the
formalist reasoning about privacy-suggests that he at least went about his
task in the correct way. When push came to shove, however, he failed to
connect his study of history to the proper reasons for examining it.
Whether there is a basis for finding a right to choose abortion in the
Constitution should depend upon whether laws banning abortion are con-
sistent with what history reveals to be the deeply held commitments of the
304 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
305 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
306 See, e.g., BOBBrIT, supra note 10, at 158-59 (suggesting that a rule stipulating that the
government may not "coerce intimate acts" would be more persuasive than the justification
provided in Roe); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1569-71
(1979) (equating a law that forbids abortions to one which requires a woman to be a good sa-
maritan to carry the fetus to term-hereby imposing on the woman an obligation which vio-
lates deeply rooted principles of American law). Roe is justified by arguments such as equal
protection, see, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Re-
lation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (suggesting that the Court's opinion
would have been strengthened by utilizing a sex-equality based justification rather than fo-
cusing on reproductive autonomy), or the theory that forcing a woman to carry a fetus to term
kidnaps her body in an unconstitutional way. See Judith Jarvis, A Defense of Abortion, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-62 (1971) (noting that while it may be unjust for a mother to refuse
to allow an unborn baby to "use" her body to develop, it does not follow that the baby has a
"right" to such use).
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people today. Commentators attacking the Roe decision have focused on
almost everything but this question.
30 7
Contrary to the bulk of scholarly commentary, Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Roe v. Wade took precisely the correct approach to answering the
question in that case, which was whether, as a historical matter, laws ban-
ning abortion were consistent with deeply held commitments. 30 8 Justice
Blackmun's decision was a deliberate endeavor to trace the history of public
sentiment about abortion and procreative autonomy, tackled in Blackmun's
characteristically thorough way. Blackmun's opinion takes the reader from
ancient Greece, through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, up to pres-
ent debates about the abortion controversy.30 9
Justice Blackmun failed, however, to appreciate that what ultimately
mattered was whether the history he surveyed demonstrated a widely held
commitment to procreative autonomy at the present time, one that would
justify Supreme Court intervention. On this score the evidence was decid-
edly mixed, and the Court's decision may well have been premature. As
Justice Blackmun acknowledged, "the restrictive criminal abortion laws in
effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage."
310
Moreover, Blackmun correctly looked to the trend of public sentiment by
examining state lawmaking, concluding "a trend toward liberalization of
abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third of the States,
of less stringent laws."311 This, too, was significant; but one-third of the
states does not a consensus make, let alone a deep or long-standing one.
Similarly, Justice Blackmun showed that contemporary debates among
medical professionals were beginning to tip in favor of wider availability of
abortion.312 This trend, however, was just beginning, and those profession-
als may well have been at the cusp of public opinion. Thus, Justice Black-
mun may have engaged in the correct study but also may have led the Court
307 See BORK, supra note 21, at 113-15 (questioning the relevance and persuasiveness of
the cases relied upon by the Roe Court to expand the right of privacy); Ely, supra note 96, at
926-30 (concluding that the Court's analysis is not based upon inference of the Framer's in-
tent or the system of government "contemplated by the Constitution"); Epstein, supra note 96,
at 178-85 (criticizing the Court for defining and balancing timely social and political interests
under the guise of a Due Process analysis).
308 But see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 47, 95-98 (1995) (arguing that Blackmun's historical discussion was irrelevant
to the constitutional question at hand).
309 See 410 U.S. at 129-47 (explaining that laws proscribing abortions arise from late
nineteenth century statutory changes and are not of ancient or common law origin).
310 Id. at 129.
311 Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
312 See id. at 141-47 (detailing recent developments in abortion legislation which have
resulted from a more liberal medical community response).
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to a premature conclusion by failing to understand the significance of what
the study showed.
In light of this discussion of Roe, it becomes plain that the Court in
Bowers made precisely the same error as that of the Roe Court, but one
tending in the opposite direction. In Bowers, the Supreme Court purported
to rely on history to find that there was no right to engage in homosexual
sodomy in the Constitution.313  Among academics the decision has been
widely reviled.314 Among the public, the evidence is perhaps less certain,
and surely the issue of gay rights is a controversial one. What is stunning,
however, is how the Bowers Court's purported use of history failed in the
same way as did the Roe Court's, yet with the opposite result.
Justice White, writing for the Court in Bowers, presented evidence that
the trend in society was moving speedily away from the result the Court
reached, yet he ignored this evidence and ridiculed the notion that the Con-
stitution might offer any protection for homosexual practices. Justice White
reviewed the history of criminal sodomy laws regulating homosexual con-
duct,315 although in a much less careful way than did Justice Blackmun in
Roe, leaving White's decision open to challenge. 16 Importantly, however,
White's historical review concluded that "until 1961, all 50 states outlawed
sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to pro-
vide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between con-
senting adults."317 Then, the Court concluded that "to claim that a right to
313 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 & nn.5-7 (1986) (noting that sodomy
was prohibited by the original thirteen states and was a criminal common law offense).
,4 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1721-26 (1993) (identifying the fundamental error
in Bowers as the equation of homosexual identity with the act of sodomy); Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1494-99, 1532-37 (1988) (reviling and then rewriting
Bowers relying on civic republicanism); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Prece-
dent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CER. L. REV. 648, 648-56 (1987) (criticizing the logic, or
lack thereof, supporting the Court's opinion).
315 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94.
316 See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for
the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081-89 (1988) (chal-
lenging the historical assertion relied upon by the Bowers majority). As Bill Eskridge argues,
the Court's opinion is flawed in terms of historical precedent, by overlooking the Court's re-
jection of natural law as a valid justification of sex regulation in the SkinnerlGriswoldlRoe
line of cases, as well as historiography, by failing to recognize that the traditional protections
against coercive sex and sex with minors did not support the Court's result. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming May 1999).
317Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94.
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engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."
3 18
Although the weighing of historically based commitments is not an ex-
act science, there is good reason to suggest that Justice White underesti-
mated some important evidence. Justice White's historical examination re-
vealed that during the twenty-some years between 1961 and 1985, more
than half the states had eliminated their criminal sodomy laws, and perhaps
(in the face of what looks to be intentional ambiguity in Justice White's
opinion) other states had lessened the severity of the offense.31 Particularly
in light of an understanding that repealing a law may be every bit as difficult
as enacting one, Justice White told us something very significant about
changing public perceptions. 32  One might argue that the trend was still a
bit premature for the Bowers Court to come out the other way, especially
given that the trends in public sentiment were quite recent. There were,
however, other options, such as a holding that a state must enforce its sod-
omy laws equally or not at all, or even a holding that the case was moot, or
that Hardwick did not have standing, thus avoiding the question for the time
being.321 But Justice White's somewhat sarcastic opinion, asserting that any
historical claim to sexual autonomy on the part of gays was "facetious,"
3 2
is hardly a fair summary of what the evidence suggested were the commit-
ments of his national audience. It is little wonder that since Bowers, gay
rights have found much broader public acceptance, as well as greater ac-
ceptance by the Court.
The point of this discussion of Roe and Bowers is emphatically not that
constitutional meaning should be determined on the basis of opinion polls.
That approach confuses present preferences for deeper commitments, decid-
323edly not the task of sedimentary interpretation. Rather, the goal of con-
318 Id. at 194; see also id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (tracing the "ancient roots"
of antisodomy laws).
319 See Bartlett, supra note 160, at 315 ("[E]ven by Justice White's own account, over
half the states since 1961 had... repealed their sodomy laws ... [or] did not enforce them.").
320 In fairness, this movement may have been influenced by the Model Penal Code's rec-
ommendation that states repeal those laws, as much as by a clear shift in public opinion. See
Halley, supra note 314, at 1774-76 (tracing the changing degrees over time to which state
courts have been willing to judicially repeal sodomy statutes).
321 See Donald A. Dripps, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Law of Standing: Noncases
Make Bad Law, 44 EMORY LJ. 1417, 1418 (1995) (arguing that Hardwick did not have
standing and, if he had, that "the result of the litigation would have been different"); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 n.309 (1996) (claiming that a "thoroughgoing [judicial] minimalist
would ... have dismissed th[e] case as moot").
322 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
323 See infra Part IIl.C (discussing the role of judges in sedimentary interpretation as
identifying deeper commitments).
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stitutional decision makers (or advocates) is to fashion a historical narrative
that identifies deeper commitments and justifies the enduring nature of those
commitments. The evolution of statutes, changes in common understand-
ings, and patterns of non-enforcement of certain laws are all tools in devel-
oping the narrative. These privacy cases emphasize that deeper values may
well be found in the topmost sedimentary layer. Nonetheless, it is sediment
that is sought, not sand.
3. Washington v. Glucksberg: Sedimentary Interpretation
In sharp contrast to the decisions discussed above stands one recent de-
cision, Washington v. Glucksburg,324 in which the Court self-consciously
recognized its obligation to consider all of our history, not just that of the
Founding, and to use that history to determine what it said about our present
commitments. This methodology was apparent to a greater or lesser degree
in most of the opinions in the case, but was most prominent in the majority
decision and in Justice Souter's concurrence. Glucksburg presented the
question of whether state laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide were
unconstitutional as applied to the terminally ill.
325
In modem-day terms, the case presented a contest between competing
sets of contested commitments. The first is society's concern about the
value of human life and the gravity of letting it slip away. The second is the
still developing right to bodily autonomy, a right reflected in cases such as
Planned Parenthood v. Casey326 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health,327 as well as in our long history of individual liberty. Both
of these commitments were aired forcefully in Glucksberg, and both were
considered in a way that took the historical evolution of values into account.
Although they came at the issue in somewhat different ways, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's majority opinion and Justice Souter's concurring opinion
both devoted substantial effort to examining the historical development of
the competing sets of values. Both decisions attended to the long history of
regulation in the area.328 Both took into account numerous sources of con-
stitutional history, including statutes, state and federal court decisions, ex-
ecutive actions, activity by mobilized citizens, professional task forces, and
324 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
325 See id. at 2261 (considering the constitutionality of state statutes prohibiting physi-
cian-assisted suicide).
326 505 U.S. 833 (1993).
327 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
328 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262-67; id. at 2286-89 (Souter, J., concurring).
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the like.329 Both decisions worked hard to contextualize the controversy.
The opinions differed somewhat as to which set of competing values were
emphasized, 330 but that is precisely as it should be. Comparative narratives
about deeply held commitments are inevitable and help to produce thought-
ful sedimentary interpretation.
Indeed, there is yet another, perhaps more remarkable, way in which
Glucksberg was faithful to sedimentary interpretation, that is, regarding the
construction of the (substantive) Due Process Clause itself. The idea of the
Supreme Court striking down state laws as arbitrary under the Due Process
Clause is highly contested, with its own long history. Justice Souter's
opinion traces that history, struggling to embed the Supreme Court's man-
ner of deciding these cases in current understandings about the role of the
Constitution and the Supreme Court.331 In a lesser fashion, even the Chief
Justice did the same.332 Thus, Glucksberg stands both as a united statement
in favor of the use of substantive due process and as a mirror of the broad
public consensus that the right to die is not, at this time, one of our funda-
mental commitments.
None of this is meant to glorify the result in Glucksberg. Like many
constitutional decisions handed down each term, it has had its proponents
and opponents. But, in Glucksberg, the Supreme Court seems to have come
together in understanding the need to consider present commitments in light
of their historical developments. Although the task was perhaps made eas-
ier in that it was a substantive due process case in which the Court's own
formula is directed to this very inquiry, Glucksberg nevertheless stands as a
model of sedimentary interpretation.
329 See id. at 2262-75 (considering the broad historical treatment of assisted suicide); id.
at 2286-89 (Souter, J., concurring) (same).
330 See id. at 2268 & n.17 (describing the debate between the Court and Justice Souter
over whether the law at issue is consistent with "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices" (the Court's position), or whether it sets up "one of these 'arbitrary impositions'
or "purposeless restraints" (Justice Souter's position) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
331 See Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. at 2277-86 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that the
Court may not derive its values merely from personal and private notions, but rather is "bound
to confine the values that it recognizes to those.., expressed in the constitutional text, or
those exemplified by 'the traditions from which [the Nation] developed' (quoting Poe, 367
U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
332 See id. at 2267-68 (discussing the role "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices" must play in guiding responsible decisionmaking).
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III. HARD QUESTIONS: RECONCILIATION, CONTESTABILITY,
AND COMPETENCE
The practice of sedimentary interpretation may be stated simply, but it
poses questions of great theoretical difficulty. The task of a constitutional
interpreter is to use history to understand today's deeper, long-standing
commitments, and to reconcile those commitments with present prefer-
ences.333 Yet, how can we reconcile deeper values with present preferences
when those "deeper" or more fundamental values actually rest quite close to
the top of the constitutional topography? And, how can we pretend that the
values we identify are, in fact, "our" values in a plural society in which his-
torical commitments are contested? Moreover, why is it that judges are
seemingly privileged in this identification of fundamental values, if in fact
the process of identification is one of historical narrative? These are the
problems of reconciliation, contestability, and judicial competence.
Rather than purporting to offer clear resolution of these difficult ques-
tions, this Part instead explains why they are the correct "hard questions" of
constitutional interpretation. In the process, it offers some tentative conclu-
sions. No theory of constitutional interpretation is either determinate or
problem free. Any promise to the contrary (as originalism sometimes ap-
pears to make) is illusory. Every theory of constitutional interpretation has
its own difficult questions. The relevant issue, however, is whether the dif-
ficult questions presented are the correct ones, not whether these questions
have clear and certain answers.
Moreover, despite the apparent difficulty in answering these questions,
it is worth bearing in mind that we manage to address them innately on a
daily basis. We do it in both our personal lives and in our collective con-
stitutional life. We may struggle with difficult cases, but we nonetheless
resolve them and move on. A good measure of the worth of sedimentary
interpretation is that we often already interpret the Constitution in this very
way. As difficult questions are tackled, therefore, keep in mind that how-
ever difficult they are, they are questions which we seem prepared to grap-
ple with every day.
333 A similar proposition was advanced by Jed Rubenfield, when he wrote: "An account
of constitutional interpretation must be able (1) to distinguish interpreting from rewriting,
rooting interpretation somehow in text and history; and yet (2) to explain and incorporate the
undeniable role of normative judgment in constitutional law, beyond the letter of the law, and
sometimes in defiance of the original intentions." Jed Rubenfeld, On Fidelity in Constitu-
tional Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1469, 1487 (1997).
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A. The Problem of Reconciliation
At bottom, constitutionalism necessarily must be the reconciliation of
present-day, popular preferences with some set of deeper, more enduring
values. Without the juxtaposition between present-day preferences and
more enduring values, the idea of constitutionalism is meaningless.3 34 If
there is no difference between present desires and these other values, then
the very idea of constitutionalism collapses upon itself and we are left with
nothing but popular preferences, no matter how they are aggregated and rep-
resented. Constitutionalism necessarily implies some idea of restraint-of
constraint.335 Constitutionalism may be much more, but it cannot be less.
3 36
Stated in this way, it becomes clear that the real problem is one of per-
spective. The closer the constitutional commitments or values are to the
surface of the sedimentary Constitution, the more difficult it is to tell them
apart from present-day preferences. One conceptual advantage of origi-
nalism is that the values it enforces are quite distinct from present prefer-
ences. But originalism is impossible in practice, for all the reasons dis-
cussed previously, and so its conceptual advantage is rendered futile.
Instead, as the distinctions between present desires and past values become
less clear, we necessarily must confront the problem of reconciliation.
Despite the difficulty of reconciliation, this idea of past commitments
running alongside present preferences is not an unfamiliar one. We en-
counter it daily in our ordinary lives. It may be a beautiful day, and the pre-
sent preference may be to go swimming, or work in the garden; but it may
also be a Sabbath day and many people may have much deeper commit-
334 See Sherry, supra note 218, at 1013 ("The task of the pragmatist decisionmaker [, es-
pecially in constitutional cases,] is to reconcile a flawed tradition with an imperfect world so
as to improve both and do damage to neither.").
335 See HOLMES, supra note 134, at 274 ("Constitutionalism... assumes that the pas-
sions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint.");
Rubenfeld, supra note 333, at 1483 (defining constitutionalism as "self government over
time," restrained by "commitment").
336 It may seem that this definition sidesteps a large part of what the Constitution does, in
that, as many have observed, the Constitution's foremost function seems to be the structuring
of American government. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JuDIcLAL REviEW 90 (1980) (noting that the body of the Constitution is devoted almost en-
tirely to questions of structure). But the two functions of structure and interpretation are not
mutually exclusive, for interpretive questions about the mechanics of government regularly
arise. If no such questions emerge, it means that we have agreed on those values underlying
the present governmental structure. If disagreement arises as to structural mechanics, then the
same problem presents itself: How do we reconcile the interpretation we wish to give struc-
tural provisions today with what our commitment to constitutional values suggests is the cor-
rect interpretation? See Sandalow, supra note 13, at 1069 ("Constitutional law is the means
by which we express the values that we hold to be fundamental in the operations of govern-
ment.").
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ments that lead them to worship. We might receive an invitation that would
cause us to break plans with a friend, but, although the invitation is appeal-
ing, longer-standing loyalties lead us to decline. We reconcile these con-
flicts between present preferences and deeper commitments regularly,
sometimes with great struggle and sometimes quite easily.337 Indeed, the
heightened level of angst that accompanies some such decisions is likely a
function of factors that mirror the idea of constitutionalism: how important
is the deeper commitment, how strong is our present desire, how compelling
is the reason to deviate from deeper principles, what are the consequences
of such departure likely to be, and how well are we able to rationalize the
departure?
As in our personal lives, the problem of reconciliation in our collective
constitutional life is also one we solve every day. Constitutionalism is diffi-
cult precisely because it challenges us to decide on a daily basis who we are
and for what we stand.3 38 It would be nice if we could elude the question
simply by turning to a rule book written two hundred years ago that an-
swered all of these hard questions, but we cannot. To make matters worse,
present preferences inevitably influence our perception of our deeper com-
mitments. Precisely because our desire to act upon our present preferences
is so compelling, we are prone to distort our understanding of deeper com-
mitments, thus complicating the process of reconciliation.
Despite the difficulty of reconciliation, it is precisely the correct prob-
lem; solving it gives content to our understanding of who we are and what
we are about. Constitutionalism in a very real sense is the process of con-
stituting ourselves,3 39 and it should come as no great shock to learn that the
task is not an easy one. Although our generation defines its commitments
daily as it resolves these difficult problems, 340 any theory that purports to
offer easy answers is likely to be a chimera. Sedimentary constitutionalism
337 See Bartlett, supra note 160, at 334 ("Individuals attain new understandings of them-
selves and others by struggling to resolve the incoherence between their deeply ingrained
habits and norms and their experiences and insights.").
338 Cf Hoy, supra note 21, at 497 ("In understanding the law we are really trying to un-
-derstand ourselves, and the tradition of legal interpretation and judicial practice is an impor-
tantjpart of what we have become." (footnote omitted)).
See WOLIN, supra note 156, at 9 ("A constitution not only constitutes a structure of
power and authority, it constitutes a people in a certain way."); Mark Tushnet, Constituting
We the People, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1997) (discussing "a coherent narrative in
which the Constitution constitutes the people of the United States"); Winter, Indeterminacy
and Incommensurability, supra note 137, at 1486 (explaining the "double sense" of the word
"constitutional" as "simultaneously constituted and constituting" the "human subject").
340 See Tushnet, supra note 339, at 1560-61 (noting that constitutionalism is "a project,
that is, a self-creating activity in which the people of the United States daily decide whether to
continue to pursue the course we have been pursuing").
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presents the problem squarely, which in and of itself suggests the sense of
the approach.
B. The Contestability of History
Although the process of reconciling deeper commitments with present
preferences is hard enough in our personal lives, it appears almost over-
whelming in the constitutional context. After all, the American people are
not a monolith.341 We are a disparate people come ashore from many dif-
ferent lands, each with our own history and our own way of understanding
342that history. Given our differences, the deeper commitments we seek toidentify necessarily will be contested.343 But it is this very process of con-
341 See Eisgruber, supra note 308, at 56 n.23 (stating that it is important to ask whether
"Americans living under the Constitution in fact constitute a single people with shared com-
mitments"). National differences and their place in a national "civic" history are the focus of
Rogers Smith's extensive treatment of American citizenship laws. ROGERS M. SMrrH, CivIc
IDEALS (1997). Smith examines how citizenship laws have been used to mold a national
story, while excluding different groups at different times. Smith's book tackles at great length
the question, "How and why do people come to construct civic identities?," see id. at 30, a
question treated only briefly in this section. Although Smith concedes the need to construct a
national story, see id. at 480, his broader theme is the peril of doing so in ways that exclude or
disrespect individual group identity.
This is the basis for Appleby's book describing the tension placed on a unified na-
tional story by the constant waves of immigrants, each wave with its own story to tell. See,
e.g., APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 133-34 (noting that Turner's frontier thesis of Ameri-
cans was immediately problematic in light of the millions of uprooted Europeans arriving on
our shores); see id. at 294-302 (describing the difficulty of creating a national story for the
United States in light of the many separate group stories).
343 See id. at 255-61 (arguing that even if the facts are agreed upon, different groups will
emphasize different facts, or see them in different ways); see also Rudolph J.R. Peritz, History
as Explanation: Annals ofAmerican Political Economy, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 231, 234-
35 (1997) (discussing how "historical knowledge ultimately emerges out of... the very inter-
pretive divergences produced by juxtaposing alternative historical accounts," and then going
on to discuss history as "discourse"). There is obviously a tension between recognizing that
different groups will have experienced different histories, and the need to construct a national
identity. The debate over this tension plays out, in part, in academic history circles in the de-
bate over "synthesis" in American history. Compare Thomas Bender, Wholes and Parts:
Continuing the Conversation, 74 J. AM. HIST. 123, 126 (1987) (explaining that synthesis re-
quires "neither orthodoxy nor an authoritative 'we'), and Thomas Bender, Wholes and Parts:
The Needfor Synthesis in American History, 73 J. AM. HIST. 120, 126-27 (1986) (arguing for
the role of history in creating a public culture), with Richard Wightman Fox, Public Culture
and the Problem of Synthesis, 74 J. AM. IST. 113, 114-15 (1987) (questioning whether syn-
thesis is likely to express the dominant group's views), Nell Irvin Painter, Bias and Synthesis
in History, 74 J. AM. HIST. 109, 110-11 (1987) (expressing concern that synthesis might fail
to recognize various groups' histories), and Roy Rosenzweig, What Is the Matter with His-
tory?, 74 J. AM. HIST. 117, 118 (1987) (wondering in whose voice a synthesis history will be
told).
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test and resolution by which we define ourselves as a constitutional na-
tion.344
The telling of history is inevitably the process of choosing.345 In de-
scribing past events, the historical interpreter must cull from the many facts
that "really" happened those that have significance for the narrative being
346told. Thomas Jefferson wrote many, many things. Much of what he
wrote occupies little of our attention today, while certain letters, documents,
and tracts play a prominent role in our national narrative.347  We decide
what it is from the past that we are to emphasize or integrate into our pres-
ent being.348 The rest, we cull. As Alfred North Whitehead put so ele-
gantly, the past is "[perpetually] perishing."
349
What is taken from the past, and what is left out, inevitably is influ-
enced by the person or people piecing the narrative together, as well as by
344 See APPLEBY Er AL., supra note 4, at 63 (describing how nations use history to con-
struct national identity); WOLIN, supra note 156, at 12 ("Societies try to express what they are
about as political collectivities by appealing to or constructing their pasts and connecting that
past with present arrangements of power.... What is at stake here is an interpretation of the
meaning of collective identity as expressed through the constitutionalization of power."). The
authors of Telling the Truth About History describe at length how history has been used by
Americans to create national identity, a special problem for Americans after the Revolution.
See APPLEBY ET AL, supra note 4, at 90-159. They go on to explain the tension in America
today between telling stories that are unifying, but omitting crucial parts of specific group sto-
ries, or the telling of faithful group stories, even though those histories splinter national iden-
tity. See, e.g., id. at 116 (contrasting "melting pot" with "colorful patchwork quilt"); id. at
289 ("Democracy and history always live in a kind of tension with each other. Nations use
history to build a sense of national identity, pitting the demands for stories that build solidarity
against open-ended scholarly inquiry that can trample on cherished illusions.").
3 See Boorstin, supra note 163, at 428 ("Selection is usually a difficult, and always cru-
cial task for the historian. To give form to the chaos of the past is never easy, and sometimes
seems impossible.").
346 See CARR, supra note 158, at 10 ("The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in
a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of
the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate."); DANTO,
supra note 158, at 14 ("Perhaps not everything is part of history as a whole, nor is history as a
whole the widest possible context. A story, as we have said, must leave things out."); Boor-
stin, supra note 163, at 433 ("The legal historian can hope only to give to the data of the past
one of many possible illuminating formulations."); Sandalow, supra note 15, at 1070 ("C[V]e
search out from the past those elements of experience and strains of thought that appear most
relevant to our own time.").
347 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947) (discussing Jefferson's
works on prohibiting governmental establishment of religion).
348 See supra note 153-155 and accompanying text. Karl Llewellyn recognized this over
sixty years ago when he wrote, referring to the correct frame for constitutional decisionmak-
ing, "[tihe base-line ... becomes so much of the past only as is still alive, and the immediate
future comes to bear as well." Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 33; see also Bartlett, supra note
160, at 330-31 ("II"]he question is ... which traditions among this patchwork we will come to
identi' as our 'own."').
See WHrEHEAD, supra note 153, at 237-38, 274.
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their purpose in telling it.350 History is a narrative that seeks to make sense
of the past, and the sense in the telling comes from a description of cause
and effect. But understanding cause and effect in human behavior turns on
one's understanding of what leads people to act. A story told one way will
make sense of history to one audience. Another audience will need to hear
the story in a slightly different fashion for it all to come together. If it were
otherwise, we would not need countless histories of the Civil War, or even
of specific battles, let alone numerous independent tellings of such critical
events as emancipation.
What constitutional law has going for it is that it is perpetually being
351retold by many different people. Constitutional law is the telling of who
we are, and what we value most highly.35 2 It is a story often told by judges,
but it is also a story told by the people, by immigrants who have adopted
this story as their own, by outsiders who seek to tell a story like our own, by
insiders who wish to have the story told one way rather than another.353 In
350 This is a central theme of APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 4. The authors argue that de-
mocratization has led to the fragmentation of history, as groups tell the story of their history
differently. Each group will emphasize different aspects even of a shared story. See id at 11
("Even in a democracy, history always involves power and exclusion, for any history is al-
ways someone's history, told by that someone from a partial point of view."). It is also the
one sense in which Arthur Danto concedes that history can be relativistic. He explains:
[I]mposition of a narrative organization [on history] logically involves us with an in-
expungable subjective factor. There is an element of sheer arbitrariness in it. We
organize events relative to some events which we find significant in a sense not
touched upon here. It is a sense of significance common, however, to all narratives,
and is determined by the topical interests of this human being or that. The relativists
are accordingly right.
DANTO, supra note 158, at 142.
351 This point is emphasized by the "arrival" (albeit self-proclaimed) of critical history
"as a category of intellectual practice relevant to law." Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The
Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (1997). As for the definition of
critical history, Gordon explains:
[I]t is any approach to the past that produces disturbances in the field-that inverts
or scrambles familiar narratives of stasis, recovery or progress; anything that ad-
vances rival perspectives (such of those as [sic] the losers rather than the winners)
for surveying developments, or that posits alternative trajectories that might have
produced a very different present ....
Id. at 1024.
352 See also SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 98, at 4 ("Two centuries after our found-
ing, we are still debating precisely what kind of country the United States is and what it stands
for at the core."); Eisgruber, supra note 308, at 53 ("Constitutionalism is, among other things,
a wa% for a political community to 'talk out' its political identity." (citations omitted)).
53 See Brown, supra note 20, at 205 ("[O]ur traditions are formed by many overlapping
communities. Not infrequently, the traditions of a geographical, ethnic, religious, or political
community will run at cross-purposes with the traditions of the larger communities-state and
national-in which they are nested.").
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this constant retelling, our constitutional history is boiled down, synthe-
sized, and reduced to a common narrative.3 '
It is difficult to tell a shared story, but it also is essential-and inevita-
ble-that we try." We are a nation of immigrants, having come to these
shores in successive waves, each with very different stories. Yet, we have
had to make a nation of ourselves. It is no accident, as Rebecca Brown
points out, that we require naturalized citizens to learn about the Constitu-
tion: "Why should we care if new citizens know the Constitution," Brown
asks. "It does not touch on their immediate concerns or activities as some
other societal prescriptions might."356 The Constitution is essential because
it is the foundation on which we build this shared story. It is the place
where we establish consensus about our most fundamental values.
35 7
Although essential, the telling of an uncontested history is in some
sense also impossible.35 8 We are going to disagree about shared values, and
we are going to tell the story of our history in ways that emphasize the par-
354 See I ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 36 ("Mhe narrative we tell ourselves about our
Constitution's roots is a deeply significant act of collective self-definition; its continual re-
telling plays a critical role in the ongoing construction of national identity."); cf Rakove, su-
pra note 131, at 1038 ("We tirn to history to understand how the present emerged from the
past; to derive lessons that enable us to act responsibly as citizens; to fashion notions of indi-
vidual and communal identity within the modem patriotic, pluralistic, polyglot, and polycul-
tural state.").
355 This is the tension at the bottom of Rogers Smith's Civic Ideals:
And just as it is hard to see why national allegiances should often prevail, given
democratic cultural pluralist views, it is also hard to see how these pluralist positions
can be politically sustainable if national obligations are minimized. If citizens feel
that their most profound commitments go to a racial, ethnic, religious, regional, na-
tional, or voluntary subgroup, then the broader society's leaders may find that their
government lacks adequate popular support to perform some functions effectively.
SMITH, supra note 341, at 480. Shared stories are so essential to nation-building that often
they are just that: stories. It is not uncommon for national histories to include myth as well as
reality. See MCNEILL, supra note 152, at 13-22 (discussing national myths and "mythistory").
36 Brown, supra note 20, at 177.
357 See Nelson, supra note 137, at 1269 ("[E]ven though American society is character-
ized by deep cleavages and conflicting social practices, nearly all Americans accept and par-
ticipate in an abiding social consensus. This consensus binds society together, and if it did not
exist, society itself could not exist.").
358 As Rogers Smith explains:
Almost every state contains many people whose political history, religious or politi-
cal beliefs, ethnicity, language, or other traits give them reason to decide that their
primary political identity and allegiance is to some group other than that defined by
the regime governing the territory in which they reside.... The U.S. has native
tribes that have never accepted the national government's claim of sovereignty,
black and Chicano nationalists, citizens who believe that their religious memberships
outweigh their national allegiance, and many others who at least sometimes do not
feel that they are first and foremost Americans.
SMrrH, supra note 341, at 32.
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ticular values we hold most dear.359  Presently, we fight a battle over
whether the First Amendment permits restrictions on hate speech.36° Each
side of that battle tells a different history of who we are: one history em-
phasizes our tradition of autonomy and claims a preferred position for un-
fettered speech; the other history is communitarian and emphasizes values
of human dignity and equality.361 As caught up as we get in this debate, we
should remember that it is not a new one, nor one that will likely be settled
for all time. At the outset of World War II, a similar debate occurred be-
tween those who believed speech could be curtailed in the service of democ-
racy, and those who felt democracy could tolerate no restriction on
speech.362 As time passed, and as we compared ourselves with the totali-
tarian regimes that were our foes, the values of free speech prevailed. 363 It
was, however, evolving values that settled the controversy, and because
those values continue to evolve under differing sets of circumstances, no
dispute over deep values will remain settled for all time.,
The contestability of history is less unsettling if we can understand that
this contest may represent an essential element of nation-shaping. The very
process of telling the story, of disagreeing about it, of emphasizing one
359 See WOLIN, supra note 156, at 3 ("[The framers] set in motion a form of politics, a
good part of which would be absorbed by contests to settle the meaning of the Constitution by
unsettling some competing meaning.").
360 For a critique of the Left's argument in favor of hate speech restrictions, see Amy
Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84
CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1511-16, 1541-72 (1996) (arguing that leftist censors of speech invariably
do their own causes harm, because hate speech has been used to fight hate speech, and it is
impossible to develop a theory that permits "subversive" uses of such speech but limits "op-
pressive" uses).
361 Compare Nadine Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have to Choose
Between Freedom of Speech and Equality?, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 449, 458-62 (1989)
(arguing that censoring hate speech ignores the free speech tradition of First Amendment ju-
risprudence and could undermine equality goals), with Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2378-79 (1996) (ar-
guing that an absolutist First Amendment response to hate speech actually sanctions racism
and fails to remedy the injuries caused by hate speech).
362 Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561-70 (1951) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the "clear and present danger test" is ineffective against the "well-
organized, nation-wide conspiracy" of communism), with id. at 581-91 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (insisting that the United States cannot accept the totalitarian suppression of speech typi-
cal of the Soviet state). For a historical review of First Amendment doctrinal development in
reaction to totalitarianism, see Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitari-
anism in Post-War Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423,437-47 (1996).
363 See STEVEN H. SHIFfRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
69-72 (1990) (comparing other countries' conception of democracy with the typical American
conception and concluding that "[flrom an American perspective, any system of government
that tells its citizens that they may not dissent 'in any way' from the ideology of the ruling
party is by that fact alone an undemocratic government").
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piece or another to integrate the peoples who tell it, is what the Constitution
is about. Our nation not only has changed over time; it has been called upon
to integrate wave after wave of immigrants who have settled on this land.
Debating our deeper values forms who we are. Looking to history to re-
solve those debates enables us to develop a shared history, one upon which
we can all find some basic agreement. Inevitably our attention will be fo-
cused on areas in which there is disagreement, but this overlooks the vast
areas in which there is some shared understanding of what it means to be an
American and to share an American past. The study of history and the de-
bates over what that history teaches us lead us to claim a shared past, a past
that represents the Constitution of the nation.
C. The Role of Judges
But what about the judges?
The role of judges is one that causes academics unease. For approxi-
mately half a century, academics have worried about the role that judges
play in our democracy, and have struggled over how to reconcile judicial
review and majoritarian government.364 There is ample room for profound
skepticism about whether the "countermajoritarian difficulty" has any basis
whatsoever in the actual operations of American government. 365 Nonethe-
less, to complete a discussion of the role of history in constitutionalism, it is
appropriate to take account of these concerns and to discuss the role of the
historian judge.
Seeing constitutional law as inevitably historical reshapes the role of
judges in a critical fashion. To understand how this is so, it may be profit-
able to return briefly to Lawrence Lessig, the one theorist who seems at-
tracted to the sedimentary understanding of constitutional law, but who
nonetheless tumbles at the end of his theory into the countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty. After explaining at length how judges can remain faithful to the
Constitution by translating not only facts but also changed background un-
derstandings, Lessig confronts the problem of contested background under-
standings.366 What is a judge to do if there is contest over the background
discourse?
364 See Friedman, supra note 192, at 579 (detailing the academic struggle over judicial
review during the last quarter-century); Friedman, supra note 273, at 334-39 (describing aca-
demia's historical obsession with the countermajoritarian difficulty).
365 See Friedman, supra note 192, at 628-53 (challenging the premises of the counterma-
joritarian difficulty); Friedman, supra note 273, at 337-39 (describing scholarly work that
questions the premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty).
366 See Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 8, at 471.
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Despite his cogent understanding that constitutional law is about the
background discourse, Lessig nonetheless stumbles by casting his decision
367rule for judges in terms of democracy. According to Lessig, if the back-
ground understanding has shifted and there is no contest, judges may trans-
late consistent with the now uncontested understanding. If there is contest
in the discourse over background understandings, however, then Lessig ar-
gues that judges must try to remain "agnostic," meaning that "legislatures
receive greater deference within domains of contested discourses." 368 Fur-
ther, "[w]here a discourse is rendered contested, if possible, judgments
within that contested sphere will be shifted to those with the strongest po-
litical pedigree."369 Thus, Lessig's theory is ultimately one framed against a
background discourse itself: the norm of democracy, defined as the work of
actors other than judges.
370
If constitutionalism is the weighting of historically identified, deeper
values over present preferences, judges should worry about history, not de-
mocracy.371 Lessig is far too sanguine about how often (actually, how sel-
367 See id.
368 Id. at 439.
369 Id.
370 Lessig is not the only constitutional scholar who makes this mistake. Michael
McConnell, for example, argues that "[flor most judges, ... the principal constraint on con-
stitutional authority is not text, history, or even precedent, but deference to the decisions of
representative institutions in close cases." Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humil-
ity in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitu-
tion, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1269, 1289 (1997). Thomas Merrill falters over this point as well.
After describing his theory of"conventionalism," which has many affinities with sedimentary
constitutionalism, he states,
conventionalism basically shuts off the courts as an avenue for social change. We
tend to think of activist judges as the great antithesis of democratic governance, and
a judiciary controlled by conventionalist judges would be a very inhospitable place
for judicial activism.... Far better to hire a lobbyist and see if you can get a law en-
acted in Congress.
Merrill, supra note 137, at 522. David Strauss also makes the point that his version of com-
mon law constitutionalism is "at least broadly consistent with the demands of democracy."
Strauss, supra note 122, at 930.
371 To illustrate this point, consider the argument, advanced by many self-professed
originalists, that originalism is the most democratic form of constitutional interpretation. See
supra note 101 (quoting originalist scholars who express the view that constitutional change
should occur through the amendment process, not through judicial decision-making). Yet as
Michael Dorf and Michael J. Klarman have persuasively argued, originalism simply substi-
tutes one countermajoritarian difficulty for another. See Dorf, supra note 202, at 353 (ex-
plaining that originalism merely "empowers judges to override modem majorities in the name
of old majorities"); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 494 & n.16 (1997) ("Text, original intent, and tradition are prob-
lematic sources because of the dead hand problem-that is, a current generation is being gov-
erned by values endorsed in the past."); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as
Spoken, 104 YALE L.J., 1119, 1133 (1995) ("If the Court exercises its leadership effectively,
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dom) the background, structural discourse he describes will be uncontested.
Almost any time there is controversy over the outcome of a constitutional
case, there will be contest about the background discourse. Moreover, Les-
sig's (or anyone else's) version of democracy is itself contestable and con-
tested. For example, is there general agreement that administrative officials,
Congress, -police officers, or municipal personnel directors have a
"strong[er] political pedigree" than Supreme Court Justices?
372
History is also contested, but the proper role of the constitutional inter-
preter is to address this contest over deeper commitments. Democracy as a
metric tells us almost nothing about what judges should do. Judges should
refrain from invalidating other acts of government when they cannot iden-
tify a fundamental, historically based, deeper commitment that justifies
striking down the act of another branch of government. If deeper commit-
ments cannot be identified, judges should not disturb the present-day deci-
sions of other actors whose job it is to make them. Judges are not paid to
defer to what some people imagine to be more democratic or politically ten-
able actors, but to identify deeper commitments. Too much focus on the
former has distracted judges from the latter, more appropriate, task.
Under our sedimentary Constitution, judges inevitably have a central
role in constitutional interpretation. Judicial review, like all of constitu-
tional law, has itself been the subject of sedimentary evolution. As early as
Marbury v. Madison,73 judges claimed the right to interpret the Constitu-
tion and measure the acts of other governmental commands against it. Even
after Marbury, however, this judicial role was contested. Judicial suprem-
acy in interpretation has built up beneath us. As Steven Winter perceptively
argues, today no one seriously questions the practice of judicial review.
374
The expanded role of judges is inevitable; the only serious question con-
cerns how judges perform that role.
To the extent that judges play a privileged role in constitutional inter-
pretation, sedimentary interpretation at the least provides them with a role
they are relatively qualified to play. The role of judges is to examine the
sedimentary history of our country and identify the deeper commitments re-
vealed by that history. The common countermajoritarian complaint about
such a role is that judges act at some remove from the body politic. Histori-
today's countermajoritarian decision may yet receive tomorrow's stamp of popular ap-
proval.").
372 Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 8, at 439.
373 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
374 Winter, Upside/Down View, supra note 137, at 1923-24 (arguing that "judicial review
is itself an institution so firmly established... that its continued existence is utterly unassail-
able").
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ans tell us, however, that history is best told at a remove. Of course, remove
is a question of degree, not of kind, and even judges are not as removed
from politics and political life as we sometimes idealize them to be. In their
role as national historians, however, their remove is both appropriate and
essential. Identifying deeper commitments is a function best performed by
the constitutional actor least caught up in identifying present preferences.
375
If there is to be a struggle between the two, and constitutionalism is pre-
cisely this struggle, then it is the judges who should have precedence in the
telling of our history.
Moreover, as Thomas Merrill has explained, identifying historical
376commitments is much like what we ordinarily expect of judges. The
telling of history is an evidentiary exercise. It requires judges to sift through
competing evidence offered by litigants in support of their views as to what
that history reveals about fundamental commitments. In a compelling arti-
cle, Merrill persuasively argues that judges are uniquely suited to this
task.3 " Referring to his somewhat analogous idea of conventionalism,
Merrill explains:
Conventionalism is essentially the stuff of the law office memorandum. One
collects the most directly applicable precedents, first of the Supreme Court,
then of the lower courts. Then one looks for executive interpretations, or in-
terpretations reflected in subsequent statutes.... [T]he skills required to en-
gage in conventionalist interpretation are generally well within the ken of the
average lawyer and judge.
3 78 "
The very nature of sedimentary interpretation, however, makes clear
that although judges resolve contests between competing stories, they are
hardly the only storytellers. The evidence of historical commitments is not
the creation of judges, but rather the product of all human existence. As the
discussion of sources of interpretation made clear, judges should, and regu-
larly do, consider a wide variety of information. In Washington v. Glucks-
375 Suzanna Sherry offers a view of pragmatic judging with great affinity to sedimentary
interpretation:
Judging-especially in difficult constitutional cases-is not a mechanical exercise,
but a learned and lived craft. The tools of the trade are a thoughtful life lived in
American social and legal culture. A pragmatist finds no formula by which to decide
the difficult questions, but instead internalizes legal precedents, cultural traditions,
moral values and social consequences, creatively synthesizing them into the new
patterns that best suit the question at hand.
She7rr , supra note 218, at 1013.
See Merrill, supra note 137, at 518.
377 See id; cf Nelson, supra note 137, at 1283 (observing that judges are similarly well-
suited to answer historical questions regarding the evolving social consensus on an issue).
378 Merrill, supra note 137, at 521; see also GADAMER, supra note 153, at 324-41 (de-
picting the judge as the ideal historical interpreter).
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berg,379 as in Roe v. Wade,38° the Court considered the judgments of legis-
lative enactments, expert commissions, popular elections and referenda,
evolving practice, and the like. This body of evidence is something to
which we all contribute.
Perhaps more important, because sedimentary development is ongoing,
no actor in our constitutional system has a final say. It is somewhat remark-
able that people seem to miss the fact that the telling of constitutional his-
tory is an ongoing process, one that does not cease with one iteration. The
national narrative is not static, and judges are hardly the only contributors to
the narrative. History tells its own story. To believe otherwise is to miss
the accretions of narrative that have occurred, marked by either rapid
change (such as when the Supreme Court reversed itself in the flag salute
cases)381 or slow evolution. To reiterate an earlier point, the judges that de-
cided these important cases did not conjure it all up themselves. Rather,
they merely reflected changes that already had occurred in the population at
large.382 Thus we are all participants in the telling of this history.
In a sense, constitutional decisions provide a focal point in an ongoing
societal dialogue about the meaning of our deepest commitments.383 Judi-
cial decisions attempt to summarize the nature of these commitments and
are then held up for public scrutiny. By centering the debate, judicial deci-
sions play a vital role in constituting and recording our national commit-
ments. But the political science approach to understanding judicial review
has made clear, at least since Robert Dahl's seminal work, Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,3 4 that
the judiciary is seldom out of step with the dominant opinion of a national
majority.385
379 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
380 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
381 See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Min-
ersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), decided just three years earlier).
382 See Winter, Upside/Down View, supra note 137, at 1920 (stating that "much of what
the [Supreme] Court does necessarily employs mainstream conceptions... [by] exercising
control not against the prevailing majority, but on its behalf").
383 See supra notes 236-45 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court's in-
quiry in constitutional decisions explores historical commitments as well as popular prefer-
ences); see also Friedman, supra note 192, at 653-80 (discussing the process of judicial re-
view as "dialogue" in which the entire country participates in framing constitutional
meaning).
384 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
385 See id. at 285 (concluding that "policy views dominant on the Court are never for long
out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United
States"); see also ROBERT A. DABL, DEMOCRACY AND rrs CRrrIcs 190 (1989) (same);
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME CoURT 224 (1960) (asserting that it is
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The difficult questions revolve around understanding why this is so and
how we can improve the process of constitutional dialogue. Many scholars,
from a variety of disciplines, are presently engaged in resolving these ques-
tions. But, as with other difficult questions of constitutional interpretation,
at least this approach realistically portrays the role of a constitutional judge.
The "countermajoritarian difficulty" overstates the finality of judicial deci-
sions and the exclusivity of the judicial role. Sedimentary interpretation, by
contrast, sees the creation of constitutional law as a gradual societal process,
and asks how judges can best participate in that process.
CONCLUSION
We end where we began. Ours is not the Constitution of 1787. It is a
constantly developing charter layered over throughout all of our constitu-
tional history with new and important understandings. Constitutional
change is both gradual and sudden. The task of the constitutional interpreter
is to study history in order to tell the accumulated story of today's constitu-
tional commitments. This is not an easy task. Resolving contested views
and reconciling deeper commitments with present desires is difficult. It is
the correct task, nonetheless, and one in which we often engage. The point
only is to ensure that we do so more self-consciously. Constitutional inter-
pretation must explain the present in relation to the past.
"hard to find a single historical instance when the Court has stood finm for very long against a
really clear wave of public demand").
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